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INTRODUCTION

In the last weeks of 2001, Argentina experienced a financial collapse
of catastrophic proportions.1 In one day alone, the Argentine peso lost
40% of its value.2 As the peso collapsed, a run on the banks ensued. According to The Economist, throughout the collapse, “income per person
in dollar terms…shrunk from around $7,000 to just $3,500” and “unemployment [rose] to perhaps 25%.”3 This economic chaos meant that by
late 2002, over half the Argentine population was living below the poverty line.4 The crisis soon spread from the economic to the political
sphere. In December 2001, one day of riots left 30 civilians dead and
led to the resignation of President Fernando de la Rua and the collapse
of the government. A “tragicomic spectacle of a succession of five presidents taking office over a mere ten days” followed.5
In response to the crisis, which has been likened to the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States,6 Argentina adopted a number of
measures to stabilize the economy and restore political confidence.
Among these efforts was a significant devaluation of the peso through
the termination of the currency board which had pegged the peso to the
U.S. dollar, the pesification of all financial obligations,7 and the effec1. See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET, THE
IMF AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA 1–2 (2005). For a discussion of the economic background to the collapse, see Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkel & Martin Rapetti, The Argentinean
Debt: History, Default and Restructuring 2–18 (Apr. 2005, revised Aug. 2005) (unpublished
CEDES
working
paper),
available
at
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/
ipd/pub/Frenkel_SDR_Eng.pdf.
2. See Certificate Concerning the State of Necessity in Argentina, Guillermo Nielsen, Secretary of Finance of Argentina, Jan. 2003, ¶ 11 [hereinafter Nielsen Declaration] (on file with authors). Certification was made by the Argentine government to the courts adjudicating the debt
cases and the ICSID cases arising out of the economic crisis.
3. Argentina’s Collapse: A Decline Without Parallel, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2–8, 2002, at 26, 26.
4. Nielsen Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 5; see also Slump Turns Jobless Argentines Into Scavengers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at § 1, at 14. Beginning in late November 2000, massive
strikes swept Argentina. On November 23, 2000, “[m]illions of workers stayed off their jobs in
the largest national strike in years as a union–led protest against government austerity measures
virtually paralyzed the country.” Argentina: Strikes Against Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2000, at A6.
5. BLUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1.
6. See, e.g., A Survey of Capitalism and Democracy: Liberty’s Great Advance, ECONOMIST,
June 28, 2003, at 4, 6 (“Argentina has endured an economic collapse to match the Great Depression of the 1930s….”).
7. See Law No. 25561, Jan. 7, 2002, 29810 B.O. 1, available at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=71477.
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tive freezing of all bank accounts through a series of measures known
collectively as the Corralito.8
Though these measures offered a long-term prospect of restored economic confidence and stability, they also imposed immediate and painful costs on all participants in the Argentine economy, including foreign
investors. While Argentine citizens had little legal recourse, many foreign investors who were harmed by Argentina’s response to the crisis
sought legal protection under the regime of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) which Argentina had entered into during the 1980s and 1990s.9
Such treaties offered investors guarantees including the internationalization of contractual breaches, national treatment, and most-favored nation protections.10 In addition, these treaties often provided investors the
possibility of direct investor-state arbitration before the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).11
For investors harmed by Argentina’s response to the economic crisis,
the possibility of direct arbitration against the Argentine government for
8. See Decree No. 1570, Dec. 3, 2001, 29787 B.O. 1, available at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=70355. For reference to the measures as the Corralito, see, for example, CARINA LOPEZ, STANDARD & POOR’S, THE ARGENTINE
CRISIS: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AFTER THE SOVEREIGN DEFAULT (Apr. 12, 2002),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/europe/francais/Fr_news/Argentine-Chronology-ofEvents_12-04-02.html.
9. For a list of Argentinean BITs, see U.N. Conference on Int’l Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD],
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999, at 26–27, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Dec. 2000)
(prepared by Abraham Negash), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf.
10. For a discussion of protections often found in BITs, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 233–58 (2004); Andrew Guzman, Book Note,
The International Law on Foreign Investment, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 612, 613–14 (1995).
11. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has been created
under the auspices of the World Bank to hear such cases. See Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. For a discussion of ICSID, see The
World Bank Group, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: About ICSID,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). For investors in Latin America, the possibility of direct arbitration against a government represented a significant
change from the Calvo Doctrine, according to which a government’s liability toward foreigners
can be no greater than that owed to nationals. As a result, disputes between foreigners and a host
country could only be decided by the country’s own legal system. For brief explanations of the
Calvo doctrine, see Bilateral Investment Treaties With Argentina, Treaty Doc. 103-2; Armenia,
Treaty Doc. 103-11; Bulgaria, Treaty Doc. 103-3; Ecuador, Treaty Doc. 103-15; Kazakhstan,
Treaty Doc. 103-12; Kyrgyzstan, Treaty Doc. 103-13; Moldova, Treaty Doc. 103-14; and Romania, Treaty Doc. 102-36: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 31–32
(1993) (responses of U.S. Department of State to questions asked by Senator Pell); 1 CARLOS
CALVO, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL TEÓRICO Y PRÁCTICO DE EUROPA Y AMÉRICA 191 (Durand
& Pedone–Lauriel eds., 1st ed. 1868).
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breaches of BITs offered a potentially promising means to recoup losses
suffered during the crisis. Claims framed as a violation of a BIT could
be brought directly against Argentina through ICSID. Only limited
means were available to challenge ICSID awards and such awards were
generally perceived as enforceable in national courts. Not surprisingly,
then, Argentina has become subject to no fewer than forty-three ICSID
arbitrations brought by investors who assert that Argentina’s response to
the crisis harmed investments protected by various BITs.12 Argentina’s
potential liability from these cases alone could be greater than U.S. $8
billion, more than the entire financial reserves of the Argentine government in 2002.13 Some have speculated that the total value of potential
claims against Argentina could reach U.S. $80 billion.14
Argentina’s rhetorical response to this onslaught of cases has been to
criticize the ICSID system and pressure for reforms.15 Argentina’s legal
strategy, in contrast, has been to turn back to the very BITs under which
investors have brought claims and to invoke a long-dormant treaty
clause that appeared perfectly tailored to deal with just such a situation.16 Argentina’s BITs with the United States, Germany, and the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) each contain a nonprecluded measures (NPM) provision that limits the applicability of investor protections under the BIT in exceptional circumstances. These
NPM clauses allow states to take actions otherwise inconsistent with the
treaty when, for example, the actions are necessary for the protection of
essential security, the maintenance of public order, or to respond to a
public health emergency.17 NPM provisions effectively “permit host12. For a listing of concluded and pending cases before ICSID, see The World Bank Group,
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID Cases,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
13. Gabriel Bottini, Counsel, Office of the Attorney Gen., Republic of Arg., Issues of Jurisdiction and Merits Arising from the Argentine Litigation at ICSID, Lecture at the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law Symposium: International Investment and
Transnational Litigation: Challenges of Growing and Expanding Investor State Disputes (Feb. 2,
2007).
14. Wailin Wong, Argentina Treasury Attorney: World Bank Claims Could Reach $80 Billion, DOW JONES INT’L NEWS, Jan. 21. 2005.
15. See Julio Burdman, La proteccion a las inversions extranjeras en Argentina (1989–2005):
Una mirada político–económica, in POLÍTICAS LIBERALES EXITOSAS: SOLUCIONES PENSANDO
EN LA GENTE 139, 149 (Gustavo Lazzari & Martín Simonetta eds., 2005), available at
http://admin.fnst.org/uploads/1198/Politicas_liberales_exitosas.pdf.
16. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, ¶¶ 332-55 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Award.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.–Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103–2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-
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state impairment of covered investment” and, in turn, weaken the BIT
“as an instrument for regulating host-state governments.”18 As long as
the host-state’s actions are taken in pursuit of one of the permissible objectives specified in the NPM clause, acts otherwise prohibited by the
treaty do not constitute breaches of the treaty and states should face no
liability under the BIT. The lawyers in Argentina’s Procuración del Tesoro de la Nación have argued that the economic collapse of 2001–2002
triggered the NPM clauses of many of its BITs and thereby relieved it of
liability.19
The history of NPM provisions reaches back far beyond Argentina’s
BITs concluded in the 1980s and 1990s. NPM clauses were regular
elements of U.S. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties
beginning in the post-WWII era.20 The NPM clause in the U.S.Nicaragua FCN treaty was raised before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1984 Nicaragua case21 and an equivalent clause in the
U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity22 played an important part in the Oil Platforms case.23 NPM clauses migrated from the early FCN treaties to the
international investment regime beginning with the establishment of the
German BIT program in the late 1950s. The first known investment
treaty with an NPM clause was Germany’s first BIT, which was concluded with Pakistan in 1959,24 and NPM clauses can be found in nearly
every subsequent German BIT. Likewise, the first ever U.S. BIT, concluded with Panama in 1982, contained an NPM clause.25 Again, each
subsequent U.S. BIT has contained such a clause. Though BITs have
been the subject of considerable academic inquiry,26 the NPM clauses
Argentina BIT].
18. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11
INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 159, 170 (1993).
19. For one such clause, see, for example, U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17, art. XI.
20. See The Charles H. Sullivan Report on the Standard Provisions of the Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation as They Evolved Through Jan. 1, 1962, at page 302 (on file with
authors). One of the earliest NPM clauses appears in the U.S.-China FCN treaty. Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-P.R.C., art. XXVI, Nov. 4, 1946, 63 Stat. 1299, reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT’L L. (SUPPLEMENT) 27, 47 (1949).
21. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 15 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment (Merits)].
22. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.–Iran, art. XX, Aug. 15,
1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. 3853; 284 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter U.S.–Iran FCN Treaty].
23. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803, 811 (Dec. 12).
24. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Protocol, F.R.G.–Pak., ¶ 2, Nov.
25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 [hereinafter Germany-Pakistan BIT].
25. Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.–Pan., art. X(1),
Oct. 27, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1227.
26. The academic scholarship on BITs can largely be classed into two groups. The first wave
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they often contain surprisingly have gone almost unnoticed. Yet, NPM
provisions are relatively wide-spread in the legal regime governing international investment. They appear regularly in the BITs of states that
play a major role in the international financial system, such as Germany,
India, the Belgian-Luxembourg Union, Canada, and the United States.
They also arise sporadically in particular BIT relationships of numerous
other states. Of the 2000 BITs presently in force, NPM clauses appear in
at least 200 such treaties.
The prevalence of NPM clauses in BITs has significant implications
for the international investment regime more generally. BITs have long
been understood as extremely strong “legalized” instruments of investor
protection, providing far-reaching guarantees for cross-border investment.27 For example, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report affirmed that the “principal purpose of the bilateral investment treaties is to encourage and protect U.S. investment in developing
countries.”28 Yet, the presence of NPM clauses in BITs suggests that
those protections do not apply in exceptional or crisis situations, when
of scholarship examined the development of BITs and their substantive protections. See, e.g.,
RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); KENNETH
J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1992); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 269
RECUEIL DES COURS 251 (1997); Vandevelde, supra note 18. A second wave of scholarship has
examined the diffusion of BITs and the impact of BITs on investment flows. See, e.g., Zachary
Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006); Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their
Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 75 (2005); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jennifer Tobin,
Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of
Bilateral Investment Treaties (Yale Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper
No. 293, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121l; Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries? (May
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=616242; see also Andrew
T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 643 (1998); Jason W. Yackee, Sacrificing Sovereignty: Bilateral Investment Treaties, International Arbitration, and the Quest for Capital (Univ.
of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ., & Org. Working Paper No. C06–15, Oct. 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950567. Only two scholars have even noted
the inclusion of NPM clauses in BITs and their treatment has been cursory. See Jose E. Alvarez,
Political Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The
Hazards of Exon–Florio, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 15, 176 (1989); Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 170.
27. BITs generally rank highly on all three categories of legalization—obligation, precision,
and delegation—suggested by Ken Abbott and his collaborators in the legalization project. For an
explanation of the three categories, see Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54
INT’L ORG. 401 (2000).
28. Investment Treaties with Senegal, Zaire, Morocco, Turkey, Cameroon, Bangladesh,
Egypt, and Grenada, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 100-32, at 2–3 (1988).
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international investments are at most risk. The traditional understanding
of BITs is that host states commit through such treaties not to injure foreign investors or, at least, to bear the costs if they do. NPM clauses perform a risk-allocation function, transferring the costs of harming an investment from host states to investors in exceptional circumstances.
Under BITs that include NPM clauses, the state must compensate investors for harms that breach the treaty in ordinary circumstances, but in
exceptional circumstances, such as the Argentine financial crisis, NPM
clauses transfer those risks to the investor, and the state will not be liable for actions that would ordinarily breach the BIT. In an ever more
globalized world in which the very kinds of exceptional circumstances
covered by NPM clauses—financial crises, terrorist threats, and public
health emergencies—are all too common, NPM clauses fundamentally
limit the legal regime protecting foreign investors.
The interpretation and application of NPM clauses will therefore
prove critical to determining both state freedom to respond to exceptional circumstances and the scope of investment protections accorded
under BITs. Arbitral awards have recently been handed down by ICSID
panels in the first four of the many cases brought against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT as a result of the economic crises. The four
tribunals, however, took diametrically different approaches to the NPM
clause of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. On identical facts, three tribunals
found the NPM clause inapplicable and held Argentina liable for damages to investors in breach of the BIT.29 A fourth tribunal found Argentina’s invocation of the clause justified and held Argentina not liable for
harms to investors caused during the period of necessity created by the
economic crisis.30 In addition, an Annulment Committee under the
ICSID Convention reviewed the first of these awards to hold Argentina
liable and found it to contain “errors and lucans” of law.31 The split de29. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Award, ¶ 391
(Sept.
28,
2007)
[hereinafter
Sempra
Award],
available
at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Sempra_Energy-Award.pdf; Enron Corp. Ponderosa
Asset, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter
Enron Award], available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf; CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 359.
30. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), ¶¶ 226, 266 [hereinafter LG&E Decision on Liability], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/09_LGE_Liability_e.pdf.
31. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb 01/08, Decision
of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment (Sept. 25, 2007), ¶ 136 [hereinafter
CMS Annulment Decision]. Despite the Annulment Committee’s findings of serious errors in the
Award, it observed that it lacked jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention to overturn the Award. Id. ¶ 136.
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cisions and, at times, poor jurisprudence of these tribunals are grounds
for concern about the viability of an investor-state arbitral system without meaningful appellate review,32 but also raise important questions
about the interpretation and application of NPM clauses. How much
freedom do NPM clauses give states to take actions in extraordinary circumstances that would otherwise breach a BIT? Are BITs really as
strong a form of investor protection as they have been understood to be?
In what sorts of situations can such clauses be invoked? What are the
consequences of NPM clauses for states and investors in terms of liability and compensation? Ultimately, should states or investors bear the
risks and costs of actions by states to respond to extraordinary circumstances?
For Argentina, the interpretation and application of the NPM provisions of its BITs has the potential to relieve the state of billions of dollars of liability and greatly ease its on-going economic recovery. More
broadly, the interpretation and application of NPM clauses in a wide
range of BITs will determine the risk allocation between states and investors in times of crisis. While a BIT’s substantive provisions clearly
afford investors strong protections in ordinary situations, the interpretation of NPM clauses will govern whether, in exceptional situations, the
host state or investors will bear the costs of actions deemed necessary to
respond to the crisis. That calculation, in turn, has implications for the
willingness of states to enter into investment protection treaties, the
pricing of cross-border investment, the distribution of investment flows,
the policy options available to states in emergencies, and the policy responses to a range of international crises.
The interpretation and application of NPM clauses also raises more
fundamental questions about the process of treaty interpretation itself.
Ascertaining the meaning of NPM clauses will often depend on how
states understood such clauses and the ways in which they memorialized
those understandings in their treaty commitments. To what degree
should states’ shared understandings of such clauses control their interpretation? Must states document those understandings for them to be relevant in a subsequent arbitration? These issues become all the more
pressing in the context of BITs, which confer direct rights on investors
to arbitration, and in the ICSID forum, in which only one state party to
32. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521,
1617–1625 (2005) (arguing for the establishment of an “Investment Arbitration Appellate Court”
to prevent the proliferation of inconsistent individual decisions).
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the treaty is formally before the tribunal. Unfortunately, the tribunals
that have addressed NPM clauses to date have often failed to engage in
the kind of rigorous treaty interpretation mandated by the Vienna Convention and instead have taken interpretive short-cuts that threaten the
very legitimacy of the investor-state arbitration system.33 Underlying
the NPM analysis in this paper is a call for arbitral tribunals to return to
first principles of treaty interpretation and to give serious consideration
to the text of a treaty and, to the degree permissible under the Vienna
Convention, the intent of states entering into such a treaty.
This Article casts new light on a long-dormant element of the international legal architecture of foreign investment with significant consequences for states, investors, and the international financial system more
generally. In so doing, it offers four theoretical contributions to the existing literature on treaty interpretation, investment regulation, and international arbitration. The Article’s first theoretical contribution is to
question the standard assumption that BITs are solely instruments of investment protection by recognizing that such treaties often incorporate
significant exceptions that preserve state freedom of action in exceptional circumstances. A second theoretical contribution is that the Article begins a heretofore overlooked exploration of the legal mechanisms
through which states control and allocate risks in their bilateral treaty
agreements. A third theoretical contribution relates to the process of
treaty interpretation itself. The Article critiques the approach taken by
all of the ICSID tribunals in the Argentina cases thus far, suggesting
that their one-size-fits-all approach to interpretation does not reflect the
range of meanings states have intended for NPM clauses. A final theoretical contribution is that the Article suggests that the ICSID system
would be strengthened if arbitral tribunals were to import the margin of
appreciation doctrine from the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) to the international investment
context with respect to issues that touch at the core constitutional issues
of the state in question, using the margin as a template for determining
the deference to be accorded to a state’s own invocation of NPM provisions.
From a practical perspective, the Article provides an urgently needed
framework for understanding, interpreting, and applying NPM provisions in BITs. The split ICSID decisions arising from the Argentine cri33. Some of these interpretive shortcuts are identified in the CMS Annulment Decision. See
CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 31, ¶¶ 96–100 (noting, for example, that “it is quite unclear how the Tribunal arrived at its conclusion”).
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sis make this framework ever more timely. The framework presented
here examines the interpretation of key elements of many NPM clauses
and considers the consequences of their invocation for liability and
compensation. Such a framework can help guide states in formulating
policy responses in exceptional circumstances, can assist investors in
identifying and pricing risk in their international investment decisions,
and can aid arbitral tribunals in interpreting and applying NPM clauses
in investment arbitrations.
This Article is the first of a two-part study. In a subsequent article we
explore risk limitation and risk allocation devices in bilateral treaty
agreements more generally. Whereas this Article focuses on the identification, interpretation, and application of NPM provisions in BITs, the
companion article seeks to answer the broader question of when and
why states include risk allocation devices, such as NPM clauses, in their
bilateral instruments and seeks to explain the variance in state usage of
such provisions. Taken collectively, the two articles offer the first detailed exploration of risk allocation in bilateral treaties. Such risk allocation devices may well have their most important consequences in the
circumstances discussed in this paper, namely when NPM clauses shift
the risk of investor harms from host states to investors themselves and
thereby alter the basic relationships of international investment law.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II we will document the
relatively widespread use of NPM clauses in international investment
instruments and suggest that they are a critical, though largely unrecognized, element of the international investment regime. In Part III we will
explore the relationship between NPM clauses and background defenses
in customary international law, such as the state of necessity, and will
argue that NPM clauses provide an additional exception from the substantive protections of a BIT. In Part IV we will examine the elements
of NPM clauses from the practice of various states, identify key components, and consider the relationship between NPM clauses and the larger
treaty in which they are situated. In Part V we will offer a detailed interpretive framework for assessing the applicability of NPM clauses that
will be of use to states, investors, and arbitral tribunals. In Part VI we
will consider the appropriate standards with which to review a state’s
invocation of an NPM clause and argue that the margin of appreciation
doctrine, imported from European human rights law, offers a template
for how arbitral tribunals can undertake such a review. In Part VII we
will examine the consequences of a successful invocation of an NPM
clause for a state’s liability in international law and the duty to pay
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compensation. Part VIII will return briefly to the four recent cases
against Argentina and seeks to explain the contradictory outcomes
based on the tribunals’ very different understandings of the function of
NPM clauses. Part IX will examine the implications of various interpretations of NPM clauses for states, investors, and the international financial system more broadly. A brief conclusion will follow.

II.

THE PREVALENCE OF NPM CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW

NPM clauses appear in a range of international treaties,34 are a relatively frequent element in BITs, and play an important role in the legal
regime of foreign investment more broadly. Though they are far from
ubiquitous, they appear in all or most of the BITs concluded by a number of states of importance to international investment flows, including
the United States, Germany, the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union,
and India.35 In addition, Canada has also included NPM clauses in its
BITs concluded after the mid-1990s, expanding the NPM provisions
over time.36 Collectively, these six states account for more than 200
BITs containing NPM clauses.
34. Many other bi- and multilateral agreements include NPM–type exceptions as well. In addition to the U.S. FCN treaties mentioned above, see supra note 20, such provisions can be found
in the General Agreement on Trade in Services arts. XIV & XIV bis, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183; 33 I.L.M. 1167; the North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts.
2101 & 2102, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts.
XX & XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated version) art. 30, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2002/c_325/c_32520021224en00010184.pdf. Regional and global human rights treaties recognize limitations on otherwise protected rights for
specified, overarching public policy reasons, such as security and public order, as well. See, e.g.,
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 8(2),
9(2), 10(2), 11(2), & 15, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
ECHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 4(1), 12(3), 13, 19(3), 21,
22(2), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
35. Instead of citing all of these countries’ BITs with NPM clauses, we refer the reader to the
BIT country lists available at United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, CountrySpecific Lists of BITs, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1 (last
visited Nov. 9, 2007), and to the discussion of these BITs’ NPM clauses below in Section IV; see
infra notes 67–129 and accompanying text.
36. Canada’s early BITs did not include an NPM clause. Beginning in 1995, Canada’s BITs
contained a limited NPM clause with permissible objectives including the protection of human,
plant, and animal life. See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.–Pan., art.
XVII(3),
Sept.
12,
1996,
C.T.S.
1998/35,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_panama.pdf. Canada’s most recent BITs,
based on its 2004 Model BIT, include a much more expansive NPM clause with permissible objectives including the integrity of the financial system, the protection of essential security inter-
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In addition to these states, which include NPM clauses as a matter of
course, several other countries include such provisions in their investment treaties on an occasional basis. NPM clauses can, for example, be
found in Peru’s BITs with Bolivia,37 Paraguay,38 and Venezuela;39 Turkey’s BITs with Qatar40 and Morocco;41 China’s BITs with Singapore,42
New Zealand,43 and Sri Lanka;44 Switzerland’s BITs with Chad,45 Mauritius,46 Uganda,47 and the United Arab Emirates,48 and Uganda’s BITs
with Sudan49 and Eritrea.50 This list, though far from exhaustive, is inests, and actions required under the U.N. Charter. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru,
art.
10, Nov. 14,
2006, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_peru.pdf.
37. Convenio sobre Promoción y Protección de Inversiones, Peru-Bol., art. 3(5), July 30,
1993
[hereinafter
Peru–Bolivia
BIT],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/peru_bolivia.pdf.
38. Convenio sobre Promoción y Protección Reciproca de Inversiones, Peru–Para., art. 11(1),
Feb.
1,
1994,
[hereinafter
Peru-Paraguay
BIT],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/peru_paraguay_esp.pdf.
39. Convenio sobre Promoción y Protección de Inversiones, Peru-Venez., art. 3(5), Jan. 12,
1996
[hereinafter
Peru-Venezuela
BIT],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/peru_venezuela_esp.pdf.
40. Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.–
Qatar, art. VII(1), Dec. 25, 2001 [hereinafter Qatar-Turkey BIT], available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/turkey_qatar.pdf.
41. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Morocco, art. 2(2),
Apr.
8,
1997,
[hereinafter
Turkey-Morocco
BIT]
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/turkey_morocco.pdf.
42. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Sing., art. 11, Nov.
21, 1985, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_singapor.pdf.
43. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, N.Z.-P.R.C., art. 11, Nov. 22,
1988, 1787 U.N.T.S. 186 (1994) [hereinafter New Zealand-China BIT].
44. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Sri Lanka,
art. 11, Mar. 13, 1986 [hereinafter Sri Lanka-China BIT], available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_srilanka.pdf.
45. Accord de commerce, de protection des investissements et de coopération technique,
Switz.–Chad, art. 2,(3), Feb. 21, 1967 [hereinafter Swiss-Chad BIT], available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_chad_fr.pdf.
46. Accord concernant la promotion et la protection réciproque des investissements, Switz.Mauritius,
art.
11(3),
Nov.
26,
1998,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_mauritius_fr.pdf.
47. Convention concernant l’encouragement et la protection réciproque des investissements,
Switz.-Uganda,
Aug.
23,
1971,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_uganda_fr.pdf.
48. Accord concernant la promotion et la protection réciproque des investissements, Switz.U.A.E.,
art.
11(4),
Nov.
3,
1998,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_uae_fr.pdf.
49. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Uganda-Sudan,
art. 14, available http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/sudan_uganda.pdf.
50. Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Eri.-Uganda, art. 14, June 30, 2001,
avalable at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uganda_eritrea.pdf.
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dicative of the relatively wide-spread use of NPM clauses and their considerable importance to the international investment legal regime.
Even in BITs involving Germany or the United States, which already
include NPM clauses as a matter of course, these two state’s negotiating
partners have often pushed for clarification or expansion of a particular
treaty’s NPM provisions. For example, in the negotiation of the U.S.Panama BIT, Panama sought to ensure the applicability of the public
order exception, and this standard exception was memorialized in a protocol to the treaty.51 In the U.S.-Bangladesh BIT negotiations, Bangladesh sought assurances that the NPM clause would apply to employment questions, and this understanding was again reflected in the
protocol.52 When negotiating the U.S.-Russia BIT, Russian officials insisted that the self-judging nature of the NPM clause be explicitly
stated, and this too was eventually reflected in the protocol to the treaty.53 NPM clauses thus are of significance not just to those states that
regularly include the provisions, but also to a range of other countries,
including lesser-developed states.

III. DISTINGUISHING TREATY-BASED NPM CLAUSES FROM
BACKGROUND DEFENSES IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law provides states some legal flexibility in
exceptional situations. As the International Law Commission (ILC)
51. Panama Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Pan, Oct. 27, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9914, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43582.pdf (“Because of political
sensitivities in Panama, the Panamanians insisted on a separate exchange of notes (information
copy attached) clarifying the standard provision in the BIT which exempts measures taken for
public order. In these notes the Parties agree that this exception is not meant to authorize either
Party to take such measures in the territory of the other.”).
52. See Letter of Submittal from Michael Armacost to President Reagan, May 9, 1986, annexed to Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.Bangl., Mar. 12, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-23. (1986) (“The treaty's employment provision
is also limited by paragraph 3 of the Protocol. That paragraph: (1) subjects the right of nationals
or companies to employ personnel to Article X, which provides that Parties are not precluded
from, inter alia, adopting measures necessary to maintain public order, protecting essential security interests, or prescribing special formalities for the establishment of investments.”).
53. See Bilateral Investment Treaties With the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, The Peoples’ Republic of the Congo, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia, and Two Protocols
to Treaties with Finland and Ireland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102nd
Cong., 66, 73 (1992) [hereinafter August 4, 1992 Hearings] (statement of Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
Associate Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law, San Diego, California).
For a clause to be “self-judging” means that the issue of whether its invocation is legally justified
is removed from substantive review by other treaty parties as well as third-party dispute settlers;
this independent evaluation by the invoking state remains, however, subject to a good faith review. See infra notes 295–313 and accompanying text.
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Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles) explain, there are secondary rules of customary
international law that govern “the circumstances in which the wrongfulness of conduct under international law may be precluded.”54 Among
these circumstances are force majeure, distress, and necessity, each of
which can relieve a state of international liability. Force majeure can be
invoked where “acts of God” outside a state’s control intervene and
make it impossible for the state to fulfill its legal obligations.55 A situation of distress occurs when a state has no other way to safeguard a life
in its care than to violate a legal rule.56 Necessity arises when a state has
no other means available to safeguard an essential interest and can do so
without harming an essential interest of another state.57 Each of these
defenses precludes the wrongfulness of a state’s actions and thereby allows the state to avoid liability.
NPM provisions are distinct from these customary defenses in terms
of their substantive content, their theoretical justification, their source of
legal authority, and their scope of applicability. First, the substantive
content of NPM clauses differs from the relatively narrow background
customary defenses. Background customary defenses provide an excuse
for breaching a treaty that may absolve a state of international legal responsibility after the fact. In contrast, NPM clauses remove certain
types of state actions from the substantive protections of a particular
treaty instrument. Generally speaking, NPM clauses will remove a
broader array of state actions from the protections of a particular treaty
than would be excused after the fact by the relatively narrow group of
ex-post defenses provided for in customary law.
Second, NPM provisions are distinct from customary defenses in
terms of their theoretical justification. NPM clauses exempt from the
protections of a treaty certain types of state actions because the actions
are sufficiently related to particular state objectives. In contrast, customary defenses remove liability after the fact due to overriding systemic policy goals, such as the fact that an actor should not have to
jeopardize his own life or a state imperil its essential interests.

54. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, art. 24(14), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft
Articles],
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
55. See id. art. 23.
56. See id. art. 24; see also Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 82 I.L.R. 499, 554–55 (1990).
57. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 25.
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Third, NPM clauses have a different source of legal authority than do
customary defenses. Customary defenses are secondary legal rules that
relive liability after the fact. In contrast, NPM clauses are primary legal
rules that limit the applicability of an international treaty with respect to
certain types of conduct.58 NPM clauses arise from treaty law, rather
than from customary international law. Whereas background customary
defenses are a general part of customary international law arising
through state practice and opinio juris, NPM provisions are included in
the specific language of a treaty. As such, they constitute the lex specialis rules in force between the two states parties to the particular BIT
in which the NPM clause is included.59
Finally, NPM clauses are distinct from customary defenses in terms
of their scope of applicability. Whereas customary defenses are applicable to all states as a general part of customary law, NPM clauses apply
only to the states parties to a particular treaty that includes such a
clause. NPM clauses arise where the two states parties to a BIT decide
to include such a clause in their treaty relationship to further their particular interests. As a result, whereas customary defenses are uniform,
NPM clauses exhibit considerable variation across states and treaty instruments. While there is only one version of force majeure in customary international law, there are a theoretically unlimited number of potential NPM clause formulations based on the particular bargains
negotiated by the states parties to a BIT. Similarly, states can impart distinct meanings to the terms used in their NPM clauses. Even identical
formulations of NPM clauses may not have uniform meaning because
states may have understood those terms differently in drafting their treaties. As a result, the interpretation of NPM clauses requires a particularized analysis of the specific clause in question. We offer a framework
for such analysis in Part IV.
In recent cases against Argentina, some tribunals have conflated
NPM clauses and customary law defenses, perhaps due to their common
use of the term “necessary.”60 The defense of necessity in customary
58. See CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 31, ¶¶ 132–33.
59. Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles confirms the principle of lex specialis derogat legi
generali, stating that “[t]hese articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for
the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.” ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 55; see also Gabriel Bottini, Protection of Essential Interests in the BIT
Era, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2008) (noting that BIT clauses are part of the primary
treaty rules intended to define what constitutes a breach in the first place, whereas necessity is a
secondary rule that may justify a violation once this has already occurred).
60. See CMS Award, supra note 16.
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law provides that a state may not be liable for actions taken to “safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.”61 In
terms of the legal rules of treaty interpretation, equating NPM clauses
with this background defense of necessity is inappropriate for two reasons: it fails to recognize the distinction between treaty and custom and,
it violates the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation. Treaty
and custom are separate sources of international law and consist of independent legal regimes. As the ICJ found in the Nicaragua case, “even
if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the States in question are bound by these
rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence.”62
Reducing the NPM clause to merely a treaty-based reiteration of the
necessity defense would violate the principle of effectiveness in treaty
interpretation (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). As the WTO Appellate
body found in the U.S.-Gasoline case,
[o]ne of the corollaries of the “general rule of interpretation” in
the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning
and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to
adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.63
61. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 25 (“Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the
State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a
whole.”). See also Gabcikovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (Sept. 25).
62. Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 95. In Nicaragua, the United States argued that background customary law had been “subsumed” or “supervened” by the existence of
certain identical or nearly identical rules in the U.N. Charter. Id. The Court rejected this argument. For a further treatment by the Court of the relationship of custom and treaty, see North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38 (Feb. 20). See also II
INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 232 (A.D. McNair ed., 1956), as cited in ILC Draft Articles,
supra note 54, art 25(4) (describing Anglo-Portuguese Dispute of 1832, in which the British government was advised that Portugal could invoke necessity to excuse the appropriation of British
property).
63. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline]. Similarly, Professor Fitzmaurice observes, “texts are to be presumed to have been intended to have a definite force and effect, and should be interpreted so as to
have such force and effect rather than so as not to have it and so as to have the fullest value and
effect consistent with their wording.” G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 1, 8 (1951); see also H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effective-
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Reading an NPM clause as equivalent to the customary defense of necessity would render the clause pointless because the customary defense
of necessity would be available to states irrespective of the inclusion of
the NPM clause in a BIT. In order to satisfy the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation, NPM clauses must be read as distinct rules
that states create in their treaty relationships, independent of the necessity defense in customary international law.
Given that the necessity defense and NPM clauses are distinct rules
of law, a further question arises as to the relationship between the two:
namely, does an NPM clause replace the customary defense of necessity
or do the two continue to coexist? The ICJ answered that question in the
Nicaragua case, observing: “customary international law continues to
exist and to apply, separately from international treaty law, even where
the two categories of law have an identical content.”64 The only circumstances in which the treaty rule could be said to replace the customary
rule are if the treaty specifically indicates that it replaces customary
rules or if the treaty provision and the customary rule are in such direct
conflict that they cannot co-exist.65 Where the treaty or the particular
treaty provision in question is silent as to its relationship with customary
law, as is the case with most BIT NPM provisions, then both the customary and treaty rule should be treated as applicable separately and independently. Hence, as a result of including NPM clauses in their BITs,
states have created a treaty-based legal mechanism to allocate risks between themselves and investors in extraordinary circumstances that is
distinct from, but coexistent with, defenses otherwise available in customary international law.

IV. THE ANATOMY OF NPM CLAUSES
Just as substantive protections found in BITs vary, so do NPM provisions. Even in the BITs of those states that include NPM exceptions as a
general practice, the specific wording used varies. These differences
arise in part from adjustments of the standard phrases used in model
treaties over time and in part from modifications agreed upon in the
ness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 48 (1949).
64. Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 96.
65. In those cases, the interpretive rules of lex specialis and lex posterior dictate that the more
specific and generally later treaty provision would trump the preexisting customary rule. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. For an early discussion, see Hans Aufricht, Supersession of Treaties in International Law, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 655, 656–57 (1952).
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course of negotiations of particular BITs with a treaty partner. The specific formulations of NPM clauses define the extent of state freedom of
action in exceptional circumstances and the protections available to investors in times of crisis. This section offers an overview of the principal types of NPM provisions by way of several representative examples,
taken primarily from the practice of those states that most frequently include NPMs in their agreements.

A.

Placement of NPM Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties

Many bilateral investment agreements consist of three types of documents: the main treaty text, a protocol attached thereto, and an exchange of notes accompanying them. In such a tripartite agreement
structure, the main treaty text contains the principal substantive and
procedural provisions, including guarantees of national and mostfavored nation treatment, rules on expropriations and dispute settlement,
as well as standard treaty provisions on, inter alia, entry into force, duration, and termination. Where a protocol is attached to the treaty, it often addresses primarily interpretive issues that are intended to clarify the
meaning and scope of the treaty’s core substantive provisions.66 Any
remaining issues not yet sufficiently addressed in these two documents
may then be taken up in exchanges of notes between the negotiating
governments.67
NPM provisions may appear either in the main treaty text or in the attached protocol, though they are more often found in the body of the
treaty itself.68 The United States, India, and the Belgium-Luxembourg
66. The choice to address such interpretive matters in the protocol rather than in the main
treaty text will often be guided by considerations of linguistic economy and does not as such give
rise to any normative hierarchy; rather, a protocol, considered as a document in its own right and
regardless of its specific title, is an international treaty just like the BIT to which it relates. Cf.
Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 2.
67. See, e.g., U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17 (including Exchange of Notes).
68. We have found no instance in which a general NPM clause is included in the exchange of
notes. A related issue that is at times discussed in such notes, however, concerns the modalities
for the entry of employees related to an investment. For example, the letters of exchange between
Ceylon and Germany upon the conclusion of their 1963 BIT confirm the mutual understanding
that “Ceylon will grant the necessary permits to German nationals who in connection with investments by German nationals or companies desire to enter and stay in Ceylon and to carry on an
activity there as employees, except as reasons of public order end security, of public health or
morality may warrant otherwise.” Treaty for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Letters of Exchange, F.R.G.-Ceylon, Nov. 8, 1963 (emphasis added), available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_ceylon.pdf. The practice of addressing
limitations on the entry of personnel in the letters of exchange appears to have been pursued until
the 1970s. Subsequent agreements in the 1980s and 1990s then switched to including a provision
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Economic Union69 follow this practice, as do most other states whose
BITs contain such exceptions on an occasional basis. Germany generally places the NPM clause in the protocol rather than in the main treaty
text.70 This placement of the NPM provision in the protocol to the treaty
is a structural-textual decision which does not affect or diminish the legal value of the NPM clause.71 Once a state expresses its consent to be
bound by the protocol’s provisions—usually through ratification together with the main treaty text, as in the German practice—then NPM
provisions included therein have the same legal effect as those found in
the main treaty text.

B.

Examples of NPM Clauses

A few examples of NPM clauses offer an overview of their form and
structure. Germany has included NPM clauses in its BIT protocols since
the first such instrument was signed with Pakistan in 1959; that treaty’s
NPM provision provided that “[m]easures taken for reasons of public
security and order, public health or morality shall not be deemed as discrimination within the meaning of Article 2.”72 The “nondiscrimination” standard to which the exception refers was replaced in
subsequent German BITs with the now predominant national and mostfavored-nation treatment standards which stipulate that investments by
nationals of the other contracting party shall not be submitted to treatin the protocol according to which “sympathetic consideration” was to be accorded to the issuing
of entry permits for employees related to an admitted investment. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, Somal.-F.R.G., pmbl., Nov.
27, 1981, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_somalia.pdf.
69. Upon ending the customs union with Germany following World War I, Luxembourg entered into an economic union with Belgium on July 2, 1921 (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic
Union), which took effect on May 1, 1922. For documentation, see 18 CHRONIQUE DE POLITIQUE
ÉTRANGÈRE 367–464 (July 1965).
70. In only three of 95 German BITs with NPM provisions reviewed has the NPM exception
been moved to the main treaty body. See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Thail.-F.R.G., art. 3(2), June 24, 2002, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_thailand.pdf; Tratado sobre Fomento y
Reciproca Protección de Inversiones de Capital, F.R.G.-El Sal., art. 3(7), Dec. 11, 1997 [hereinafter
Germany-El
Salvador
BIT],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_elsalvador_sp_gr/pdf; Agreement for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-India, art. 12, July 10, 1995, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_india.pdf.
71. In German practice, the protocol’s chapeau generally states that the additional “arrangements” agreed upon therein “shall be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty.” Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Capital Investment, F.R.G.-Haiti, Aug. 14, 1973,
1016 U.N.T.S. 83, 88 (1976); see also supra note 66.
72. Germany-Pakistan BIT, supra note 24, Protocol, ¶ 2.
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ment “less favorable than” that accorded to investments of one’s own
nationals, or nationals of third countries, respectively. The standard
NPM provision in German BITs was adjusted accordingly, and now
reads: “Measures that have to be taken for reasons of public security and
order, public health or morality shall not be deemed ‘treatment less favorable’ within the meaning of Article 3 [the article containing the national and most favored nation treatment standards].”73
U.S. BITs likewise have included NPM clauses since the beginning
of the BIT program in the early 1980s. For example, the first U.S. BIT,
signed with Panama in 1982, stipulates in Art. X that “[t]his treaty shall
not preclude the application by either Party of any and all measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace and security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”74 Over the years, the United States has developed new versions of
its Model BIT and, hence, variations in the form and structure of the
NPM clause have appeared over time. One of the more notable modifications occurred in the late 1990s when the United States clarified its
position on the self-judging nature of the NPM clauses in its BITs by
including explicit language to that effect, now stating that a party was
not precluded from taking any measures that “it considers necessary”
for the protection of the stated permissible objectives.75 In the most recent 2004 U.S. Model BIT, the NPM provision reads: “Nothing in this
Treaty shall be construed: …to preclude a Party from applying measures
that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interest.”76
The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU)77 also habitually includes NPM clauses in its BITs. The typical NPM clause is
73. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol,
P.R.C.–F.R.G., ¶ 4(a), Dec. 1, 2003 [hereinafter China-Germany BIT], available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_germany.pdf.
74. Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Pan., art. X(1),
Oct. 27, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1227 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama BIT]. A subsequent protocol amending
the dispute settlement provisions of the original treaty was signed on June 1, 2000. See Protocol
Amending Investment Treaty with Panama, U.S.-Pan., June 1, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 10646, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_panama_2000.pdf.
75. For greater in–depth discussion of NPM clauses in U.S. BITs, see infra notes 316–33 and
accompanying text.
76. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT art. 18(2) [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf
77. See supra note 69.
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phrased as an exception to the subsequently defined treatment standard:
“Except for measures required to maintain public order, such investments shall enjoy continuous protection and security, i.e. excluding any
unjustified or discriminatory measure which could hinder, either in law
or in practice, the management, maintenance, use, possession or liquidation thereof.”78 While the overwhelming number of BLEU BITs only
give “public order” as a permissible NPM objective, a few add “security
of the state” as another.79
India’s BITs also include NPM provisions as a matter of course. The
country’s BIT program began in the mid-1990s as India’s international
trade expanded, with all currently operative BITs concluded in or after
1994. The first BIT, signed with the United Kingdom, contains the
NPM clause in Article 11: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this Article nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from
taking action for the protection of its essential security interests or in
circumstances of extreme emergency in accordance with its laws normally and reasonably applied on a non-discriminatory basis.”80 A few
Indian NPM clauses also reserve the right of each contracting party to
take measures necessary “for the prevention of diseases and pests in
animals or plants.”81
Finally, while Canada’s first half-a-dozen BITs signed between 1989
and 1991 did not contain any NPM clauses, in the mid-1990s Canada
began to include NPM clauses and has, since 1994,82 incorporated in78. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Uganda-Belg.Lux., art. 3(2), Feb. 1, 2005 [hereinafter Uganda-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT], available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uganda_belgium.pdf.
79. See Accord concernant l'encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements,
Belg.-Lux.-Uzb., art. 3(2), Feb. 17, 1998 [hereinafter Uzbekistan-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT]
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_uzbekistan_fr.pdf (“Sous réserve des
mesures destinées à maintenir l'ordre public et à garantir la sûreté de l'Etat, ces investissements
jouiront d'une sécurité et d'une protection constantes, excluant toute mesure injustifiée ou discriminatoire qui pourrait entraver, en droit ou en fait, la gestion, l'entretien, l'utilisation, la jouissance ou la liquidation desdits investissements.”); see also Accord concernant l'encouragement et
la protection réciproques des investissements, Belg.-Lux.-Mex., art. 3(2), Aug. 27, 1998 [hereinafter
Belgium-Luxembourg-Mexico
BIT],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_mexico_fr.pdf.
80. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-India, art. 11(2), Mar.
14, 1994, 1995 India T.S. No. 27 [hereinafter U.K.-India BIT], available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_india.pdf.
81. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-Neth., art.
12, Nov. 6, 1995, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/investment_india_netherlands.pdf.
82. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Ukr., art. 17, Oct. 24,
1994, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_ukraine.pdf.

2008]

INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES

329

creasingly detailed catalogues of permissible objectives in all of its investment protection agreements.83 In revising its BITs, Canada took particular guidance from the investment provisions of Chapter 11 of the
North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).84 In the most recent
2004 Canadian Model BIT, the NPM exceptions are addressed in Art.
10.85 Permissible objectives include measures necessary “(a) to protect
human, animal or plant life or health; (b) to ensure compliance with
laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement; or (c) for the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources.”86 Also included are measures necessary to
preserve “integrity and stability of a Party’s financial system,”87 measures related to national and international security concerns,88 and measures “adopted by a Party in conformity with a decision” of the WTO.89

C.

Form and Structure of NPM Clauses

Despite textual variation, NPM clauses share several structural elements. First, NPM clauses require a link between the measures adopted
by the host state that might breach the treaty and the permissible objectives stated in the provision (the “nexus” requirement). Second, they define the breadth, or “scope,” of the NPM clause’s application vis-à-vis
the other treaty provisions. Third, they list the “permissible objectives”
in the pursuit of which measures deviating from other substantive treaty
provisions are not precluded by the BIT. Collectively, these terms determine whether states or investors will bear the costs of state action in
exceptional circumstances.

83. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Annex I, Can.-Uru., Oct. 9,
1997, 1999 Can. T.S. No. 31 [hereinafter Canada-Uruguay BIT] (including four and one half pages of text detailing exceptions).
84. See Andrew Newcombe, Canada’s New Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement, CAN. COUNCIL ON INT’L L. (Fall 2004), available at http://www.ccilccdi.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=89&Itemid=76.
85. Canadian 2004 Model Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPA)
art. 10 [hereinafter Canadian 2004 Model FIPA], available at http://www.dfait–maeci.gc.ca/tna–
nac/documents/2004–FIPA–model–en.pdf.
86. Id. art. 10(1).
87. Id. art. 10(2)(c).
88. Id. art. 10(4). This provision is taken almost verbatim from Article 2102 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 605, 699–700 [hereinafter NAFTA].
89. Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(7).
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The Nexus Requirement

NPM clauses require that measures taken by a state that would otherwise deviate from a treaty obligation must be sufficiently related to
the permissible objectives specified in the clause (discussed infra). We
term this relationship the “nexus requirement.” The wording of this
“nexus” requirement differs both across and within the practice of individual states, reflecting different allocations of risk between the states
parties to a BIT and investors. One widely used phrasing requires that
measures undertaken have to be “necessary” for the attainment of one of
the permissible objectives.90 Other NPM clauses define the nexus requirement by specifying that the state’s measures must be “required,”91
“directed to,”92 or “have to be taken”93 in furtherance of a permissible
objective. Yet other BITs use less demanding formulations, stating that
“measures taken for reasons of”94 or “in the interest of”95 one of the
listed objectives are permissible.96 The nexus requirement is of consid-

90. The NPM clauses in the U.S. BITs consistently use the “necessary for” wording. See, e.g.,
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-Mozam.,
art. XIV, Dec. 1, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106–31 (2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Mozambique BIT];
U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74, art. X(1). Similarly, the French language versions of the BITs
by the Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union refer to “mesures nécessaires” (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Accord concernant l'encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements,
Belg.-Lux.-Est.,
art.
3(2),
Jan.
24,
1996,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_estonia_fr.pdf. For an example in
Spanish speaking of “medidas necesarias,” see Acuerdo para la Promocion y Proteccion Reciprocas de Inversiones, Arg.-Morocco, art. 3(3), June 13, 1996 [hereinafter Argentina-Morocco BIT],
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_morocco_sp.pdf.
91. The English language versions of the Belgium-Luxembourg BITs use “required.” See,
e.g., Belgium-Luxembourg BIT with Uganda, supra note 78; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Kaz.-Belg.-Lux., art. 3(3), Apr. 16, 1998, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/kazak_belgo_lux.pdf.
92. See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, N.Z.-P.R.C., art.
11, Nov. 22, 1988, 1787 U.N.T.S. 186 (1994). Some Belgium-Luxembourg BITs use the phrase
“destinées à.” See, e.g., Belgium-Luxembourg-Mexico BIT, supra note 79, art. 3(2).
93. This is a common phrase in Germany’s NPM clauses. See Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, F.R.G.-Burundi, ¶ 3(a), Sept.
10, 1984, 1517 U.N.T.S. 288 (1988).
94. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Capital Investment, Protocol, F.R.G.-Haiti, ¶ 2(a), Aug. 14, 1973, 1016 U.N.T.S. 84 (1976); Swiss-Chad BIT,
supra note 45.
95. See Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., Protocol, ¶ 2(c), June 13, 1989, 1707 U.N.T.S. 194 (1993) [hereinafter Germany-Russia BIT].
96. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Kaz.India,
art.
12(2),
Dec.
9,
1996,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/kazakh_india.pdf.
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erable importance in the interpretation of NPM provisions for it governs
how closely related state action must be to the objective pursued.

2.

Scope

NPM clauses can either be drafted so as to apply to an entire BIT or
can be written in a more limited form so that they apply only to a subset
of the treaty’s substantive provisions. The U.S., Indian, and Canadian
NPM clauses, for example, are of “comprehensive scope” and apply to
the treaty as a whole. The NPM clauses in U.S. BITs provide that
“[t]his Treaty shall not preclude”97 the application of the subsequently
specified measures. As a result, the successful invocation of the NPM
clause precludes the existence of a violation with respect to any and all
substantive treaty provisions. This approach is even more explicit in the
Indian and Canadian BITs, which note that “nothing in this Agreement”98 shall preclude the host state from taking measures in pursuit of
the stated permissible objectives.99 Like certain types of general exceptions found in multilateral treaties,100 NPM clauses of comprehensive
scope establish exceptions to all treaty provisions.101
By contrast, “limited scope” NPM clauses apply only to specified
provisions. In this sense, the German and BLEU NPM clauses are of
“limited scope.” The protocols to German BITs, for example, provide
that measures undertaken in pursuit of one of the permissible objectives
shall not be considered “treatment less favourable”102 in the context of
the national and most favored nation (MFN) treatment standards. The
clause only applies to this particular standard and not to other treaty
provisions, such as those on dispute settlement. In BLEU BITs, the
NPM clause prefaces the pledge of “continuous protection and security”
for foreign investments and the scope of the NPM clause is thus limited
97. See, e.g., U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74 (emphasis added); U.S.-Mozambique BIT, supra note 90 (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., U.S.-India BIT, supra note 80, art. 11(2); Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra
note 85, art. 10 (emphasis added).
99. For other examples of BITs with a comprehensive NPM clause, see, for example, QatarTurkey BIT, supra note 40, art. VII(1) (“This Agreement shall not preclude…”); Peru-Venezuela
BIT, supra note 39, art. 3(5) (“Nada de lo acordado en el presente Convenio impedirá...”); PeruParaguay BIT, supra note 38, art. 11(1) (“El presente Convenio no impedirá…”).
100. See, e.g., Conference on Trade & Dev., National Treatment, at 44, UNCTAD Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11(Vol. IV) (1999) (noting that general exceptions in international investment
agreements “apply to all provisions in the agreement, not only to national treatment”).
101. For an identical interpretation of similar language in the context of GATT art. XX, see
United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 63.
102. See, e.g., China-Germany BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, ¶ 4(a).
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to allow only for what would otherwise be violations of the “continuous
protection and security” guarantee.103

3.

Permissible Objectives

NPM clauses seek to protect state freedom of action in certain domains of public policy from the restrictions or limitations that would
otherwise be imposed by obligations created by a BIT. To achieve this
end, NPM clauses specify the policy domains in which state action shall
remain permissible even in the face of otherwise countervailing investment protection standards under the BIT. The following sections highlight the permissible objectives that occur with the greatest frequency.

a.

Security

The security objective allows the state to act in the protection of its
own security interests. There is some variation in the specific wording
of the security objective. German BITs use the term “public security,”104
whereas Indian and U.S. BITs employ the phrase “essential security interests.”105 Notably, and somewhat contrary to expectations, the formulation “national security”106 is rarely used; equally rare are such cognates as “internal or external national security”107 and “security of the
state.”108 Indian NPM clauses furthermore authorize non-precluded
measures in “circumstances of extreme emergency,” which would include both security and other emergencies of particular gravity.109

b.

International Peace and Security

From the inception of the U.S. BIT program, U.S. NPM clauses have
included the “fulfillment of…obligations with respect to the mainte103. See, e.g., Uganda-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT, supra note 78, art. 3(2). A similar example
of the limited scope NPM clause can be found in the Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 41, art.
2(2) (“Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment and subject to the strictly
necessary measures to maintain the public order provide full protection and security for investments of investors of the other Contracting Party.”).
104. See, e.g., China-Germany BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, ¶ 4(a).
105. See, e.g., U.K.-India BIT, supra note 80, art. 12(2); U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74,
art. X(1); see also Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(4)(a)–(b).
106. See Peru-Paraguay BIT, supra note 38, art. 11(1) (referring to “la seguridad nacional”).
107. See Peru-Venezuela BIT, supra note 39, art. 3(5); Peru-Bolivia BIT, supra note 37, art.
3(5) (speaking of “seguridad nacional interna y externa”).
108. See Belgium-Luxembourg-Mexico BIT, supra note 79, art 3(2) (including “la sûreté de
l'Etat” as a permissible objective); Uzbekistan-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT, supra note 79, art. 3(2)
(including “la sûreté de l'Etat” as a permissible objective).
109. See, e.g., U.K.-India BIT, supra note 80, art. 11(2).
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nance or restoration of international peace and security”110 among permissible objectives. Similar phrasing can also be found in the 2004 Canadian Model BIT111 as well as in the BIT between Turkey and Qatar.112

c.

Public Order

The “public order” objective is part of almost all NPM clauses in the
BITs concluded by Germany113 and BLEU,114 and also appears in
agreements entered into by the United States,115 India,116 Peru,117 Argentina,118 and Turkey.119 The term is rarely defined and may have divergent meanings within domestic legal orders. In domestic law, particularly of civil law states, public order often appears under its domestic
linguistic labels “ordre public,” “orden público,” or “öffentliche Ordnung.” Some BITs expand the already potentially broad concept of public order by including a separate reference to “law” as a permissible objective. For example, the BIT between China and BLEU adds defense of
the state law to maintenance of public order as permissible objectives.120
Likewise, the agreement between the Russian Federation and Germany
provides that “[m]easures undertaken in the interests of law and order”
shall not be regarded as discriminatory measures in the context of the
treatment of investments.121

110. See, e.g., U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74, art. X(1).
111. See Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(4)(c).
112. Qatar-Turkey BIT, supra note 40, art. VII(1).
113. See, e.g., Germany-El Salvador BIT, supra note 70, art. 3(7).
114. See, e.g., Belgium-Luxembourg-Mexico BIT, supra note 79, art. 3(2).
115. See, e.g., U.S.-Argentine BIT, supra note 17, art. XI.
116. See, e.g., Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Port.India,
art.
12,
¶
2,
July
28,
2000,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/portugal_india_por.pdf.
117. See, e.g., Peru-Venezuela BIT, supra note 39, art. 3(5); Peru-Paraguay BIT, supra note
38, art. 11, ¶ 1; Peru-Bolivia BIT, supra note 37, art. 3(5).
118. See, e.g., Acuerdo para la Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de las Inversiones, Mex.Arg.,
art.
2(5)(b),
Nov.
13,
1996,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/mexico_argentina_sp.pdf; Argentina-Morocco
BIT, supra note 89, art. 3(3).
119. See Qatar-Turkey BIT, supra note 40, art. VII(1); Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 41,
art. 2(2).
120. See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Belg.-Lux.P.R.C., art. 3(2), June 4, 1984, 1938 U.N.T.S. 334 [hereinafter BLEU-China BIT].
121. See Germany-Russia BIT, supra note 95, Protocol, ¶ 2(c). The treaty continues to be in
force between Germany and the Russian Federation, the USSR’s principal successor state.
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Public Health

The permissible objective of public health is included in all of Germany’s NPM clauses122 and also appears in several BITs concluded by
China. Related exceptions found in Canadian BITs allow measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”123 NPM clauses in BITs by India124 and China125 sometimes include the “prevention
of diseases and pests in animals and plants.”

e.

Public Morality

Public morality, like public health, is a consistent element in Germany’s NPM clauses.126 It also appears in several BITs concluded by
the United States127 and Peru,128 as well as in at least one Turkish agreement.129

f.

Other Permissible Objectives

Some permissible objectives appear on a less frequent basis and/or
are limited to particular national drafting practices. Indian BITs routinely include an “extreme emergency” term.130 The Chinese BIT with
Sri Lanka affirms, inter alia, the “right of either Contracting Party to
apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind or take any other action
which is directed to the protection of its national interests.”131 This is an
extremely broad formulation—allowing potentially unlimited deviation
from the BIT—and appears in no other known NPM provision. Several
Canadian NPM clauses cover the adoption of measures “relating to the
122. See China-Germany BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, ¶ 4(a).
123. See, e.g., Canada-Uruguay BIT, supra note 83, Annex I § III 2(b); Canadian 2004 Model
FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(1)(a).
124. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Czech Rep.-India,
art.
12,
Oct.
11,
1996
[hereinafter
Czech-India
BIT],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech_india.pdf.
125. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Sing., art. 11, Nov.
21, 1985, 1443 U.N.T.S. 293.
126. See China-Germany BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, ¶ 4(a).
127. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Egypt, art. X(1), Mar. 11, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-24 (1986); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Cameroon, art. X(1), Feb.
26, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-22 (1986); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Sen., art. X(1), Dec. 6, 1983, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-15
(1986).
128. See Peruvian BITs, supra notes 37–39.
129. See Qatar-Turkey BIT, supra note 40, art. VII(1).
130. See, e.g., Czech-India BIT, supra note 124, art. 12.
131. See Sri Lanka-China BIT, supra note 44, art. 11.
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conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption,”132 as well as “reasonable measures for prudential reasons” aimed at, inter alia, “ensuring the integrity
and stability of a Contracting Party’s financial system.”133

132. Canada-Uruguay BIT, supra note 83, Annex I § III 2(c); see also Canadian 2004 Model
FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(1)(c).
133. Canada-Uruguay BIT, supra note 83, Annex I § III (3)(c); see also Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(2)(c). This Canadian formulation with respect to protecting state
finances was first included in the 2004 Model BIT and may be a response to the Argentine financial crisis and the current ICSID arbitrations addressing the question of whether a financial crisis
gives rise to either the national security or public order objectives of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. The
Canadian language clarifies beyond any doubt that response to such a financial crisis would be
permissible under the BIT.

 “measures necessary for”
 “necessary measures”
 “taking action for the
protection of”

 “required to”
 “necessary to”

measures ...

 “that have to be taken
for”
 “taken for reasons of”
 “necessary for”

measures ...

 “necessary for”

measures

Nexus

 prevention of diseases and pests in animals or plants
 public order

Rarely/occasionally included:

 essential security interests
 circumstances of extreme emergency

Consistently/frequently included:

 security of the state
 public or national interest or security

Rarely/occasionally included:

 public order

Consistently/frequently included:

 interest of law and order and security
 internal and external security

Rarely/occasionally included:

 public security
 public order
 public health
 public morality

Consistently/frequently included:

 public morals

Rarely/occasionally included:

 essential security interests
 international peace and security
 public order

Consistently/frequently included:

Permissible Objectives

“[N]othing in this
Agreement precludes ...”

Comprehensive:

NPM clause provides
exception to treatment
standard of “continuous
protection and security”

Limited:

NPM measures shall not
be deemed “treatment
less favorable” for
purposes of national and
MFN treatment standards

Limited:

“This Treaty shall not
preclude ...”

Comprehensive:

Scope

No explicit
indication one way
or the other

No explicit
indication one way
or the other, but
presumptively not
self-judging

No explicit
indication one way
or the other, but
presumptively not
self-judging

Mostly ambiguous or
implicitly selfjudging; more recently turn toward
explicitly selfjudging language

Deference
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BLEU

Germany

U.S.

Country
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TABLE 1: KEY PROVISIONS IN NPM CLAUSES OF PRINCIPAL USERS
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THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF NPM PROVISIONS
The Interpretive Approach

Despite the prevalence of NPM clauses in BITs, they were not a focus of investor-state arbitration until the Argentine financial collapse of
2001-2002. Yet, more than forty cases are now pending in ICSID in
which these clauses are likely to prove decisive. The four ICSID cases
recently decided against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT highlight the interpretive challenges presented by NPM clauses. The tribunals were presented with identical facts and the NPM clause contained
in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, according to which “[t]his treaty shall not
preclude the application by either Party of any and all measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace and security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”134 Moreover, in each case Argentina advanced the same argument—that the actions taken in response to the crisis were necessary to
protect essential security interests and maintain public order—and presented very similar expert testimony. Yet, the tribunals reached opposite
conclusions, based on different interpretations of the treaty’s NPM
terms.135 More specifically, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals
found that the NPM clause was inapplicable, while the LG&E Tribunal
found the clause to apply and relieve Argentina of liability during the
period of applicability.
Even setting aside the conflicting awards in these cases, the reasoning
of the tribunals is deeply problematic from an interpretive perspective.
At times, each tribunal appears to conflate customary international law
and the treaty-based defense of the non-precluded measures provisions.
None of the tribunals offer a coherent analysis of the “necessary for”
nexus, nor do they fully define the contours of the permissible objectives of “essential security” and “public order.” The tribunals fail to recognize or fully grapple with the variety of formulations of NPM clauses
and the potential meanings of their terms. In essence, the tribunals take
interpretive shortcuts that push toward uniform interpretation of treaty
terms, but fail to do justice to the interpretive rules of the Vienna Con134. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17, art. XI..
135. See CMS Award, supra note 16; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30. It is important to recognize that none of these past decisions is controlling in the interpretation of an
NPM clause in a future case. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 30, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993.
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vention, much less the intents of the states party to the treaty. A coherent framework for the analysis of NPM clauses is, therefore, urgently
needed to help states, investors, and arbitrators engage in the often difficult work of treaty interpretation and thereby determine the risk allocation states have chosen to incorporate into their BITs. This part of the
Article provides such an interpretative framework.
The tribunals’ interpretations of the NPM clause in the U.S.Argentina BIT also raise a deeper question about the process of treaty
interpretation itself. As will be discussed in more detail below, there is
strong evidence that both the United States and Argentina intended their
BIT’s NPM clause to be self-judging and subject only to a good faith
review. Yet, the states failed to expressly manifest that intent in the text
of the treaty. In interpreting such treaties, a tribunal must decide what
weight to give extrinsic evidence of state intent. The difficulty of ascertaining state intent is exacerbated in the context of an ICSID arbitration,
in which investors bring a case directly, as only one of the two state parties to the BIT is formally before the tribunal, and the other state cannot
necessarily be called upon to provide its interpretation or documentary
evidence thereof. To accept such extrinsic evidence of intent may well
deny investors the legitimate expectation of rights that appear—based
on the text of the treaty—to be conferred under it, and may result in a
range of potentially contradictory interpretations of similar or identical
language in different BITs. Yet, failure to give effect to states’ wellestablished intents can violate the legitimate expectations of states party
to the treaty and can undermine the legitimacy of the investor-state arbitration system itself.
The interpretation of any treaty instrument must be guided by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,136
widely regarded as part of customary international law. Yet even these
two articles often result in an unsatisfactory compromise between strict
textual interpretation, as in Article 31, and the recognition of extrinsic
sources of intent and meaning, as in Article 32.137 The tribunals in the
four Argentina cases essentially failed to grapple with this issue. While
a satisfactory resolution of the use of external evidence and the balancing of competing interests in the interpretation of an NPM clause may

136. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, arts. 31, 32.
137. See generally Alexander P. Fachiri, Interpretation of Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 745
(1929); Philip Marshall Brown, The Interpretation of Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (1929)
(both focusing on the use of preliminary materials in the interpretation of multilateral treaties).
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be difficult, the Vienna Convention requires, and the dictates of legitimacy demand, that tribunals fully engage in that process.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention instructs interpreters to look to
the “ordinary meaning” of the text, in light of its “context” and the
treaty’s “object and purpose.”138 A term’s context and the treaty’s object
and purpose can, at times, assist in establishing an ordinary meaning,
but “context” is defined narrowly under the Vienna Convention—
limited to the rest of the treaty and the documents concluded with it—
and the “object and purpose” of a treaty may be contested. Hence, the
Vienna Convention clearly prioritizes a textual approach to interpretation. While an “ordinary meaning” interpretation may be possible in
some circumstances, many of the terms found in NPM clauses lack
clear, ordinary meanings. What is, for example, the ordinary meaning of
“public morality”? Does it carry the same meaning in a BIT between
Germany and Pakistan as in a BIT between Germany and Switzerland?
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention further recognizes that states may
assign special meanings to treaty terms if those special meanings are
clearly established.139 Often, however, states fail to “clearly establish”
special meanings, precisely because their understandings of terms do
not seem to them “special” in the context of Article 31(4) of the Vienna
Convention. In these situations, the interpretive methods of Article 31
may prove inadequate and a tribunal, operating under the framework of
the Vienna Convention, must decide what weight to accord to external
sources.
Where an Article 31 analysis results in ambiguity in a treaty’s terms,
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows recourse to external sources
to aid in the interpretive process. Although the Convention does not directly look to the intent of the parties, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention clearly allows for recourse to circumstances of the adoption of a
treaty, which may in turn be indicative of state intent. Article 32 looks
to the travaux préparatoires to the treaty and the “circumstances of its
conclusion.”140 Yet, the use of such external sources also opens the real
possibility of divergent interpretations of similar or even identical treaty
terms. For example, based on the travaux and the circumstances surrounding a treaty’s conclusion, the term “public order” may have one
meaning in a treaty between two civil law states and a very different
meaning in a treaty between two common law states. Some may find
138. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 31.
139. Id. art. 31(4).
140. Id. art. 32.
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this range of valid interpretations of similar terms troubling,141 but it is
both appropriate and necessary given that a goal of treaty interpretation
is, even within the framework of the Vienna Convention, to give effect
to the intent of the parties which entered into the treaty instrument.142
While there is an understandable attractiveness to assigning uniform
meanings to similar or identical terms across various treaties,143 overlooking the nuances of state intent, and skipping past external sources of
interpretation, even the Vienna Convention recognizes that treaty interpretation is a far more nuanced process that may, at times, lead to divergent interpretations and may take into account circumstances external to
the text of the treaty.144 Such an interpretive process is, admittedly,
more difficult than merely accepting the interpretation of a prior tribunal
or a particular asserted “ordinary meaning.” Yet, if the legitimacy of the
investor-state arbitration system is to be preserved, the meanings of
terms must be fully explored and the intent of state parties must be recognized, at least to the extent permitted by the Vienna Convention.145 If
the potentially competing expectations of states and investors are to be
accommodated, ICSID tribunals must do the hard work of serious treaty
interpretation.
The framework for the interpretation of NPM clauses we present here
offers a foundation for such a nuanced interpretive process. It takes as
its starting point the Vienna Convention’s focus on the actual text of the
agreement, but also recognizes the need—particularly in the context of
bilateral treaties—to give effect to the intent of the parties where ordinary meanings prove illusive or ambiguous.146 Even within the textual
141. For a detailed discussion of the tension between diversity and uniformity in the interpretation of international obligations, see Philip C. Jessup, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of
Nations, 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1964).
142. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 63 (Dec. 19) (de Castro, J., dissenting) (“It is a well–established principle that the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the true will of the parties. The terms used in a declaration of intention must be regarded as
the means…to be used in order to reach a conclusion as to the intention of the authors of the declaration.”).
143. See Quincy Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 94,
103–104 (1929) (noting the danger of “misunderstandings that would result” from non–uniform
interpretations). Some of the ICSID tribunals in the cases against Argentina have fallen victim to
this seduction, particularly with respect to the interpretation of the “necessary for” clause in the
US-Argentina BIT as equivalent to the customary law defense of necessity. See Enron Award,
supra note 29, ¶ 309.
144. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, arts. 31, 32.
145. For a discussion of the need for strongly documented jurisprudence to preserve the legitimacy of international dispute resolution, see Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence Helfer, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273 (1997).
146. See, e.g., Maltass v. Maltass, 1 Robb. Ecc. 67, 76 (1844) (U.K.) (“[I]n constru-
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formalism of the Vienna Convention, interpretive space is afforded to
recognize that ordinary meanings may differ between treaties; to look to
special meanings established by the parties; to account for a term’s context and the treaty’s object and purpose; and to consider preparatory
works and the circumstances of a treaty’s conclusion where the text itself is ambiguous. The framework we offer, while based in the rules of
the Vienna Convention, also recognizes the convention’s shortcomings,
notably the restrictions on recognizing the intent of the parties and the
difficulty of giving effect to both the expectations of states parties and
those of investors. It offers a process for the interpretation of NPM
clauses, poses the questions that must be asked in construing the meaning of the text and the intent that lies behind that text, and suggests
some of the possible meanings key NPM terms may carry in the practice
of states that most commonly use NPM clauses.147

B.

Interpreting Key Terms in NPM Clauses: Meanings and
Ambiguities

Given that different interpretations of NPM terms may be appropriate
in particular treaties and that distinct meanings may be implied from
states’ own practices and the bargains underlying specific BITs, the interpretative analysis offered here does not seek to provide a single interpretation of any BIT language. Rather, it undertakes the requisite processes of treaty interpretation needed to explore the potential range of
meanings of NPM terms, suggesting particular usages of terms in the
practice of three states that most commonly use NPM clauses—United
States, Germany and India—and offering a framework of interpretation
reflective of both the legal requirements of the Vienna Convention and
the potential risk allocations intended by states. The framework offered
ing…treaties, we ought to look at all the historical circumstances attending them, in order to ascertain what was the true intention of the contracting parties, and to give the widest scope to the
language of the treaties in order to embrace within it all the objects intended to be included.”) (on
file with author); see also Hersch Lauterpacht, Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the
Interpretation of Treaties, 48 HARV. L. REV. 549, 563–64 (1935).
147. This approach explicitly recognizes that:
A treaty is not concluded in vacuo.… As a result of past developments, certain circumstances came into existence which the parties desired in some manner to regulate or
alter and to accomplish this end they chose to enter into a treaty. The treaty, in short,
stands, therefore, as a related part of the general setting in which the parties acted, and
that setting must be taken into account if the purpose which the treaty was intended to
serve is to be fully comprehended and effectuated.
Comment to Article 19, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. OF INT’L L.
(SUPPLEMENT) 666, 953 (1935).
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here may be of particular use to arbitrators as a guide for considering
the potential meanings states may have assigned various treaty terms,
but it puts the onus back on the tribunal itself to find an interpretation
appropriate to each specific clause and individual treaty bargain.

1.

The Nexus Requirement

The nexus requirement of NPM clauses requires a link between the
actions taken by a state that would otherwise violate the treaty and the
permissible objectives provided for in the NPM clause. The variety of
linguistic formulations of the nexus requirement raises the first interpretive challenge. The most common formulation, particularly evident in
U.S. practice, requires that the actions taken by the state are “necessary
for” the ends permitted in the NPM clause.148 Differences in word structure and phrasing are not uncommon. The BIT between China and New
Zealand uses the phrasing “directed to,”149 which suggests that actions
are permissible as long as they are intended by the government to further a legitimate end. Perhaps the most lenient nexus standard is found
in the BIT between India and Croatia, which merely uses the word “for”
to establish the necessary nexus.150 Such a formulation would, at least in
its ordinary meaning, suggest a relatively thin nexus, under which
measures would appear to be permissible as long as they merely further
a permissible objective.
BITs for which the official language is not English obviously use different phrases and constructions to establish the nexus requirement than
the common English versions noted above. Translations may not convey
the exact meaning intended by the contracting parties. For example, the
BIT between Bolivia and Peru provides: “nada le impedirá adoptar las
medidas exigidas por razones de seguridad nacional interna y ex-

148. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Bahr., art. 14, Sept. 29, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106–125 (2000) [hereinafter U.S.Bahrain BIT] (“This Treaty shall not preclude a Party from applying measures which it considers
necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”).
149. The text provides that the treaty “shall not in any way limit the right of either Contracting Party to apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind or take any other action directed to the
protection of its essential security interests.” New Zealand-China BIT, supra note 43, art. 11.
150. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, India-Croat., art.
12(2),
May
4,
2001,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/croatia_india.pdf (“Nothing in this agreement
precludes the host Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of its essential security
interests.”) (emphasis added).
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terna.”151 This provision uses the phrase “exigidas por,” perhaps best
translated as “required by” or “demanded by” to establish the nexus requirement. Whether this phrase creates a measurably different standard
than the more common “necessary for” remains an open question and
will require an arbitrator to consider the text of the treaty and, perhaps,
the intent of the parties entering into the treaty.
Even with respect to the most common English language formulation
of the nexus requirement—that the acts taken be “necessary for” the
specified ends—at least four distinct interpretations of the identical language can be identified in state practice and international jurisprudence.
Each of these potential interpretations could well be considered an “ordinary meaning” of the term “necessary for” under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and different states may have intended each of these
meanings in particular BITs. Moreover, each potential interpretation results in a different set of circumstances in which an NPM clause transfers the risks and costs of state action in exceptional circumstances from
states to investors. Several ICSID tribunals in the cases against Argentina have been quick to latch on to the first of these alternatives, which
equates NPM clauses with the customary law defense of necessity,
without any consideration of the well-established competing interpretations.
The equation of the term “necessary for” with the requirements of the
customary international law defense of necessity, chosen by three of the
four Argentina tribunals,152 sets the highest nexus requirement. While
the customary defense of necessity is separate and distinct from NPM
clauses, the similar language used in the customary necessity defense
has led some tribunals to use it as a point of comparison.153 As framed
by the International Law Commission (ILC), the customary defense of
necessity is available in the limited circumstances in which the action
taken is “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril” and that action “does not seriously
impair an essential interest” of another state.154 The ICJ confirmed this
most restrictive reading of necessity in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, finding that the defense was inapplicable because other means
were available to Hungary to remedy the situation.155 According to the
151. Peru-Bolivia BIT, supra note 37, art. 3(5).
152. See CMS Award, supra note 16; Enron Award, supra note 29.
153. See CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶¶ 353–78.
154. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 25.
155. See Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 40, 42. The Court noted “that, even
supposing, as Hungary maintained, that the construction and operation of the dam would have
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Commentaries to the Draft Articles, “[t]he plea [of necessity] is excluded if there are other (otherwise lawful) means available, even if they
may be more costly or less convenient.”156 An act is thus only necessary
for the purposes of the necessity defense in customary law if it is the
only means to secure an essential state interest. Reading the nexus element of an NPM clause as equivalent to the customary necessity defense would result in a narrow application of the clause and would not
meaningfully enhance state freedom of action in exceptional circumstances beyond that already available in customary law. As a consequence, the risks and costs of exceptional state actions would largely
rest with states themselves.157 There is, however, good reason to doubt
the appropriateness of the analogy to the necessity defense in the interpretation of “necessary for” in most BITs. If states merely intended the
NPM clause to refer to the necessity defense in customary law, the
NPM clause would not have been necessary in the first place as the customary defense of necessity would have been available to the state parties in any event.158
A second interpretation of the “necessary for” language is found in
the ICJ’s application of a similar term contained in U.S. FCN treaties. In
Nicaragua,159 for example, the ICJ noted that to satisfy the “necessary
for” term of the U.S.-Nicaragua FCN Treaty, “the measures taken must
not merely be such as tend to protect the essential security interests of
the party taking them, but must be ‘necessary’ for that purpose.”160 Applying a restrictive standard, the Court concluded: “the mining of Nicaraguan Ports…cannot possibly be justified as ‘necessary’ to protect the
essential security interests of the United States.”161 In 2003, the ICJ excreated serious risks, Hungary had means available to it, other than the suspension and abandonment of the works, of responding to that situation. It could for example have proceeded regularly
to discharge gravel into the river downstream of the dam.” Id. at 42.
156. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 25, ¶ 15.
157. For a treatment of an NPM clause in this way, see CMS Award, supra note 16.
158. If such an incorporation of the strict necessity standard had indeed been desired, one
could at least have expected that states would have indicated such an intent, for example, with an
affirmative statement that the agreement shall be without prejudice to available defenses under
customary law. Note in this context the inconsistent reasoning of the Enron Tribunal which requires an explicit textual reference for a clause to be accepted as self–judging, but deems it appropriate to infer the incorporation of the necessity nexus requirement without such a reference.
See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 334 et seq.
159. The U.S.-Nicaragua FCN Treaty provides that “the present treaty shall not preclude the
application of measures [by the state] necessary to protect its essential security interests.” Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Nicar., art. XXI, Jan. 21, 1956, T.I.A.S. No.
4024, 9 U.S.T. 449 (1958).
160. Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 141.
161. Id.
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amined a similar clause in the U.S.-Iran FCN treaty.162 In that case, the
acts taken by the United States involved the use of force in potential
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As a result, the ICJ again
applied a restrictive interpretation, importing into the definition of necessity the requirements of self-defense in international law.163 The
Court included the necessity and proportionality requirements of the law
of self-defense in the interpretation of the “necessary” term.164 Yet, the
ICJ recognized that the term “necessary for” in the FCN treaty was distinct from the necessity defense in customary law. Given the special
context of the use of force in both the Nicaragua and Oil Platforms
cases, the ICJ’s narrow construction of “necessary for”165 may not be
applicable outside these special circumstances. An interpretation of
“necessary for” based on the requirements of self-defense would again
leave states very little freedom of action beyond that already available
under customary international law and would largely make states themselves carry the costs of actions taken in exceptional circumstances.
In stark contrast to the narrow interpretation of “necessary for” in the
customary defense of necessity and the ICJ’s reading of FCN treaties,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has taken a much
broader approach to the interpretation of the term “necessary.” The
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR) permits restrictions of a number of rights and freedoms166 to
the extent “necessary in a democratic society” and if the actions are
taken, inter alia, “in the interests of national security…or public safety,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, [and] for the protection of health
or morals….”167 In the 1976 case of Handyside v. U.K., the ECtHR inquired into the meaning of the nexus requirement and asked whether
“the protection of morals in a democratic society necessitated the various measures taken”168 by the state. The ECtHR compared the term
162. U.S.–Iran FCN Treaty, supra note 22, art XX(1)(d).
163. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 183 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil
Platforms Judgment] (“In the present case, the question whether the measures taken were “necessary” overlaps with the question of their validity as acts of self–defence.”).
164. Id. at 183, 196-97.
165. The Court found that it is a “requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly in self–defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no
room for any ‘measure of discretion.’” Id. at 196.
166. ECHR, supra note 34, art. 8 (the right to respect for privacy and family life); art. 9 (freedom of thought conscience and religion); art. 10 (freedom of expression); art. 11 (freedom of assembly and association); Protocol, art. 1 (protection of property).
167. Id. art. 10(2).
168. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 21 (¶ 47) (1976) [hereinafter
Handyside].
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“necessary” with other nexus terms used elsewhere in the Convention,
noting:
[W]hilst the adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article
10 para. 2, is not synonymous with “indispensable” (cf., in Articles 2 para. 2…and 6 para. 1, the words “absolutely necessary”
and “strictly necessary” and, in Article 15 para. 1, the phrase “to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”),
neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”,
“ordinary” (cf. Article 4 para. 3), “useful” (cf. the French text of
the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1), “reasonable”
(cf. Articles 5 para. 3 and 6 para. 1) or “desirable.”169
Situating “necessary” between indispensable and useful, the ECtHR
concluded that “it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion
of ‘necessity’ in this context.”170 Leaving national governments with a
margin of appreciation to determine which measures are necessary to
achieve the objectives authorized by the Convention,171 the ECtHR will
only examine whether the national determination falls within the internationally defined boundaries of that margin. The margin of appreciation is, of course, an interpretive process more than a particular standard. The breadth of the margin of appreciation varies based on the
particular provision of the Convention being applied. Yet, in nearly all
cases, the margin rests on an interpretation of the term “necessary” that
is noticeably broader than that given to the same term in the context of
the customary defense of necessity or the ICJ’s interpretation of particular FCN treaties.
A fourth potential interpretation of “necessary for” effectively splits
the difference between the necessity defense in customary international
law and the approach employed by the ECtHR. This fourth approach
might be called a “least restrictive alternative” test and stems both from
U.S. constitutional practice and jurisprudence under the GATT and
WTO. In U.S. practice, the state is allowed to take an action that burdens citizens’ rights if it furthers an essential state interest, but only if it
is the least restrictive alternative available to achieve a particular
goal.172 As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, “where state action im169. Id. at 22 (¶ 48).
170. Id.
171. For a brief discussion of the margin of appreciation doctrine, see infra notes 288, 289,
and 292, as well as the accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ( “[E]ven though the governmen-
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pinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties
[it] must…be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative.”173
A variant of the least restrictive alternative approach to the “necessary for” formulation also has been employed by GATT and WTO panels. In the Thailand Cigarettes case, Thailand banned foreign produced
cigarettes but allowed the sale of domestic produced cigarettes, justifying the measure based on Article XX (b) of GATT on the grounds that
such restrictions were “necessary to protect human...health.”174 The
GATT panel in that case disagreed, finding that
the import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered
to be “necessary” in terms of Article XX (b) only if there were
no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or
less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives.175
In other words, Thailand’s actions could only be justified if they were
the least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate policy objective.
In this case, a ban on all foreign cigarettes was not the least restrictive
means available and was deemed a breach of GATT obligations.
Though this “least-restrictive-means” test is somewhat similar to the
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation approach, it will often be narrower
when applied, since the margin of appreciation does not require the
measure chosen by the state to be the least restrictive available as long
as it falls within the court-determined margin.176
tal purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.”).
173. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973). Petitioners may show
that a measure fails the least restrictive alternative test if they can prove that other “less drastic”
“methods of satisfying the State's interest” are available. Id. In the context of non–precluded
measures provisions, interpretation of the “necessary for” provision as a least restrictive alternative test would mean that a state action could fall under the NPM clause unless claimants can
identify a less restrictive alternative than the one chosen by the government that would have
achieved the same permissible objectives. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-6 to 16-8 (1978).
174. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(b), Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; GATT, Annex, art. XXI. GATT 1947 is incorporated into
GATT 1994. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 1(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (incorporating all provisions from GATT 1947 into GATT 1994).
175. Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
¶ 75, WT/DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990).
176. See generally DAVID M. BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1995).
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NPM provisions, even if they employ the common “necessary for”
formulation, rarely provide conclusive interpretive guidance as to which
of these or other possible interpretations should be given to their nexus
term. Though some have suggested that the interpretation of the ICJ in
the Nicaragua and Oil Platforms cases should be controlling,177 those
decisions are only binding on the parties to those disputes. Further, it
only reflects the ICJ’s interpretation of the U.S.-Nicaragua and U.S.Iran FCN treaties in the special context of the use of force and of selfdefense. As such, the determination of the appropriate nexus standard in
any particular NPM provision will require first instance analysis by the
tribunal interpreting that treaty. Given the range of potential meanings
of even the standard “necessary for” phrase, a textual analysis will often
leave considerable ambiguities. Thus, interpretation may require resorting to the supplementary means of interpretation provided for in Article
32 of the Vienna Convention.178 What is not permissible in this process
is interpreting the absence of specific interpretive guidance in the BIT
as an authoritative indication that the nexus requirement was intended to
merely mirror the strict necessity defense standard under customary
law.179 This might be a convenient option and attractive shortcut, but
such an approach disregards the fact that the absence of interpretive
guidance does not privilege a reading based on available customary law
and fails to engage in the serious interpretation of competing and
equally valid interpretations from other areas of international law.
The interpretation of “necessary” is likely to have considerable consequences for the allocation of risks and costs between states and investors. A narrow reading of “necessary” in an NPM clause will limit a
state’s freedom of action and cause the state to bear the costs of many
actions that would otherwise violate the BIT. In contrast, a broader
reading of “necessary” will transfer more of the risks of state action in
exceptional circumstances to investors. The critical question that a third
party dispute resolution mechanism will need to consider is whether
evidence, either from the BIT itself or from the travaux provides guidance as to which of the potential interpretations of “necessary for” the
parties may have intended. Absent such guidance—even in extrinsic
sources—the least restrictive alternative approach developed by the

177. See CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 339 (stating the claimant’s view of the treaty’s emergency clauses).
178. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 32.
179. See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 334.
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GATT and WTO panels offers perhaps the best middle ground for balancing the legitimate expectations of both states and investors.

2.

Permissible Objectives

A second set of terms contained in NPM provisions specifies the
permissible ends towards which state action must be directed if the
NPM clause is to preclude a violation of the treaty. While some permissible objectives may have ordinary meanings that can be determined
from the text, others are less clear and may again present interpretive
ambiguities that require recourse to background materials and the
broader context of the bargain behind the treaty. Again, the interpretation of permissible objectives in NPM clauses will determine the types
of measures states may take in exceptional circumstances without incurring liability and, ultimately, the allocation of risk between states and
investors in exceptional circumstances.

a.

Essential Security Interests

The terms “essential security interests” or “security interests” appear
in a wide range of NPM clauses as one of the permissible objectives.180
Other treaties use slightly different formulations, including “public security”181 and “considerations of…security.”182 Whatever formulation is
employed in the particular treaty, the key interpretative question is how
a state’s “essential security” or “security” is defined. Does it encompass
merely situations of armed attack against the state or should it be construed more broadly to encompass preemptive action? Must the threat
even be military, or can “essential security” be threatened by economic
or public health crises?

180. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 18 (using the standard language found in
most earlier U.S. BITs: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed…to preclude a Party from applying measures…for the…protection of its own essential security interests.”). Most Indian BITs
use a similar formulation. The BIT between India and Egypt, for example, provides: “Nothing in
this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of its
essential[] security interests.” Treaty for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Egypt–India, art. 11(2), Apr. 9, 1997 [hereinafter Egypt-India BIT], available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt_india.pdf.
181. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Protocol,
F.R.G.-Bangl.,
¶
2(a),
May
6,
1981,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_bangladesh.pdf.
182. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Belg.-Lux.-Cameroon,
art.
4(2),
Mar.
27,
1980,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_cameroun.pdf
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As noted above, the ICJ has examined language contained in both the
U.S.-Nicaragua and U.S.-Iran FCN treaties similar to the “essential security interests” clause in many NPM provisions. The ICJ’s approach to
these two treaties suggests a relatively wide, but not unlimited interpretation of the “essential security” term. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ
observed that “the concept of essential security interests certainly extends beyond the concept of an armed attack, and has been subject to
very broad interpretations in the past.”183 The question as framed by the
Court was “whether the risk run by these ‘essential security interests’ is
reasonable.”184 In the Nicaragua case the ICJ did not need to further
parse the meaning of “essential security interests” as it determined that
the actions taken by the United States were not necessary to protect
those interests, however defined, and hence, the United States’ actions
failed the nexus test, and were not permissible under the treaty.185
The ICJ revisited the interpretation of “essential security” in its 2003
decision in the Oil Platforms case.186 Again, however, the Court did not
directly opine on the scope of “essential security” interests.187 In its
Counter Memorial in the case, the United States defined its essential security interests to include “the uninterrupted flow of maritime commerce in the Gulf” which was “essential to the economy and security
interests of many States, including the United States.”188 The ICJ noted
approvingly that both the United States and Iran recognized “some of
the interests referred to by the United States—the safety of United
States vessels and crew, and the uninterrupted flow of maritime commerce in the Persian Gulf—as being reasonable security interests of the
United States.”189 The conception of essential security interests advanced by the United States and acknowledged by the ICJ190 appears to
183. Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 116.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 141.
186. For a discussion of the case, see Pieter H. F. Bekker, International Decision: Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 550 (2004).
187. Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 163, at 196 (providing that U.S. actions “cannot be
justified, under Article XX, paragraph 1(d), of the 1955 Treaty, as being measures necessary to
protect the essential security interests of the United States, since those actions constituted recourse to armed force not qualifying, under international law on the question, as acts of self–
defence, and thus did not fall within the category of measures contemplated, upon its correct interpretation, by that provision of the Treaty”).
188. Counter Memorial of the United States, Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), ¶ 3.11 (June 23,
1997) [hereinafter Counter Memorial of the U.S.], available at http://www.icj–
cij.org/docket/files/90/8632.pdf.
189. Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 163, at 196.
190. Id.
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include economic interests—such as the flow of maritime commerce—
as well as territorial or military interests.191 The ICJ’s interpretation of
“essential security” is indicative of a broad reading of the term that goes
well beyond pure military threats and encompasses other types of
threats that may impact a state’s security.
A similar essential security term is also found in the language of the
GATT and WTO. GATT Article XXI provides for exceptions based on
“the protection of [a party’s] essential security interests,”192 but does not
further define what constitutes an “essential security interest.”193 The
Article XXI exception has only been implicated in four GATT disputes
and none of them have expressly addressed the scope of “essential security interests.”194 Academic commentary on this GATT provision suggests a broad interpretation of “essential security interests” in this context as well. For example, Schloemann and Ohlhoff have argued that
“[a] wide range of legitimate ‘essential security interests’ are conceivable [under the GATT]. In principle, any policy interest of a certain intensity may be legitimately protected under Article XXI.”195 The United
States has considered the invocation of the Article XXI exception in a
broad range of circumstances, including the Helms-Burton Act boycott
of Cuba and the Massachusetts Burma law.196 To the degree such a
broad invocation is accepted,197 “essential security” may be seen as an
191. Counter Memorial of the U.S., supra note 188, ¶ 3.12 (identifying attacks on U.S. warships and commercial vessels as “serious threats” to essential U.S. security interests).
192. GATT, supra note 174, art. XXI; see also NAFTA, supra note 85, art. 2102 (1993) (using same language). For discussion of the clause, see Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says, and What the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 263, 268–69, 275 (1998); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability
for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power–Based Relations and
Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413
(2001).
193. See Peter Lindsay, Note, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2003).
194. The cases include: Czechoslovakia v. United States in 1949, Nicaragua v. United States
in 1984 (Nicaragua I), Nicaragua v. United States in 1985–1986 (Nicaragua II), and Yugoslavia
v. European Community in 1991–1992. For a discussion of why none of these cases expressly
reached an interpretation of “essential security,” see Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff,
“Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of
Competence, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 424, 426, 432–39 (1999).
195. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 194, at 444.
196. As Ryan Goodman explains, “[t]he United States argued, in part, that these measures
served its security interests because they responded directly to human rights violations committed
by the respective regimes.” Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights Law in Practice: Norms
and National Security: The WTO as a Catalyst for Inquiry, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 101, 102 (2001).
197. Goodman argues that “in principle, the United States' position involves a wholly legitimate definition of ‘security interests.’” Id. at 102.
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even more encompassing term.198 Two commentators note that “the
concept of national security, or ‘essential security interests,’ is a function of contemporary sovereignty, and as such demands individualization, or individual definition, by the state concerned before its juridical
application is possible…Any panel dealing with such issues will have to
defer to the government concerned in that regard.”199
Some states have made more explicit interpretations of the essential
security term. The United States, for example, has asserted a broad interpretation of “essential security,” both in its submissions to the ICJ in
the Oil Platforms case and in testimony by the State Department to the
U.S. Senate in BIT ratification hearings. As the State Department has
observed with regard to the essential security objective, the executive’s
understanding has been that “essential security interests would include
security-related actions taken in time of war or national emergency” and
that “actions not arising from a state of war or national emergency must
have a clear and direct relationship to the essential security interest of
the Party involved.”200 At least to the degree that this understanding has
been communicated to and shared with the United States’ treaty partners, this definition of essential security appears to govern the interpretation of the NPM clauses in U.S. BITs.
In German practice, NPM clauses use the term “public security”
rather than “essential security.” Although there is no officially published
interpretation of the “public security” objective in the specific context of
Germany’s NPM clauses, domestic usage of the term is highly suggestive as to its intended reach. German NPM clauses generally group the
security objective and the public order objective together within a single
reference to “public security and order” (“öffentliche Sicherheit und
Ordnung”),201 a phrase with a long pedigree202 that is included in virtually all domestic state police laws to define the scope of the state’s po198. Id.
199. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 194, at 450. Part of this deference stems from the
phrase “as it considers necessary” included in GATT Article XXI. See generally id.
200. Letter of Submittal from Strobe Talbott, U.S. Sec’y of State, to U.S. Senate (June 26,
TREATY
DOC.
No.
104–10,
available
at
1995),
S.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43579.pdf.
201. For a discussion of the key terms, see MARKUS MÖSTL, DIE STAATLICHE GARANTIE FÜR
SICHERHEIT UND ORDNUNG: SICHERHEITSGEWÄHRLEISTUNG IM
DIE
ÖFFENTICHE
VERFASSUNGSSTAAT, IM BUNDESSTAAT UND IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION [STATE
GUARANTEE OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND ORDER] 119 (2002).
202. The phrase “public security and order” originated in ch. II, tit. 17 § 10 of the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten of 1794. See ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE
PREUßISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794, at 620 (1970), available at http://www.smixx.de/ra/Links_FR/PrALR/pralr.html (visited Nov. 19, 2007).
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lice powers.203 In the 1985 Brokdorf judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court summarized the core meaning of the “public security” element of the term as follows:
The term “public security” comprises the protection of central
legal interests such as the life, health, freedom, honor, property
and assets of the individual as well as the integrity of the legal
order and of the institutions of the state; a threat to public security will commonly be assumed in the face of an impending
criminal violation of these protected interests.204
This definition contains three elements.205 First, the integrity of the legal
order is understood as covering the entire body of formally valid laws
and regulations.206 Second, the integrity of the individual’s rights and
legal interests is usually already addressed by the broader concept of the
legal order, but on occasion the two may diverge.207 The third protected
element, the integrity of the institutions of the state, refers to the state’s
territorial integrity and political independence.208 Taken collectively,
these three protected elements suggest that the German interpretation of
the essential security permissible objective is, likewise, relatively broad.
Indian BITs also use the “essential security” language as one of the
permissible objectives.209 While there is no formal guidance available as
to the interpretation of this clause in Indian BITs, Indian domestic practice sheds light on India’s understanding of the term. One possible reading of the Indian “essential security” clause is as a reference to the “security of the state,” language which has received considerable treatment
from Indian domestic courts. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, the
203. BODO PIEROTH, BERNHARD SCHLINK & MICHAEL KNIESEL, POLIZEI– UND
ORDNUNGSRECHT [POLICE LAW] 123 (2d ed. 2004).
204. Brokdorf Judgment, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
315,
352
(F.R.G.),
translated
at
May
14,
1985,
69
BVerfGE
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global_law/german-cases/cases_bverg.shtml?14may1985 (visited Nov.
16, 2007).
205. See Erhard Denninger, Polizeiaufgaben [Police Functions], in HANDBUCH DES
POLIZEIRECHTS [HANDBOOK OF POLICE LAW] 205–211 (Hans Lisken & Erhard Denninger eds.,
3d ed. 2001); PIEROTH, SCHLINK & KNIESEL, supra note 203, at 124.
206. PIEROTH, SCHLINK & KNIESEL, supra note 203, at 127–32.
207. Id. at 132–135 (noting that threats to legal rights by natural phenomena, such as avalanches, and by individuals themselves, as in suicide, may affect the individual rights without implicating the integrity of the legal order).
208. Id. at 135–137.
209. See, e.g., Egypt-India BIT, supra note 180, art. 11(2) (“Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of
this Article nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from taking action for
the protection of its essential, secutrity [sic] interests or in circumstances of extreme emergency in
accordance with its laws normally and reasonably applied on a non-discriminatory basis.”).
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Indian Supreme Court drew a distinction between three categories: “The
expressions ‘law and order,’ ‘public order,’ and ‘security of the State’
have been used in different Acts. Situations which affect ‘public order'
are graver than those which affect ‘law and order’. Thus those situations
which affect ‘security of the State’ are gravest.”210 Similarly, in the case
of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, Supreme Court Justice Hidayatullah observed:
One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order
represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of
state. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order
but not public order just as an act might affect public order but
not security of state.211
Treating “essential security” in Indian BITs as equivalent to “security of
the state” would set a rather high threshold, allowing the term to be triggered only in the most grave of situations.
The most recent interpretations of the “essential security” permissible
objective arise in the context of the aforementioned ICSID arbitrations
against Argentina, and confirm a broad reading of “essential security,”
at least as intended in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Despite arguments by
claimants in all of these cases that the NPM clause of the U.S.Argentina BIT does not apply to situations of economic emergency, the
tribunals interpreted the essential security and public order provisions
broadly to encompass economic emergencies.212 The LG&E tribunal
found Article XI applicable to an economic emergency, observing:
To conclude that such a severe economic crisis could not constitute an essential security interest is to diminish the havoc that the
economy can wreak on the lives of an entire population and the
ability of the Government to lead. When a State’s economic
foundation is under siege, the severity of the problem can equal
that of any military invasion.213
Though the LG&E Tribunal appears more willing to accept an economic
emergency as grounds for invoking the NPM clause, even the CMS Tribunal noted that “there is nothing in the context of customary interna210. Union of India and Another v. Tulsiram Patel and Others, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416 (India).
211. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 740 (1965) (India).
212. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 203; CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 340;
Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 332.
213. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 238.
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tional law or the object and purpose of the treaty that could on its own
exclude major economic crises from the scope of Article XI.”214 This
broad interpretation appears to conform both to the text of Article XI of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the intent of both states.

b.

International Peace and Security

The permissible objective of “international peace and security” appears frequently in NPM clauses and has a relatively uncontested interpretation. For example, the 2004 Canadian Model BIT provides:
“[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party
from taking action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.”215 This provision is generally understood to allow states to take
actions mandated by the UN Security Council in furtherance of its
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security.”216 As UN member states are required to “accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council,” the provision ensures that states
parties will not be held in breach of their obligations under a BIT if they
are acting in furtherance of a Security Council resolution.217 In so doing,
this permissible objective shifts the risks of state action in pursuance of
UN mandates from states to investors.
There has been relative agreement as to the interpretation of this aspect of non-precluded measures provisions. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Draft Multilateral
Agreement on Investment is instructive, though the drafting project was
ultimately unsuccessful.218 According to the commentaries to a similar
clause in that instrument, the negotiating parties understood the language to “refer specifically to obligations under the UN Charter.”219 The
214. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 359.
215. Canada 2004 Model FEPA, supra note 85, art. 10(4). The NPM provision of 2004 U.S.
Model BIT, for example, provides that “nothing in this treaty shall preclude the application by
either Party of measures necessary for…the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.” 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 76,
art. 18.
216. U.N. Charter art. 24.
217. Id. art. 25.
218. Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Draft Consolidated Text, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998), Pt. VI(2)(c) [hereinafter MAI Draft Text], available at
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf.
219. See OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Commentary to the Consolidated
Text, 41, OECD Doc. DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter MAI Draft Text
Commentary], available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf).
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United States has confirmed that this reflects its view of the provision.
According to the Letter of Submittal attached to the U.S.-Bahrain BIT,
“[i]nternational obligations with respect to maintenance or restoration of
peace or security would include, for example, obligations arising out of
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.”220 Some U.S. BITs have
clarified the meaning of this clause in their protocols. The Protocol to
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, for example, provides: “[t]he Parties understand that, with respect to rights reserved in Article XI of the Treaty,
‘obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security’ means obligations under the Charter of the
United Nations.”221
While this permissible objective is generally understood to refer to
actions taken in pursuance of the UN Charter, some states might seek to
invoke it with respect to actions mandated by regional organizations,
rather than by the Security Council.222 To the degree regional action has
been taken pursuant to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and considered
necessary for the “preservation or restoration of international peace and
security,” the NPM provision would presumably be applicable. Situations in which the regional action was not taken in pursuance of Chapter
VIII of the UN Charter, but solely under the mandate of the regional organization, are less clear.
A final context in which this objective might be raised by a state is
with respect to the preservation of international peace and security on a
unilateral basis or through a “coalition of the willing.”223 Such an action
would not appear to fall within the general consensus as to the meaning
of this permissible objective, though an arbitral tribunal would have to
consider whether the states parties had intended a special meaning224 for
the term that would include such unilateral actions.

220. Letter of Submittal of the U.S.-Bahrain BIT from Sec’y of State Albright to President
Clinton, annexed to U.S.-Bahrain BIT, supra note 148.
221. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17, Protocol, ¶ 6.
222. An obvious example of this is the NATO intervention in Kosovo. That action was not
approved by the Security Council, but was still aimed at the preservation of international peace
and security. In the negotiations for the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, some parties suggested adding a provision that measures taken in pursuant to “regional security arrangements” are permitted under the general exceptions clause, although no such text was added as of
the May 1998 drafting session. MAI Draft Text Commentary, supra note 219, at 42.
223. If the state’s own essential security interests were implicated, the action would, presumably, be covered by the essential security objective of most NPM clauses.
224. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 31(4).
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Public Order

Together with security, “public order” is the permissible objective
most frequently included in NPM clauses. Yet, its meaning is subject to
contestation due to its different usages in various domestic legal systems
and traditions. Notably, the common and civil law systems have very
different understandings of the phrase.225 Though the interpretation of
the public order term cannot simply be imported from domestic law,226
the meaning of the term in domestic law may be relevant as indicative
of either a special meaning assigned by the parties or as evidence of the
225. See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ordre Public (Public Order), in III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 788, 789 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997) (noting that parties to an
international agreement providing for such an exception “may have different conceptions of ordre
public”). In the Anglo–American legal tradition, the issue of “public order” arises primarily in the
context of riots on the streets or the application of the criminal law. See, e.g., Edmund H. Bennett,
Public Meetings and Public Order: The United States, 4 LAW Q. REV. 237 (1888); George H.
Dession, Sanction, Law and Public Order, 1 VAND. L. REV. 8 (1947–1948) (defining public order
as “that measure of peace and observance of basic value patterns of a culture upon which the
fruitful pursuit of legitimate interests in the given society depends” and discussing it in the context of the methods of the criminal law as the “ultimate sanctions for the achievement and preservation of public order”); George H. Dession, The Techniques of Public Order: Evolving Concepts
of Criminal Law, 5 BUFF. L. REV. 22 (1955–1956); W. Ivor Jennings, Public Order, 8 POL. Q. 7,
11 (1937) (noting in the context of the 1936 U.K. Public Order Act that, in England, “the problem
of public order...becomes simply a problem of preventing riot”). By contrast, the civil law concept of ordre public, originating in France with the Code Napoleon, is broader in scope and generally understood to encompass a country’s basic value system as a whole, expressed through all
of its domestic legislation and regulations, not just its criminal laws. See, e.g., Seidl–
Hohenveldern, supra, at 788; Günther Beitzke, Ordre Public, in II WÖRTERBUCH DES
VÖLKERRECHTS [DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 665 (Hans–Jürgen Schlochauer ed.,
1961); Wyndham A. Bewes, Public Order (Ordre Public), 37 LAW Q. REV. 315, 318 (1921). The
concept’s principal area of application has been in the field of the conflict of laws, or private international law, where it performs the function of a “defense shield” against foreign legal acts that
are deemed to contravene the national ordre public, with the consequence that such acts will not
be given domestic effect. For a pertinent example, see Article 6 of the Introductory Law to the
German Civil Code (EGBGB), which provides under the heading “Öffentliche Ordnung (ordre
public)”: “A legal norm of another country is not to be applied if its application leads to a result
that is manifestly incompatible with essential principles of the German legal order. In particular,
it is not to be applied if its application is manifestly incompatible with [constitutional] basic
rights” (authors’ translation). In the Anglo–American common law tradition, an essentially
equivalent functional role is played by the concept of “public policy.” See Bewes, supra, at 315;
Max Habicht, The Application of Soviet Laws and the Exception of Public Order, 21 AM. J. INT’L
L. 238, 238 n.1 (1927). Within the French code civil, a distinction exists between ordre public
interne, which refers to those rules of domestic law that private contracting parties cannot set
aside, and ordre public international, which is the concept applicable in the context of the conflict
of laws. See Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra, at 788.
226. But see Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 225, at 789 (stating that due to the different
ordre public conceptions prevailing among the parties to an agreement, “the material content of
the obligations assumed…may vary from State to State,” which suggests a domestically-informed
interpretation).
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broader context in which the treaty operates. That such conceptual differences may matter in investment arbitration has become evident in the
recent Enron arbitration before ICSID, where the claimant’s essentially
common-law-informed interpretation of public order clashed with Argentina’s civil law notion of “orden público.”227
Interpretations of the “public order” objective in international contexts similarly suggest a range of possible interpretations of the term.
The OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property228
contained a “public order” type exception, providing in Article 6 that
derogations from its substantive provisions would be permissible if a
state party was, inter alia, “involved in war, hostilities or other grave
national emergency due to force majeure or provoked by unforeseen
circumstances or threatening its essential security interests.”229 The
commentary provided a few illustrative examples that emphasize security-related aspects of public order, such as “civil wars, riots, or other
widespread civil disturbances” as well as natural disasters, including
“storm damage, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions etc.…with effects on a
national scale.”230 The commentary suggests by way of reference231 that
the exception was apparently intended to be reflective of the necessity
defense under customary law, but some of the examples appear to go far
beyond the normal applications of the customary defense.
The ultimately unsuccessful Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI)232 also included a “public order” exception.233 In a footnote, the
draft explained that “[t]he public order exception may be invoked only
where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the
fundamental interests of society.”234 There remained disagreement
227. See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 324, 338. The concept of “orden público” has been
part of Argentine law since at least 1869 when it was included in Article 14 of the country’s Civil
Code. See Habicht, supra note 225, at 241.
228. O.E.C.D. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Text with Notes and
Comments, 7 I.L.M. 118 (1968).
229. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 131.
231. The commentary refers to a remark made by Judge Anzilotti in the Oscar Chinn case,
according to which “[n]ecessity may excuse the non–observation of international obligations…the plea of necessity…by definition implies the impossibility of proceeding by any other
method than the one contrary to law.” Id. at 132 (citing Oscar Chin Case, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
63, 114).
232. MAI Draft Text, supra note 218.
233. For background and discussion, see Alexander Böhmer, The Struggle for a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: An Assessment of the Negotiation Process in the OECD, 41 GER. Y.B.
INT’L L. 267 (1998).
234. MAI Draft Text, supra note 218, at 77 n.2.
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among negotiating states, however, on what would qualify as a “fundamental interest.” There appears to have been consensus that the application of a state’s criminal laws, anti-terrorist measures, and moneylaundering regulations235 would fall under the “public order” heading,
but there was no agreement as to how much broader the exception
should be.236
In the U.S. BIT program, the “public order” objective has been understood as covering “measures taken pursuant to a Party’s police powers to ensure public health and safety.”237 The United States has sought
to differentiate the essential security and public order components of its
BIT agreements.238 With regard to the essential security objective, the
United States’ understanding has been that “essential security interests
would [generally] include security-related actions taken in time of war
or national emergency.”239 The differentiating characteristic between
public order and national security, then, appears to lie in a combination
of severity and scale; whereas the “public order” objective covers essentially law-enforcement related activities during peace time, “essential
security interests” are implicated when the public order itself may be
under severe stress due to armed hostilities or acute crises.
German practice has also developed a distinct meaning for the “public order” element of NPM clauses. As pointed out above, together with
“public security,” “public order” is one of the two categories defining
the reach of the state’s police powers. Whereas “public security” includes the integrity of the legal order in the form of all written laws and
regulations, “public order” refers to the complementary240 category of
all unwritten social, and thus extra-legal, norms that are nonetheless
deemed necessary for a peaceful and harmonious coexistence of the
235. See MAI Draft Text Commentary, supra note 219, at 41.
236. At least one delegation made the interpretation conditional on the MAI’s substantive
scope, arguing that a broader understanding of “public order” would need to be considered if the
MAI were not only to guarantee a national treatment standard, but also market access rights. Id.
By contrast, another delegation suggested that the “public order” concept should exclude “economic purposes” and that measures taken in pursuit of it needed to be subject to the principle of
proportionality. Id.
237. President’s Message to the Senate Transmitting the Mongolia-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty with Annex and Protocol, Letter of Submittal by Sec’y of State Strobe Talbot,
(June 16, 1995) [hereinafter Letter of Submittal]. For the text of the exception, see Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Mong., art. X, Oct. 6,
1994, S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-10 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.-Mong. BIT].
238. U.S.-Mong. BIT, supra note 237, art. X.
239. See id. art. XII.
240. See WÖRTERBUCH DER POLIZEI [DICTIONARY OF POLICE TERMINOLOGY] 1115 (s.v.
“Öffentliche Ordnung und Sicherheit”) (Martin H. W. Möllers ed., 2001).
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community.241 The concept of “public order” thus defined has been
criticized for its lack of objectively identifiable standards, susceptibility
to ideological abuse, and disconnect from the requirements of democracy and the rule of law.242 Nonetheless, it continues to be accepted by
German courts as a residual legal category.243 Because most areas of life
today are regulated in some way by positive law, the practical relevance
of the “public order” concept has receded.244 Yet, the use of the term in
Germany’s NPM clauses suggests a broad exception to the substantive
protections of a BIT and a considerable risk-shifting from states to investors in exceptional situations that implicate public order.
This brief juxtaposition shows that the terms used to identify permissible objectives, and particularly the “public order” objective, cannot
simply be assumed to have identical meanings, even if they are lexically
identical.245 Such concepts tend to be deeply rooted in and infused with
meaning by predominantly domestic legal and political practices. While
directly importing domestic meanings246 without explicit reference to
241. As the Federal Constitutional Court had noted in the Brokdorf case, “‘[p]ublic order’ refers to the entirety of unwritten rules the compliance with which, according to prevailing social
and ethical views, is deemed indispensable for orderly human cohabitation within a particular
geographic region.” Brokdorf Judgment, supra note 204, at 352 (author’s translation). This definition traces back to jurisprudence by the Prussian Higher Administrative Court. See Women’s
Boxing Competitions, 91 PrOVGE [DECISIONS OF THE PRUSSIAN HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE
COURT] 139, 140 (Nov. 9, 1933).
242. See PIEROTH, SCHLINK & KNIESEL, supra note 203, at 138–40.
243. Id. at 141.
244. See Denninger, supra note 205, at 211–14. An example in which the Federal Constitutional Court relied on the “public order” concept concerned the prohibition of a rally by right–
wing extremists on Holocaust Memorial Day, with the Court arguing that such a rally would violate “fundamental social or ethical views” that infused that day with broadly shared symbolic
value and meaning. See id. at 212 n.21 Another example is the prohibition of peep shows which
had been justified on the basis of public order considerations. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht
[Federal Administrative Court], Dec. 15, 1981, 64 BVERWGE 274.
245. Indian practice offers yet another definition of public order where it has been defined as
the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a
specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed
against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general
disturbance of public tranquility…. [Such disturbances] affect the even tempo of life and
public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections
of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order.
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1228, 1229–30 (India). Subsequent judicial interpretations and applications of “public order” have been equally broad. See Derek P.
Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 311, 330–31 (2001).
246. See CHRISTOPH VON REYHER, DIE BILATERALEN KONZEPTE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND UND DER VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA SOWIE DEREN BEDEUTUNG FÜR
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES SCHUTZES VON AUSLANDSINVESTITIONEN [THE BILATERAL CONCEPTS
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THEIR
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such a procedure in the treaty instrument247 may be inappropriate, international dispute settlers faced with incongruent meanings across the
treaty’s authentic texts will have to resort to the applicable rules of
treaty interpretation dealing with plurilingual agreements248 in order to
establish the meaning that is to prevail at the international level.249 In so
doing, they may well need to consider, as an auxiliary means, the state
parties’ domestic understandings of the “public order” term in question.

d.

Public Health

The public health term of NPM clauses raises perhaps the fewest interpretative ambiguities and clearly shifts the risk of state action to investors in the case of exceptional actions taken to protect public health.
What distinguishes public health from most of the other permissible objectives is that the existence of threats is far more susceptible to objective scientific proof than, for example, the more subjective threats to a
nation’s security. As a consequence, the major question is what scientific standards have to be met in order for a phenomenon to qualify as a
threat to public health sufficient to trigger an NPM. There may be some
easy cases, such as an outbreak of human-to-human transmitted bird flu.
Other cases, for example, those involving assessments of whether certain products are sufficiently carcinogenic, may be less clear.250
The case law of the WTO/GATT regime may suggest a possible
emerging international consensus on the level of threat necessary to justify public health actions. Article XX(b) of the GATT permits states,
SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS]
136 (2005) (arguing for the direct reliance on domestic meanings); see also Seidl-Hohenveldern,
supra note 225.
247. Peru, for example, has explicitly provided for such an approach. See, e.g., Peru-Paraguay
BIT, supra note 38, art. 11(2) (“[t]oda expresión que no esté definida en el presente Convenio
tendrá el sentido utilizado en la legislación vigente en cada Parte Contratante”).
248. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 33.
249. See generally Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 611 (1997).
250. In the asbestos cases before the World Trade Organization, for example, there was
agreement among the parties that asbestos as such was toxic, but Canada and the EC differed with
respect to the question of whether a specific variant of asbestos—chrysotile asbestos fibres—
posed a health risk even under conditions of “controlled use” and thus needed to be banned as
well. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos–Containing Products, ¶¶ 16, 27, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). While the panel had
upheld the ban on the basis of the public health exception in Art. XX (b), see Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos–Containing Products, ¶¶ 222–23,
WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), the Appellate Body did not reach that exception by deciding that
there was no breach of the relevant Article III(4) of GATT to begin with.
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subject to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX,251 to adopt
and enforce measures otherwise inconsistent with the GATT’s substantive provisions if “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health.”252 The standards for the use of such measures have been elaborated to some extent in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement).253 Article 2(2) of the SPS Agreement contains the basic standards clause which stipulates that “[m]embers shall
ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is
based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.”254 Article 3(1) obligates WTO members to base such measures
on “international standards, guidelines or recommendations,” where
available. If they do so, their measures are presumed to be in accordance
with the GATT. Higher standards than those found internationally are
permissible if they are scientifically justified on the basis of an appropriate “risk assessment” undertaken pursuant to Article 5.255
In several cases brought before it, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) addressed the specific requirements flowing from the SPS
Agreement and made three important determinations256 relevant to the
251. The chapeau of Article XX provides that measures undertaken in pursuit of the exceptions therein are “[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” GATT, supra
note 174, art. XX.
252. Id. art. XX(b).
253. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, pmbl., Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S.
493
[hereinafter
SPS
Agreement],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (stating that the WTO members desire
“to elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of
sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b)”); see also id.
art. 2(4) (“Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant provisions of this
Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of the Members under the
provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b).”).
254. Id. art. 2(2). Article 5(7) permits provisional measures under the “precautionary principle” in cases in which sufficient scientific evidence is lacking.
255. Id. art. 3(3).
256. For an article-by-article analysis of the SPS Agreement’s provisions as interpreted by the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, see WTO Analytical Index: Dispute Settlement Understanding,
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the
World
Trade
Organization,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/sps_e.htm; see also Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in the First

2008]

INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES

363

interpretation of NPM clauses. First, the Appellate Body affirmed that
the appropriate standard of review at the dispute settlement stage required an “objective assessment of the facts” in accordance with Article
11 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, rather than complete
deference to determinations made by the state invoking its right to adopt
SPS measures.257 Second, as regards the requirement that such measures
must not be adopted without sufficient scientific evidence, the Appellate
Body required that “there be a rational or objective relationship between
the SPS measure and the scientific evidence.”258 Third, such “risk assessments” and the SPS measures adopted based on them need not necessarily reflect majority views within the relevant scientific community,
but can be based on minority views coming from respected sources, as
long as they are reasonable and the rational link between risk assessment and measures taken is preserved.259
The standards developed by the WTO—that measures be based on
scientific evidence (or appropriate risk assessments) and that there be a
rational link between that evidence (or risk assessment) and the measure
claimed to have been adopted on the basis of it—seems to reflect both
the ordinary understanding of public health and the likely bargain states
would have struck between the protection of investment and the protection of the health of their citizens. The WTO standard suggests that,
where states take measures to protect public health that are rationally
related to respected scientific evidence, the risks and costs of such actions under a BIT shift from the state to investors.

Three SPS Disputes: EC-Hormones, Australia-Salmon and Japan-Varietals, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L.
641 (1999).
257. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 116–19, WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter EC Hormones Case].
258. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶ 84,
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) (“Whether there is a rational relationship between an SPS measure and the scientific evidence is to be determined on a case-by-case basis and will depend upon
the particular circumstances of the case, including the characteristics of the measure at issue and
the quality and quantity of the scientific evidence.”). This “rational relationship” requirement also
applies to measures adopted on the basis of “risk assessments” conducted pursuant to Article 5 of
the SPS Agreement. See EC Hormones Case, supra note 257, ¶ 193.
259. See EC Hormones Case, supra note 257, ¶ 194; see also Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 178,
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
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Public Morality

In contrast with the public health objective, public morality is a
highly relational concept.260 Public morality derives meaning from the
predominant moral values shared by (usually) the majority in a given
polity. As a legal concept it is aimed at regulating the conduct of members of that polity on the basis that they are deemed morally wrong.261
The inherent relativity of the “public morality” term in a BIT may necessitate granting states broad freedom of action in pursuit of this objective in order to give effect to the bargain behind BITs containing this
term. Though some political and social communities may have common
understandings of public morality, even within the comparatively homogenous European Union, significant divides have emerged. It would
clearly do injustice to the concept if a tribunal were to try to squeeze the
public morality notions prevailing in, say, Germany and Pakistan, into a
uniform meaning of the term in interpreting the relevant NPM exception
in the Germany-Pakistan BIT of 1959.262
In the European context, both the ECtHR and the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) have addressed questions of public morality. Their general
approach has been to give considerable deference to determinations by
national authorities that certain measures were necessary to protect a
community’s moral values. This approach was taken by the ECtHR in
the Handyside judgment, which concerned permissible restrictions on
freedom of expression based on considerations of morality under the
ECHR:263
[I]t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The
view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals
varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in
our era which is characterized by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State au260. See Jeremy C. Marwell, Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception After
Gambling, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 815 (2006) (noting that “[w]hat one society defines as public
morals may have little relevance for another, at least outside a certain core of religious or cultural
traditions”).
261. See Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J.
JURISPRUDENCE 65, 65–66 (2000); see also Francesco Francioni, International Law as a Common Language for National Courts, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 587, 595–96 (2001) (arguing for the existence of an independent international concept of “public morality”).
262. Germany-Pakistan BIT, supra note 24, Protocol, ¶ 2.
263. ECHR, supra note 34, art. 10(2).
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thorities are in principle in a better position than the international
judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty”
intended to meet them.264
The ECJ has adopted a similar line of reasoning, affirming that it was
first and foremost a prerogative of each member state to fill out, within
its jurisdiction, the meaning of “public morality.”265 In another case
dealing with the question of whether legal abortions could be considered
a “service” for purposes of EC law (and thus be regulated by it), the
ECJ noted that it was in no position to replace a member state’s moral
judgment with its own,266 and affirmed that they could legitimately restrict the procedure.267
The GATT also contains a “public morality” exception,268 but cases
involving the exception have only arisen recently269 and are based on a
similarly worded exception in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).270 Conceiving of “public morality” as comprising “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation,”271 the panel found the prohibition of the remote
264. Handyside, supra note 168, at 22 (¶ 48); see also Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 133
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 22 (¶ 35) (1988).
265. See Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn and Darby, 1979 E.C.R. 3795, 3813; Case 121/85,
Conegate Ltd. v. H. M. Customs and Excise, 1986 E.C.R. 1007, ¶ 14. For discussion of Henn and
Darby, see Joseph H. H. Weiler, Europornography—First Reference of the House of Lords to the
European Court of Justice, 44 MODERN L. REV. 91 (1981).
266. See Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v.
Stephen Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685, I-4739.
267. Id. ¶ 21. The case is discussed in David O’Connor, Note, Limiting “Public Morality”
Exceptions to Free Movement in Europe: Ireland’s Role in a Changing European Union, 22
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 695 (1997).
268. See GATT, supra note 174, art. XX(a). For general treatments, see CHRISTOPH
FEDDERSEN, DER ORDRE PUBLIC IN DER WTO: AUSLEGUNG UND BEDEUTUNG DES ART. XX(A)
GATT IM RAHMEN DER WTO-STREITBEILEGUNG [ORDRE PUBLIC AT THE WTO:
INTERPRETATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ART. XX(A) GATT IN THE CONTEXT OF WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT] (2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L.
689 (1998).
269. Morality concerns had been addressed in pleadings in at least two cases under the old
GATT. See Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on the Import of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1598, 1611
(Australia arguing that art. XX(a) could justify measures against the inhuman treatment of animals and that “a panel could not judge the morals of the party taking the measure”); Panel Report,
United States-Restrictions on the Import of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 842, 870 (the Netherlands and the
EEC commenting in the context of art. XX(a) that “public morality [was] an issue which was
normally strongly determined by specific religious and cultural traditions”). Neither of the two
reports was officially adopted.
270. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B, art. XIV(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167.
271. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
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provision of gambling services—the service at stake in the dispute—to
generally fall within the public morality objective,272 a conclusion affirmed by the Appellate Body.273 Both the Panel and Appellate Body ultimately decided against the United States on other grounds, but they
generally accepted the clearly stated domestic determinations that a
measure served the purpose of protecting public morals.
The collective approach of the ECtHR, the ECJ, and the WTO may
represent an emerging standard for the interpretation of public morality,
namely, that a state invoking the public morality exception would need
to adduce evidence that the adopted measures reflect or respond to prevailing moral views within its own polity and indeed are intended to
protect them. Applying this standard to the public morality objective in
NPM clauses would preserve for states considerable flexibility to respond to exceptional situations that implicate public morality. Such an
approach is likely the only way to reconcile the competing conceptions
of public morals. The deferential interpretation accorded to the term
likewise indicates a considerable risk transfer from states to investors
under a BIT containing this term.
The inherently relative definitions of terms such as public order or
public morals also raise the broader question as to whether there can
ever be a uniform international jurisprudence as to the meaning of culturally relative terms. It is, of course, always possible for states to provide precise meanings for such terms through definitions in a treaty.
Where they do not do so, however, ascribing one state’s or one culture’s
understanding of such terms to another would be inappropriate. The result may well be asymmetric treaty obligations in that the two states
party to a BIT may have very different understandings of, for example,
a public morality provision. Yet, in such a case, both states have agreed
that public order or public morality can justify actions that would otherwise breach the treaty and have at least implicitly accepted that its
treaty partner may understand public order differently.

f.

Situations of Extreme Emergency

Many Indian BITs include a permissible objective of actions taken
“in circumstances of extreme emergency.”274 Assessing the meaning of
and Betting Services, ¶ 6.465, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
272. Id. ¶ 6.474.
273. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross–Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 299, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) .
274. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-Switz., art. 11(2),
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an extreme emergency in the practice of India and its treaty partners is
difficult as there is no case law or scholarly commentary from India on
the clause, nor are there available drafting materials from the Indian
government. In one case, the Indian Supreme Court considered the interpretation of Article 12 of the 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of
Land-locked States,275 which also provides for exceptions in times of
emergency.276 While the Court noted that Article 12 provides some leeway to states, it did not offer any clear standards for determining
whether a particular situation constitutes an “extreme emergency.”
On its face, the clause appears to be relatively broad in scope—
covering all kinds of emergencies, but would presumably have a relatively high threshold for invocation—the emergency must be extreme.
Some evidence from Indian domestic practice provides insight into the
likely intent of Indian treaty drafters. One potential reading of the clause
based on Indian practice would construe it as a reference to a formal
state of emergency.277 Under the Indian Constitution, a state of emergency refers to a period of governance under an altered constitutional
structure that can be proclaimed by the president in the face of grave
threats to the nation from internal and external sources or from financial
situations of crisis.278

Apr.
4,
1997
[hereinafter
India-Switzerland
BIT],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_india.pdf.
275. See Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey and Ors, A.I.R. 1984
S.C. 667 (India).
276. Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States art. 12, June 9, 1967, 597 U.N.T.S.
8641 (“Exceptions in case of emergency: The measures of a general or particular character which
a Contracting State is obliged to take in case of an emergency endangering its political existence
or its safety may, in exceptional cases and for as short a period as possible, involve a deviation
from the provisions of this Convention on the understanding that the principle of freedom of transit shall be observed to the utmost possible extent during such a period.”).
277. On states of emergency in Indian constitutional law, see SHIVRAJ B. NAKADE,
EMERGENCY IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION (1990).
278. See INDIA CONST. art. 352(1) (“If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists
whereby the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or
external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect
in respect of the whole of India or of such part of the territory thereof....”). India has declared
such a state of emergency on at least three occasions. Between October 26, 1962, and January 10,
1968, during the India-China war, the security of India was determined to be threatened by external aggression and a state of emergency declared. A second state of emergency was declared in
December 1971 during the India-Pakistan war, and a third state of emergency was declared between June 1975 and March 1977 based on threats from internal disturbances. IMTIAZ OMAR,
EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE COURTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 7 (2002). With respect to financial crises, see INDIA CONST. art. 360 (providing for the declaration of emergency in financial
crises).
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Whether the extreme emergency clause in Indian BITs applies only
to states of emergency or some broader set of circumstances is unclear.
Indian law also provides for a number of lesser forms of emergency. For
example, Article 356 of the Indian Constitution allows the president to
assume powers generally reserved to states in situations of emergency
where there has been a failure of a state government.279 This approach is
also suggested by the findings of a government commission established
to examine federalism in India.280 The commission found that there has
been “no uniformity of approach” to the declaration of an emergency
but that such provisions were particularly important in India due to
“multitudinous people, with possibly divided loyalties.”281 In a recent
case, the Indian Supreme Court has considered the Commission’s report
and noted that the “[t]he common thread in all the emergency provisions
is that the resort to such provision has to be in exceptional circumstances when there be the real and grave situation calling for the drastic
action.”282 This standard—based on exceptional circumstances and a
grave threat—though originally developed in relation to Indian Constitutional practice, appears to be the best available articulation of the
minimum threshold for invoking the extreme emergency NPM provision in Indian BIT agreements.

VI. REVIEWING THE INVOCATION OF NPM PROVISIONS: THE SCOPE
OF DEFERENCE AND THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
Ultimately, the crucial question underlying the preceding discussions
of the nexus requirement and the various permissible objectives of BITs
is how much deference ought an arbitral tribunal pay to the respondent
state’s initial determination that a particular measure at issue falls within
the NPM clause? Generally, NPM clauses will only become relevant
when a state decides to invoke such a clause in response to asserted or
potential treaty violations. The question, then, is whether that initial determination is subject to full substantive and conclusive review by arbitral tribunals charged with settling a dispute, or if assertions by national
279. INDIA CONST. art. 356. For a judicial interpretation of the article, see S. R. Bommai v.
Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1.
280. See GOV’T OF INDIA, COMM’N ON CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS, REPORT (1987–88), §§
4.2, 4.3 (finding that emergency clauses should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances
when there is a real and grave situation calling for drastic action).
281. Id. at ch. VII.
282. Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (Jan. 24, 2006), 2005 [Sup. Ct.
India] 20.
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authorities that a state action was covered by an NPM clause deserve
some degree of deference, with the result that tribunals will undertake
something less than full substantive review?
This is, in fact, a specific application of a more general question of
international law, namely, the international relevance of a party’s domestic determinations. The basic rule, of course, is that domestic determinations based on internal law that an act is not wrongful or otherwise
excused cannot be adduced as proper justification for the nonperformance of international legal obligations.283 Should such domestic
determinations of the applicability of an NPM clause therefore simply
be ignored or might they have some—even if limited—relevance for a
tribunal’s interpretation? Such relevance must indeed be affirmed where
the treaty instrument in question itself provides for the relevance of domestic determinations, which is the case with many NPM clauses. As
the ILC has pointed out, the basic rule of the irrelevance of domestic determinations may be modified by way of relevant primary rules,284 and
states can and do provide in their treaties for different levels of deference to their own domestic determinations.285 Many BIT NPM clauses
do accord to states greater deference for their own domestic determinations than would ordinarily be available.
In this section, we make two main arguments. First, we argue that the
absence of an explicit specification of the level of deference to be accorded to an invocation of a BIT’s NPM clause does not mean that
every decision taken by national authorities in pursuit of one or more
permissible objectives should be second-guessed by an arbitral tribunal,
with the consequence that the tribunal would substitute its own view as
to whether the actions in question further a permissible objective and
meet the nexus requirements. Rather, certain treaty clauses and terms
imply through their textual formulation some deference to state determinations, so that it is appropriate, both as a matter of treaty interpretation and judicial policy, to read NPM clauses as incorporating a “margin
of appreciation” that grants states some latitude to make initial determinations as to whether their actions are covered by an NPM clause. The
function of a tribunal, then, ought to be the determination of the permissible and legitimate boundaries of the margin of appreciation that arises
from the terms of an NPM clause. We argue that the jurisprudential
283. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 27; ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, arts. 3,
32.
284. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 32(2).
285. See id. art 3.
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practice of the European Court of Human Rights provides useful guidance in how to operationalize such analysis and review.286
Second, we argue that even when states make NPM clauses explicitly
self-judging, such as the United States has done, this does not entirely
remove their invocation from review by an arbitral tribunal. Rather,
what a self-judging clause indicates is that the state invoking the clause
is to have a very wide margin of appreciation as to whether a measure is
necessary to protect one of the permissible objectives. Such a margin,
even if very wide, still has outer limits and we suggest that these limits
are found in the general principle of performance of treaty obligations in
good faith, as required by Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.287 We
discuss both types of NPM clauses—those that are silent as to the degree of deference to be accorded and those that are self-judging—in
turn.
The determination of the applicable degree of deference in a tribunal’s analysis is perhaps the single most important factor governing the
risk allocation between states and investors under a BIT. While the
nexus requirement and the scope of permissible objectives set the legal
contours of the NPM clause, the applicable standard of review determines what deference will be accorded to a state’s own determination
that an NPM clause applies to a given situation. The greater the deference given to a state’s own invocation of an NPM clause, the more the
clause will serve to shift the risks and costs of exceptional state action
from host states to investors since tribunals will have less room to invalidate the state’s invocation.

A.

Non-Self-Judging NPM Clauses: The Applicability of the
Margin of Appreciation

When treaty partners do not specify—either explicitly in the text or
implicitly through the context and drafting materials of a treaty—the
degree of deference to be accorded to their invocation of an NPM
clause, arbitrators must determine what deference to give to a state’s determination. In such cases, arbitrators will have to deduce the appropriate deference from the treaty’s language, subsequent practice in inter286. In this Article, we merely outline the relevance and appropriateness of a “margin” approach in the context of BITs and NPM clauses. In a forthcoming piece to be published in early
2008, we will discuss in greater depth the legal and normative justifications for such an approach
and defend it against criticisms that have been levied against margins of appreciation in other
contexts.
287. “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith.” Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 26 (emphasis added).
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preting and applying the treaty, its context and drafting materials. The
fact that a BIT is textually silent on the issue of deference does not,
however, automatically translate into a presumption in favor of full review to the extent that arbitrators may fully replace a state’s assessment
of a situation and the measures necessary to remedy it with their own.
The permissible objectives of a BIT or language employed in defining
the nexus requirement may indicate or even necessitate a lower standard
of review that gives greater deference to a state’s own invocation of an
NPM clause. In such cases, the margin of appreciation, employed in
similar circumstances by the European Court of Human Rights, offers a
useful interpretive approach for reviewing sate behavior. We offer three
distinct justifications for the use of the margin of appreciation in reviewing state behavior pursuant to particular BIT terms, such as NPM
clauses: textual, jurisprudential, and practical.
Where the text of the treaty provision in question, explicitly or implicitly, suggests some deference to a state’s own determination, it becomes appropriate to utilize an interpretive standard such as the margin
of appreciation to give more deference to state policy determinations
than would ordinarily be available. A treaty provision may, of course,
explicitly indicate the level of deference to be provided, as is the case
with expressly self-judging NPM clauses discussed below. Yet, even
without an express reference to a standard of review, the treaty language
may indicate the appropriateness of some deference to state determinations.
The very ambiguity and lack of a shared standard inherent in many of
the NPM terms suggest that some deference be given to a state’s own
determination that the NPM clause is applicable. This is especially true
with respect to those permissible objectives, such as essential security or
public morality, which depend upon a particular domestic determination. As Hersch Lauterpacht recognized, it is “doubtful whether any tribunal acting judicially can override the assertion of a state that a dispute
affects its security.”288 It is difficult to subject highly policy-relevant
terms like public order, health and morality, or essential security interests, to judicial evaluation by an ad hoc tribunal in the same way as
other, more technical legal terms, such as “most-favored-nation” treatment. Nor does it seem likely that the provisions of BITs were, at least
in some cases, intended to authorize a third-party dispute settler to engage in such review.
288. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
188 (1933).
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With respect to the objective of public morality, for example, the
deeply subjective nature of the concept makes it difficult for a tribunal
to second-guess a state’s invocation of the clause. Can an arbitral tribunal reasonably access the meaning of public morality in Germany or the
United States, much less in Pakistan or Bahrain? In such cases, giving
deference to state determinations may be the only way to reconcile two
competing domestic understandings of a particular treaty term or concept. It seems quite implausible to assume that states, by concluding a
BIT with an NPM clause, delegated the authority to conclusively determine whether their security, public morals or other permissible objectives had been threatened to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal set up to deal
with investment disputes. But if such a delegation was not intended,
then the only interpretation of the relevant terms that faithfully gives effect to the actual bargain struck by the states parties is one that acknowledges a degree of deference on the part of the arbitral tribunal to
determinations made by domestic authorities relating to national security, public order and other subjective permissible objectives covered by
an NPM clause.
Granting some degree of deference to a state’s own invocation of
NPM clauses is also appropriate as a matter of judicial policy. Although
the ICSID system was established to deal specifically with investment
disputes, ICSID tribunals have, to an ever greater degree, faced questions of a quasi-constitutional nature, such as the legally permissible responses to a massive economic collapse or the definition of public morality. Yet, ICSID tribunals are ad hoc tribunals established pursuant to
the ICSID Convention to resolve investment disputes. They are not
courts of appeal of any particular state and the members of an ICSID
panel are often very distant, physically, politically, culturally, and socially, from the particular state or circumstances in question. They often
lack the fact-finding capacity to fully appreciate the context of government policies. Without the kind of deep connection to the state, society,
and community impacted by the dispute, such ad hoc panels are poorly
positioned to engage in full substantive review of critical state policies
that reach beyond pure investment law. Such tribunals are, therefore, ill
positioned to undertake substantive review that essentially secondguesses core governmental policy. Hence, from a jurisprudential perspective, the more a particular dispute implicates questions of a quasiconstitutional nature and the more disconnected the tribunal from the
particular societies impacted, the more appropriate it becomes for the
tribunal to utilize an interpretive approach such as the margin of appre-
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ciation, that gives some deference to the first-order determinations of
government policy by the state itself.
In contrast to the poor positioning of ICSID tribunals to undertake
first-order review of quasi-constitutional issues, ad hoc tribunals are in a
far better position to determine whether the policies chosen by a government are within the margin of appreciation suggested by the terms of
a particular NPM clause. The European Court of Human Rights has already developed an extensive jurisprudence on ascertaining the appropriate margin of appreciation to apply given the terms of a particular
treaty provision. Ad hoc tribunals can relatively easily determine the appropriate margin of appreciation to be accorded under a treaty clause,
either on their own or by drawing on the approaches of the ECtHR. It is
both far easier and far more appropriate for such a tribunal to determine
whether a state’s particular policy response falls within a relatively
well-defined margin of appreciation than it is for the tribunal to secondguess that state’s particular policy choices.
Finally, as a practical matter, the use of an interpretive approach such
as the margin of appreciation may help preserve the legitimacy of the
ICSID system. As ICSID tribunals have come to review issues of great
national significance and of a quasi-constitutional nature, often awarding extraordinary sums to investors, the legitimacy of the ICSID system
has been called into question.289 Operationalizing the margin of appreciation in investment arbitration would help preserve the legitimacy of
ICSID panels by defining their supervisory function, while preserving
the primary responsibility of states to develop policy responses within
their legal obligations in extreme situations.
Such “margins of appreciation” granted to domestic authorities are
well known from other areas of international law290 and especially from
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR,291 where the margin doctrine has be289. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration
and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337 (2007); Franck, supra
note 32; Susan D. Franck, ICSID Institutional Reform: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution and
the Role of Structural Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE HAGUE JOINT CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 268
(Agata Fijalkowsi ed., 2007).
290. For the most recent discussion of margins of appreciation, see Yuval Shany, Toward a
General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005).
291. See id., at 926–27. The literature on the margin of appreciation has become quite voluminous; among general treatments, see, for example, YUTAKA ARAI–TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN
OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE ECHR (2002); STEVEN GREER, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION: INTERPRETATION AND
DISCRETION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); HOWARD
CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF
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come an important device to balance domestic treaty execution with international supervision. Although it has featured most prominently in
the human rights area, the “margin of appreciation” as a tool of judicial
deference and self-restraint is not restricted in its application to any specific subject area of the law. The margin doctrine simply acknowledges
the fact that in many legally regulated areas of human activity there will
often be a range of actions and behaviors that satisfy the requirements of
an applicable international legal obligation, and that first and foremost,
it is for the domestic authorities to decide which one to adopt.292
The development of such a margin in the specific context of the NPM
exceptions discussed here would recognize that a situation covered by
one of the NPM permissible objectives may be subject to a spectrum of
assessments, several of which may rise to the level of legitimately triggering the NPM exception, and that a range of possible responses may
be developed by states to deal with such situations. Both because the
state may be better positioned to assess the situation and possible policy
responses and due to the uncertainties that often affect the policymaking space, the development of a margin of appreciation in NPM assessments would allow tribunals to engage in a substantive review while
preserving for states some of the freedom of action they sought through
the inclusion of an NPM clause.293 The principal task for a tribunal adjudicating claims involving a non-self-judging NPM clause would then
be to determine the appropriate boundaries of the margin of appreciation
and, hence, respondent state’s freedom of action. In the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, states do not possess “an unlimited power of appreciation”;
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation,
Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843 (1999); Jeffrey Brauch,
The Margin of Appreciation and the European Court of Human Rights: A Threat to the Rule of
Law, 11 COLUM. J. INT’L L. 113 (2005); Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 111,
118 (1987).
292. See, e.g., Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 22 (1990) (Martens, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that states possess a margin of appreciation not “as a matter of right, but as
a matter of judicial self–restraint”); Ronald St. John, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 123 (Ronald St. John Macdonald, Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1993) (noting that the margin of appreciation
doctrine serves to balance the Court’s and member states’ respective spheres of authority); Paul
Mahoney, Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J.
1, 4 (1989) (noting that the doctrine is seen by some commentators as an “auto-limitation by the
Court of its own powers”).
293. As the ECtHR had put it in the seminal Handyside judgment, “it is in no way the Court’s
task to take the place of the competent national [authorities] but rather to review [under the applicable Convention article] the decisions they delivered in the exercise of their power of appreciation.” Handyside, supra note 168, at 23 (¶ 50).
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rather, a domestic margin “goes hand in hand” with international “supervision,” and such supervision “concerns both the aim of the measure
challenged and its ‘necessity.’”294
As in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence,295 the margin of appreciation given
to a state would vary in breadth, based on the character of the permissible objectives asserted and the level of state interference with investor
rights. Deference would, presumably, be smallest with regard to situations in which objective standards are available for assessing the permissible objective and required nexus and would be largest where objective standards are lacking, or where meanings and standards differ
considerably between treaty parties.296 Applied to the permissible objectives discussed here, deference would have to be highest with respect to
issues of “public morality,” lowest in the area most susceptible to scientifically validated evidence, such as “public health,” and somewhere in
between intermediate as concerns threats to “security.” The result of the
development of such a margin of appreciation would be to recognize
fully the bargain inherent in BITs with NPM provisions by preserving
some freedom of action for states in extraordinary circumstances and to
give arbitral tribunals a highly tractable approach to analyzing state actions under NPM clauses without the need to fully substitute a tribunal’s
294. Id. at 23 (¶ 49).
295. For variation in the “width” of the margins recognized by the ECtHR, see the contributions in The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation Under the European Convention on Human
Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice, 19 HUM RTS. L.J. 1 (1998) (discussing the margins of appreciation under various Convention provisions) and the literature cited
in supra note 90. Notably, the margin of appreciation for state interference with property rights,
as protected under Article 1 of ECHR Additional Protocol No. 1 (1952), is a relatively wide one.
See Yves Winisdoerffer, Margin of Appreciation and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, 19 HUM RTS. L.
J. 18 passim (1998); see also Ronald St. John Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine
in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in 1–2 COLLECTED COURSES OF
THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 95, 139–56 (Andrew Clapham & Frank Emmert eds., 1990).
The test that the Court applies to determine whether a measure that affects property rights falls
within the margin’s boundaries asks “whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s
fundamental rights.” Macdonald, supra, at 141.
296. This gradation based on the availability of objective standards echoes the approach
adopted by the ECtHR. See Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the
European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 57, 78–80
(1990); Macdonald, supra note 292, at 103 (noting that “the margin of appreciation is probably
wider in the absence of applicable European standards”). Compare Handyside, supra note 168, at
22 (¶ 48) (noting the absence of a uniform standard of morality and that the “requirements of
morals” are varying “from time to time and from place to place”) with Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 36 (¶ 59) (1979) (noting the difference in the margins of
appreciation between determining issues of public morality and questions that concern “far more
objective notions”).
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determination—often removed from the events and facts—for a state’s
own analysis.

B.

Self-Judging NPM Clauses: Residual Good Faith Review

While many BITs are silent as to the appropriate level of review to be
undertaken by an arbitral tribunal, others, particularly those of the
United States, may be explicitly self-judging, thus seeking to limit the
scope of review that an arbitral tribunal can undertake. The explicitly
self-judging NPM clauses in U.S. BITs provide that “[t]his treaty shall
not preclude a party from applying measures which it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to international
peace and security or the protection of its own essential security interests.”297 Such explicitly self-judging NPM clauses, containing the “it
considers necessary” language or similar formulations could be read as
an absolute bar to judicial or arbitral review. Some states have argued
that a general principle exists in international law according to which
disputes involving political questions impinging on a country’s vital interests—such as the permissible objectives covered by BIT NPM
clauses—are non-justiciable and exempt from review by international
courts and tribunals.298 In the original GATT context, for example, the
claim has been made that when a state invokes the national security exception, “a panel could not or should not be established.”299 The rationale behind the non-justiciability position is the alleged absence of “judicially manageable standards”300 of a legal nature for the evaluation of
national security interests.301 Similarly, in domestic practice, a number
of states have a political question doctrine according to which the judi297. U.S.-Bahrain BIT, supra note 148, art. 14.
298. See, e.g., Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 220–36 (Oda, J., dissenting);
id. at 285 (Schwebel, J., dissenting); THOMAS J. BODIE, POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN
ACTIVIST INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1995); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 288, at 6–48;
Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication of Security Issues: What Role for the
WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 373 n.24, 381 (2003); Ian Brownlie, Justiciability of Disputes and
Issues in International Relations, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 142 (1967); Robert Yorke Hedges, Justiciable Disputes, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 560 (1928); William H. Thayer, International Arbitration of
Justiciable Disputes, 26 HARV. L. REV. 416 (1912–1913). As early as 1756, Emerrich de Vattel
had noted that “[a]rbitration is a very reasonable mode...for the decision of every dispute which
does not directly interest the safety of the nation.” EMMERICH DE VATTEL, II THE LAW OF
NATIONS 278 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858) (1758) (emphasis added).
299. Akande & Williams, supra note 298, at 374.
300. See C. Todd Piczak, The Helms-Burton Act: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cuba, the National Security Exception of the GATT and the Political Questions Doctrine, 61 U. PITT. L. REV.
287, 318–26 (1999–2000).
301. See Akande & Williams, supra note 298, at 381–82.
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ciary will not address explicitly political questions which must instead
be resolved by the state’s executive or legislative authorities.302
Three factors militate against excluding even explicitly self-judging
BITs entirely from arbitral review. First, the stipulated principle of nonjusticiability remains ultimately an appeal to judicial discretion. States
have again and again brought cases in international fora with national
security implications, vitiating the general acceptance of such a position
that would be needed for it to pass as either a general principle or as
customary international law. Accordingly, international tribunals, including the ICJ, ECJ, the ECtHR as well as various arbitral tribunals,
have never recognized the political nature of a question as a legal bar to
the exercise of their jurisdiction and have regularly pronounced on cases
concerned with national security issues.303
Second, even a self-judging NPM clause remains within the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, because states remain subject to the general
obligation, enshrined in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, to carry
out their obligations “in good faith.”304 Hence even Judge Schwebel,
who supported the United States’ interpretation of the essential security
clause in its FNC treaty with Nicaragua, held that it would still be up to
a tribunal to determine whether a party had invoked that clause in good
faith.305 While the United States generally follows the self-judging
model of NPM clauses, it appears to have come to accept a residual
good faith requirement. As Senator Helms noted in September 2000,
302. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE
OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992); TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 98–104 (2003); THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Nada Mourtada–Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain
eds., 2007); Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J.
1457 (2005); Jared S. Pettinato, Executing the Political Question Doctrine, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 61
(2006); Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 441 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability:
The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203
(2002).
303. See Richard B. Bilder, Judicial Procedures Relating to the Use of Force, in LAW AND
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 269 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David Scheffer eds.,
1983); Akande & Williams, supra note 298, at 382–83.
304. Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 26. On “good faith” generally, see J. F.
O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991). For an affirmation of the relevance of
the “good faith” standard in the specific context of self–judging NPM clauses included in BITs,
see Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 176–81.
305. See Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 311 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (finding that “the Treaty fails to provide a basis of jurisdiction for the Court in this case, certainly for
the central questions posed by it, unless, at any rate, United States reliance upon Article
XXI(1)(d) is, on its face, without basis”).
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“the United States considers this language to be self-judging, though, in
the words of the State Department, ‘each Party would expect the provisions to be applied by the other in good faith.’”306 This more recent US
approach suggests that even an explicitly self-judging NPM clause is
not beyond the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal and is still subject to
review for the state’s good faith invocation of the clause.
A third reason for subjecting even an explicitly self-judging NPM
clause to residual good-faith review is that such review ensures a balance between state freedom of action and investor protection. Such residual review ensures that, even when states have sought to preserve
considerable freedom of action and transfer the risks of state action in
extreme situations to investors, they cannot do so on mere pretext. Residual good faith review thus requires even states that have adopted explicitly self-judging NPM clauses to analyze their own invocation of the
clause and articulate a rationale for the clause’s applicability. As a result, states are forced to internalize and apply the international legal
standards of good faith in developing their responses to extraordinary
situations. Where the state’s invocation of the clause cannot be justified
in good faith, the state must bear the costs of its actions.
If a self-judging NPM clause remains subject to a good faith review,
a tribunal must then determine what such a residual “good faith” standard requires in practice. While good faith has long been a core principle of international law,307 a workable standard of good faith review has
yet to be fully developed.308 Unfortunately, the paucity of case law on
such an important legal principle means that arbitral tribunals will have
to develop their own approaches to whether the good faith requirement
306. Bilateral Investment Treaties with Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Croatia, El Salvador,
Honduras, Jordan, Lithuania, Mozambique, Uzbekistan, and a Protocol Amending the Bilateral
Investment Treaty with Panama: Report by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, S. REP. NO. 106-23 (2000), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_reports&docid=f:er023.106. The United States has, however,
been less clear as to whether it would find that requirement subject to arbitral review. A 1998 review of bilateral investment treaties by the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development
observed: “The United States has taken the position that the determination of whether a measure
is necessary for the protection of a country’s essential security interests is a matter exclusively
within its competence, not subject to review by any international tribunal.” UNITED NATIONS
COMM. ON TRADE & DEV., BITS IN THE MID-1990S, at 86 (1998). In the ICJ context, the United
States has asserted that similar language in fact precludes any judicial review. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility).
307. See Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 375(IV), Annex, art. 13,
U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess. (Dec. 6, 1949) [hereinafter Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of
States].
308. See generally JOHN O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991).
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has been met. In developing and applying such a standard, an arbitral
tribunal will have to consider the nature of the bargain inherent in a BIT
with a self-judging NPM clause. In essence, an arbitral tribunal will still
utilize the margin of appreciation we suggested with respect to non-self
judging NPM clauses. In the case of explicitly self-judging NPM
clauses, however, tribunals will grant a particularly wide leeway that
balances the investor protection goals of a BIT with the states parties’
explicit desire to determine themselves when the NPM clause is applicable, subject to background rules of good faith. Drawing on the work
of a range of scholars and international organizations, such a standard
could be said to encompass two basic elements: first, whether the state
has engaged in honest and fair dealing and, second, whether there is a
rational basis for the assertion of the NPM provision.
The “good faith” standard in treaty performance is well established.
The 1949 Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States included
such a standard at Article 13.309 As ILC’s commentary on the provision
noted, it was seen as “a re-instatement of the fundamental principle
pacta sunt servanda.”310 Perhaps the best articulation of the honesty and
fair dealing element of the concept of good faith is contained in the
1935 Harvard Research on the Law of Treaties, according to which
“[t]he obligation to fulfill in good faith a treaty engagement requires
that its stipulations be observed in their spirit as well as according to
their letter, and that what has been promised be performed without evasion or subterfuge, honestly, and to the best of the ability of the party
which made the promise.”311 The question then is whether the state has
acted honestly and to the best of its ability in deciding to invoke the
NPM clause. Where evidence exists that a state uses the exception just
as a pretext for ulterior economic motives, or where the connection between the measures taken and national security is so spurious as to
clearly breach the good faith requirement,312 a tribunal would be competent to determine that the NPM clause was not invoked in good faith.313
309. “Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its
laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty.” Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
States, supra note 307, art. 13.
310. Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States with Commentaries, 1 YB. INT’L L.
COMM’N 286, 288 (1949).
311. Codification of International Law, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. (SUPPLEMENT) 1, 981 (1935).
312. An illustrative example of this is provided by Sweden’s attempt in 1975 to justify import
quotas on footwear for national security reasons under the GATT. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can
Helms-Burton Be Challenged Under the WTO?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1313, 1331 (1998).
313. The only way to avoid even the good faith test would be to exclude the article containing
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A state’s general conduct, the declaration of a national emergency, relevant national legislation, and the transparency of the state’s decision
making process might all be relevant in assessing this honesty and fair
dealing requirement. In other words, reliance on a self-judging NPM
exception would pass the honesty and fair dealing prong of the good
faith test as long as there is no obvious and deliberate misuse of it.
The second element of a good faith review involves a determination
of whether there was a rational basis for the state’s invocation of the
NPM clause. This element of the good faith test may have been best expressed by the International Whaling Commission in its evaluation of
the good faith requirements of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea.314 According to the Commission, good faith requires “fairness, reasonableness, integrity and honesty in international behaviour.”315 The
reasonableness requirement stressed by the Commission demands that
the state have some rational basis for its actions. For an NPM clause to
be invoked in good faith, the question a tribunal must ask is whether a
reasonable person in the state’s position could have concluded that there
was a threat to national security or public order sufficient to justify the
measures taken. Two examples are illustrative. If a state were to invoke
a self-judging NPM clause and claim a security threat from a possible
alien landing, a tribunal would have to conclude there was no rational
basis to believe such a landing was likely and hence the clause had not
been invoked in good faith. In contrast, should an island state invoke an
NPM clause to build sea barriers citing the potential for global warming
to raise sea levels, notwithstanding potentially contradictory scientific
evidence, the tribunal would have to conclude that the state had a rational basis for its determination and the self-judging NPM clause had,
in fact, been invoked in good faith.
A good faith standard based around these two key elements of honesty and fair dealing and rational basis offers a number of important advantages to an arbitral tribunal assessing the invocation of a self-judging
NPM clause. First, it reflects the nature of the bargain inherent in a selfjudging NPM clause, namely that a state will be able to determine for
itself—consistent with the background norm of good faith in internathe exception from the tribunal’s terms of reference.
314. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 300, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1261 (“States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and
shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner
which would not constitute an abuse of right.”).
315. International Whaling Commission, Res. 2001-1 (2001), available at
http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/resolution2001.htm.
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tional law—whether the provision applies. Second, it explicitly avoids a
tribunal’s second-guessing of government policy choices for which ad
hoc tribunals may be poorly positioned. Instead, the tribunal must review the honesty and reasonableness of the state’s invocation of the
clause, something arbitral tribunals are far better positioned to do.
Third, it still imposes significant constraints on the freedom of states to
take non-precluded measures by reviewing the honesty and reasonableness of governmental action, thereby balancing investor protection goals
with state freedom of action.

C.

Implicitly Self-Judging NPM Clauses? A Consideration of US
Practice

In adopting a policy of making such clauses self-judging, the United
States has been largely unique among states utilizing NPM clauses. Beginning in 1982, when the United States developed its first model BIT,
the US executive and legislative branches insisted on an expansive interpretation of NPM clauses in all BITs and have moved toward a more
and more explicitly self-judging interpretation over time. The first U.S.
BIT, signed with Panama in 1982, uses standard NPM language, but is
not explicitly self-judging.316 Over time, the U.S. BIT program has become increasingly explicit in the self-judging nature of the provisions.
By the late 1990s, this view was stated plainly in the Model U.S. BIT’s
NPM clause, which included the “which it considers necessary” phrase,
making the NPM clause explicitly self-judging.
While more recent BITs, negotiated on the basis of the later model
treaties, are explicitly self-judging, the United States has continued to
assert that even the earlier, not-explicitly-self-judging NPM clauses
should, in fact, be read as self-judging and subject only to the more limited good faith review discussed above. From the perspective of an arbitral tribunal, a determination of whether an NPM clause is implicitly
self-judging will turn on whether there is evidence to suggest either that
the parties established a special meaning for the clause or that the context of the treaty and its drafting materials indicate a self-judging meaning was intended by the parties. While a treaty-by-treaty analysis will be
required to make that determination, compelling evidence in U.S. BIT
practice indicates that even non-expressly self-judging U.S. NPM
clauses should be treated as implicitly self-judging and subject only to
good faith review.
316. See U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74, art. 10.
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The catalyst for the U.S. policy of self-judging of NPM clauses was
the Nicaragua case before the ICJ. Nicaragua based jurisdiction in part
on the alleged violation of the U.S.-Nicaraguan Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation (FCN) treaty by the United States. The United States
objected to the idea that a commercial treaty could restrict actions it
deemed vital for the protection of its national security.317 Indeed the
United States argued that the “essential security interests exception” in
the FCN treaty, which is very similar to the NPM provision in various
BITs then under negotiation, was self-judging, even though it lacked the
“it considers necessary” language.318 The ICJ nevertheless granted jurisdiction over the suit and eventually found the equivalent language to
the NPM clause in that treaty not to apply.319 Thereafter, the United
States began taking special care to ensure that it had sufficient latitude
within any specific BIT to take any measures it deemed necessary to
protect its essential security interests.
A determination of the level of deference to give to non-explicitly
self-judging BITs must look to the context and negotiating history of the
treaty, where available. All U.S. BITs must be presumed to follow
whatever Model BIT is operative at the time they are negotiated, unless
otherwise specified in a protocol or annex to the treaty. In 1988, the
U.S. Senate considered and ratified a group of eight BITs. These treaties
were drafted based on a then-operative model treaty discussed by the
Senate in the ratification process. Article X of this model treaty contains
the NPM clause. In the ratification process, the U.S. Senate attached an
understanding to each of the treaties, according to which “[u]nder Article X of the treaty either party may take all measures necessary to deal
with any unusual and extraordinary threats to national security.”320 The
Senate did not intend any change in the treaty as negotiated, however.
On the contrary, the commentary to the model treaty states explicitly
that the understanding merely “clarifies and highlights the importance
of this article.”321 In the view of the U.S. Senate, the text of the NPM
provision accorded “to the United States [the right] to take whatever
steps deemed necessary by the President for national security reasons,
notwithstanding any other provisions of the treaties.”322 The position of

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 171.
See Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 116.
Id. at 115.
S. EXEC. REP. No. 32, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 9–11 (1988).
Id. at 8.
Id.
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the United States in 1988 was thus extremely clear—the President could
take any measures he deemed necessary to protect national security.
In addition, the U.S. Department of State released a formal policy
statement on these treaties that specifically sought to avoid the “Nicaragua problem,” noting that the United States had negotiated these treaties
“with certain assumptions about the scope of their obligations and the
kinds of issues which they submit to compulsory arbitration, assumptions we believe our treaty partners share. Specifically…the United
States Government preserves its right to protect its essential security interests.”323 Even so, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty until an
executive understanding was attached, according to which “either Party
may take all measures necessary to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat to its national security.”324 These clarifications were designed to ensure that nothing in an investment treaty would constrain
the country’s freedom of action when security or public order issues
were at stake. However, from the point of view of the original ideology
underlying the United States’ drive to conclude BITs, this shift
“weaken[ed the BIT] as an instrument for regulating host-state governments, facilitating uncompensated expropriations or other host-state impairments of investment.”325
U.S. policy-makers understood the potential consequences of their
actions, but were prepared to take the risk of greater host country latitude to impair investments as the price for guaranteeing their own relative freedom of action. In the ratification process of a set of similar BITs
in August 1992, the Senate considered whether “the protections afforded investors diminished if each party can be the sole judge of its interests” and concluded that, despite these risks, the provisions were “in
the national interest.”326 As part of the materials submitted with these
five treaties, the State Department included the U.S. Model BIT, accompanied by an official “description” of each article.327 The description of Model Article X—the NPM clause—states:

323. Bilateral Investment Treaties with Panama, Senegal, Haiti, Zaire, Morocco, Turkey,
Cameroon, Bangladesh, Egypt and Grenada: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
99th Cong. (1988), quoted in Alvarez, supra note 26, at 38.
324. S. EXEC. REP. No. 32, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9–11 (1988) (Senate Foreign Relations
Committee recommending that Senate give advice and consent to BITs with Senegal, Zaire, Morocco, Turkey, Cameroon, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Grenada).
325. Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 170–71.
326. August 4, 1992 Hearings, supra note 53, at 51.
327. See United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty as of February 1992 [hereinafter
1992 Model BIT], in August 4, 1992 Hearings, supra note 51, at 65 (emphasis added).
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A Party’s essential security interests include actions taken in
times of war or national emergency, as well as other actions bearing a clear and direct relationship to the essential security interests of the Party concerned. Whether these exceptions apply in a
given situation is within each Party’s discretion. We are careful
to note, in each negotiation, the self-judging nature of the protection of a Party’s essential security interests.328
Once again, the United States asserted a self-judging interpretation and
the State Department confirmed it had made this position apparent to its
negotiating partners.329 The parties to these U.S. BITs appear to have
shared an understanding that even a non-explicitly self-judging NPM
clause should be interpreted as self-judging. In the BIT concluded the
same year with the Russian Federation this shared understanding was
explicitly noted in the Protocol attached to the main treaty text, at the
request of the Russian negotiators.330
The Letters of Submittal accompanying U.S. BITs submitted to the
Senate for ratification likewise confirm the self-judging nature of U.S.
NPM clauses. For example, the Letter of Submittal accompanying the
1997 U.S. BIT with Azerbaijan,331 whose NPM clause (Art. XIV ¶ 1) is
not explicitly self-judging, nonetheless provides that “[m]easures to protect a Party’s essential security interests are self-judging in nature, although each Party would expect the provisions to be applied by the
other in good faith.”332 Notably, the documents accompanying explicitly
self-judging BITs have indicated that the change of language did not
represent a policy change, but merely “makes explicit the implicit understanding that measures to protect a Party’s essential security interests
are self-judging in nature, although each Party would expect the provisions to be applied by the other in good faith.”333
The United States has maintained a consistent interpretation of its
NPM clauses as self-judging, even in ICSID proceedings brought by
328. Description of the United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)—February
1992, in August 4, 1992 Hearings, supra note 51, at 65 (emphasis added).
329. Id.
330. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Protocol, U.S.-Russ., ¶ 8, June 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 799 (stating that “[w]ith respect to Article X, paragraph 1, the Parties confirm their mutual understanding that whether a measure is undertaken by a
Party to protect its essential security interests is self-judging”).
331. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.Azer., Aug. 1, 1997, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43478.pdf.
332. Letter of Submittal, Dep’t of State (Sept. 8, 2000), art. XIV, annexed to id.
333. Letter of Submittal, Dep’t of State (Apr. 24, 2000), annexed to U.S.-Bahrain BIT, supra
note 148, art. XIV.
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American investors against foreign states. A September 2006 letter from
James H. Thessin, Principle Deputy Legal Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, to Abraham D. Sofaer, former Legal Advisor at the U.S.
Department of State, addressed the interpretation of Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT, specifically in the context of an ICSID arbitration
against Argentina. The letter states that “notwithstanding the decision of
the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, the position of the U.S. Government is
that the essential security language in our…Bilateral Investment Treaties is self-judging, i.e., only the Party itself is competent to determine
what is in its own essential security interests.”334
If the U.S. government is to be taken at its word that it informed negotiating partners of its self-judging interpretation of the NPM clause—
and there is no reason not to accept the State Department’s assertion in
sworn testimony to the U.S. Senate—the self-judging nature of the
NPM clause was part of the bargain struck between the United States
and its treaty partners, even where that understanding was not expressly
stated in treaty language. Certainly since 1992, and perhaps throughout
the entire U.S. BIT program since 1982, even non-explicitly selfjudging NPM clauses were treated as self-judging, given the understanding of the United States and its treaty partners to that effect. As
Kenneth Vandevelde has observed: “It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that since 1984 the United States has interpreted the essential security interests exception to be self-judging, although the Russia BIT
represents the first time since 1986 that the United States has made its
position clear publicly.”335
In the case of such non-explicitly self-judging U.S. NPM clauses, arbitral tribunals will need to engage in careful, treaty-by-treaty analysis
of the text, context, background materials, and circumstances of a
treaty’s conclusion to determine whether the parties shared an understanding of the NPM clause as implicitly self-judging. The treaty text
would still be the starting point for any analysis, but to illuminate how
the treaty partners expected NPM clauses to operate in practice, arbitra334. Letter from James H. Thessin, Principle Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State to
Abraham D. Sofaer, Senior Fellow, Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ. (Sept. 15, 2006) (on file with
authors). Argentina has likewise accepted this self–judging interpretation and never has suggested
any alternative reading of the article. These interpretations are directly relevant to Article XI of
the US-Argentina BIT and therefore constitute “subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation,” pursuant to Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention, supra
note 65, art. 31(3)(b).
335. Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 174.
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tors would have to give due weight to the actual and demonstrable intentions behind the provision. Where such evidence exists, it would be
fully appropriate for a tribunal to apply a good-faith standard of review,
discussed above, rather than a substantive review informed by a margin
of appreciation, as would be appropriate for non-self-judging NPM
clauses.

VII. NPM CLAUSES AND LIABILITY
NPM clauses raise two important questions with respect to state liability under a BIT, each of which has implications for the allocation of
risks and costs between states and investors. A first question is whether
NPM clauses actually relieve states of responsibility, liability, and the
duty to pay compensation for acts that would otherwise breach a BIT. If
NPM clauses do not relieve responsibility and liability, they would have
no practical impact on the allocation of costs, as states would bear the
costs of action regardless of the inclusion of an NPM clause. In contrast,
if NPM clauses do relieve states of liability, the successful invocation of
such a clause would transfer the costs of action in exceptional cases
from the state to an investor. Assuming NPM clauses relieve a state of
liability, the second question still remains: for what period of time
should the NPM clause be deemed to apply and liability remain precluded?

A.

Implications of NPM Clauses for State Responsibility, Liability
and Compensation

In most cases, NPM clauses will absolve states of international responsibility, liability to investors, and any duty to pay compensation either to the other state party or directly to investors. NPM clauses are
generally articulated as exceptions to a BIT’s substantive provisions,
and not merely as justifications or excuses for breach. NPM clauses create this exception through the use of the phrase “shall not preclude the
applicability of measures” or “shall not apply to” particular measures.
The exceptions contained in NPM clauses preclude the very applicability of the specified substantive obligation(s) of the BIT to acts that fall
within the scope of the clause. If a certain action is covered by the terms
of the exception, the result is the preclusion of wrongfulness, not because a violation of a particular obligation is justified under the circumstances, but because the obligation does not apply to that action in the
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first place.336 In other words, the NPM clause exempts measures
adopted for the specified permissible objectives from some or all substantive obligations under the BIT. NPM clauses may exempt covered
state actions either from all the substantive protections of a BIT or only
from certain treatment standards, based on the specific terms used in the
BIT.337
It is a well established principle of international law, codified in Article 2 of the ILC Draft Articles, that for an action to give rise to an “internationally wrongful act of a State,” such an “action” must “constitute[] a breach of an international obligation of the State.”338 By its very
terms, an NPM clause specifies that actions taken consistent with it
“shall not be precluded” by the treaty. Hence, such actions do not
breach the treaty. In its commentaries to the Draft Articles, the ILC recognizes “there is no exception to the principle stated in article 2 that
there are two necessary conditions for an internationally wrongful act—
conduct attributable to the State under international law and the breach
by that conduct of an international obligation of the State.”339 The plain
language of NPM clauses makes clear that acts properly taken under
that article are not internationally wrongful at least so long as they remain necessary to achieve one of the permissible objectives specified in
the clause.
As long as the acts taken by a state are not internationally wrongful
by virtue of an NPM clause, there is no state liability and no compensation can be due. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Draft Articles, compensation is only due for “injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act.”340 Absent such an internationally wrongful act, state responsibility
is not engaged and no compensation is due to the claimant. This position was confirmed by the ICSID Tribunal in LG&E, which found: “Article XI establishes the state of necessity as a ground for exclusion from
wrongfulness of an act of the State, and therefore, the State is exempted
from liability.”341
336. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 559–60 (6th ed. 1990) (noting, inter alia, that an exception is the “[e]xpress exclusion of something from operation of contract or deed,” referring to “a
person, thing, or case specified as distinct or not included”).
337. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
338. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 2. See generally Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v.
Fr.), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 74 (June 14).
339. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 2(9); see also Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24); Factory at Chorzów (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 9 (May 24).
340. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 31.
341. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 261.
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A reading of NPM clauses to do something less than provide an exception to the substantive protections of the BIT and, thereby, preclude
the wrongfulness of a state’s actions would violate the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation. The principle of effectiveness means
that, in the interpretation of a treaty, its terms must be construed in such
a way as to give each of them effect and not render them meaningless.342 Reading an NPM clause merely to authorize such acts but not
bar liability—would deny any meaning or effect to the “shall not preclude” phrase or its equivalent in a BIT, rendering it a legal nullity
since, even without an NPM clause, a state could always take such actions and face the consequences of liability after the fact.
Even if an NPM clause removes the wrongfulness of a state’s actions
and, hence, any duty to pay compensation to the other state party to the
treaty, it still must be determined whether the state could have some residual liability toward investors harmed by the state’s actions, rather
than to the other state party to the treaty. There are, of course, circumstances in which international law provides for such liability, for example in the field of expropriation, in which failure to pay compensation to
foreign property owners can result in international responsibility.343
Both the legal formulation and the function of NPM clauses, however,
indicate that they must relieve a state of any such residual liability to investors as well as primary responsibility to the other state party, at least
in the ICSID forum. Any residual duty a state may owe to investors for
a breach of a BIT must stem from the BIT instrument itself. As the
NPM clause specifies that the BIT “shall not preclude” state actions that
fall under it and removes such actions from the scope of the BITs protections, no residual liability can be left under the BIT.344 In essence, the
NPM clause means that the state assumed no obligations either toward
the other state party or its investors with respect to actions covered by
the NPM clause. While there may be other sources of liability that states
may have toward investors, such as the rules of expropriation in cus342. See United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note
63, at 621.
343. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 391–415
(2003); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 344–88 (2d ed.
2004).
344. The situation will be different in the case of limited scope NPM clauses, such as those
included in Germany’s BITs, which apply only to the specified treatment standards and not to the
treaty as a whole. While a violation of the national treatment standard covered by the German
NPM clause would thus not give rise to any claims for compensation, the provisions on expropriation would still apply if the severity of interference with the investment were to reach that
level.
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tomary law, those issues are distinct from the BIT.345 Hence, investors
would have to seek compensation in other fora, such as domestic courts.
By preventing the wrongfulness of a state’s actions and thereby precluding both responsibility and liability, NPM clauses effectively shift
the costs of such actions from the state to investors. Whereas, without
the NPM clause, the state would be required to compensate investors for
harms resulting from state action in breach of the BIT, the NPM clause
prevents the duty to pay compensation and causes investors to bear the
costs of state actions that fall within the scope of the NPM clause.

B.

Period of Applicability

A second question with respect to liability relates to the period during
which the exceptions provided for in the NPM clause apply. An NPM
clause involves a nexus between particular actions taken by a state and a
set of permissible objectives. Even if initially the nexus requirement is
satisfied and the NPM clause is successfully invoked, at some point in
the future that nexus might be severed by, for example, factual developments that remove the threat to, say, essential security, public order,
or public health. Once that nexus is severed, the NPM clause would no
longer apply and actions by the state might again give rise to liability.
The key question then is at what point that nexus is severed and the potential for liability returns.
The text of the NPM provision provides the legal starting point for
such an inquiry.346 Take for example a standard U.S. NPM provision:
“[t]his Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order…or the protection of
its own essential security interests.”347 The text makes clear that it is the
measures necessary to respond to threats to public order or national security that are not precluded by the treaty. Hence, liability cannot attach
to acts that would otherwise violate the treaty from the moment the state
takes such measures until the time such measures cease or are no longer
necessary for the maintenance of public order or the protection of national security interests.

345. If an ICSID tribunal has jurisdiction over such non-BIT sources of liability, the NPM
clause would not apply and the state might face direct liability to investors outside the BIT and
NPM regime. See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 25.
346. Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 31.
347. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 18.
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As used in an NPM clause, measure can be defined as “an action
taken as a means to an end” or a “legislative bill or enactment.”348 It is
the legislative act or acts taken in response to the public order or national security threat that is not precluded by the BIT. As long as the act
itself occurred under the NPM clause, even if its long-term impact continues to such a time when the act itself would not have been initially
justified under the NPM clause, no liability should attach as there was
no internationally wrongful act by the state outside the period of NPM
applicability.
Other acts might involve continuing affirmative interference by the
state with the rights of investors under the BIT. In this situation, acts are
only permissible during the period of NPM applicability, and responsibility could attach for acts subsequent to the severing of the nexus requirement by developments on the ground. The determination of such
an end point must, however, go beyond a simple conclusion that there is
not, say, a present threat to public order from riots on the streets. A government cannot be required to take decisions that would reignite the
very same threats to essential security and public order that existed at
the time such measures were initially adopted. Say, for example, a state
justified travel restrictions that would violate a BIT under the “public
health” objective of an NPM clause as a response to a quickly spreading
pandemic disease and the spread of the disease was largely stopped at
the border. The state could not then be held liable for the continuation of
those restrictions just because there was no pandemic threat within the
state itself since, by lifting the restrictions, the disease could well spread
into the State and the situation of emergency that justified the initial invocation of the NPM clause would return.
The duration of the period in which otherwise precluded measures
are permitted under an NPM clause must look to the likely impact of the
reversal or removal of those measures. Rather than examining only potentially reversible facts on the ground, a legal analysis of the end point
for the applicability of Article XI should be based either on the state’s
own termination of the measures taken in response to the crisis or on
economic and social evidence and analysis demonstrating that such
measures have become unnecessary to prevent a return to the conditions
that initially gave rise to the invocation of the NPM clause. During the
period when the NPM clause is applicable, the costs of state actions are
348. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1117 (3d ed.
1992); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1400 (10th ed. 1993) (defining
measure as “a step planned or taken as a means to an end; specif. : a proposed legislative act”).
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shifted to investors; once the nexus between state actions and a permissible objective is severed, however, liability shifts back to the state,
which could then be required to compensate investors for subsequent
harmful acts.
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FIGURE 1: APPLICATION OF NPM CLAUSE FLOW CHART
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VIII. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF NPM
CLAUSES: REVISITING THE ARGENTINA CASES
Two of the BITs under which cases have been brought against Argentina—the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union-Argentina BIT (BLEU-Argentina BIT)—include NPM
clauses.349 In each of these cases Argentina has invoked the NPM
clause,350 arguing that the measures it took were not precluded by the
BIT, that there was no internationally wrongful act, and, hence, no
compensation is due to investors. Moreover, based on the long-standing
United States policy of self-judging NPM clauses, Argentina has
claimed that the NPM provision in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is selfjudging and Argentina’s invocation of the clause subject only to good
faith review.351 Though more than forty cases are presently pending
against Argentina, only four awards involving NPM clauses have been
handed down by ICSID tribunals as of October 2007.352 The four
awards illustrate both the interpretive challenges presented by NPM
clauses and the dangers of interpretive short-cuts by arbitral tribunals.
Moreover, the four awards highlight very different understandings of
the risk allocation functions of NPM clauses. Whereas the tribunals in
the cases of CMS v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina and Sempra v. Argentina found the NPM clause inapplicable, the tribunal in LG&E v.
Argentina found the clause properly invoked and Argentina’s liability
precluded for a specified period during the crisis.353 Though the contra349. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17, art. 11; Convenio para la promoción y la protección reciproca de las inversions, Belg.-Lux.-Arg., art. XX, June 28, 1990 [hereinafter BLEUArgentina
BIT],
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_argentina_esp.pdf.
350. The case brought under the BLEU-Argentina BIT is ARB/03/7 (2005). For the complete
list of cases brought against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, see The World Bank
Group, ICSID: List of Pending Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2007).
351. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶¶ 208-218.
352. The four cases decided to date are: CMS, supra note 16; LG&E Energy, supra note 30;
Enron, supra note 29; and Sempra, supra note 29. The CMS case is presently subject to annulment proceedings. The arbitral panel in the CMS case consisted of Francisco Orrego Vicuna
(President), Marc Lalonde and Francisco Rezek. The LG&E panel consisted of Tatiana de Maekelt (President), Francisco Rezek, and Albert Jan van den Berg. The Enron panel consisted of
Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Albert Jan van den Berg and Pierre Yves Tschanz. It is interesting to
note the very different holdings despite the overlap of panel members.
353. See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 226–66 (“Argentina is exempt of responsibility, and
accordingly, the Claimants should bear the consequences of the measures taken by the host
State….”); CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 387. The divergent decisions raise the problem of an
arbitral system without meaningful appellate authority and no means of resolving different outcomes based on nearly identical facts. See Franck, supra note 32.
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dictory outcomes cannot be reconciled, they can be explained by the
tribunals’ very different understandings of the bargain that lies behind
the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the risk allocation function of the NPM
clause in the treaty.

A.

The Jurisprudence of the ICSID Panels

While the four tribunals reach different substantive outcomes and
their decisions take distinct approaches to the function of NPM clauses,
they do agree on at least two critical points. First, the tribunals interpret
the essential security and public order provisions of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT broadly so as to encompass economic emergencies,354 as suggested
in our interpretive analysis of the clause above. A second area of
agreement between the tribunals is their interpretation of the NPM
clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT as not self-judging.355 While the language of the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not explicitly
self-judging, Argentina has argued that it should be interpreted as selfjudging, again based on long-standing practice of the United States. The
tribunals, therefore, apply a substantive review to Argentina’s invocation of the clause rather than a good-faith test. Yet, the tribunals justify
this common approach on very different grounds. For the CMS Tribunal, the non-self-judging character of the U.S.-Argentina NPM clause is
based on a textual comparison of the NPM clause in the treaty with
other instruments, such as GATT, that are explicitly self-judging and the
ICJ’s treatment of similar language in the Nicaragua case.356 In contrast, the determinations by the LG&E Tribunal and the Enron Tribunal
are, in part, based on supposed consideration of the parties’ understandings at the time the treaty was concluded. In the words of the LG&E
Tribunal: “[b]ased on the evidence before the Tribunal regarding the
understanding of the Parties in 1991 at the time the Treaty was signed,
the Tribunal decides and concludes that the provision is not selfjudging.”357 In reaching this conclusion, the LG&E tribunal recognizes
that the “language of the BIT does not specify who should decide what
constitutes essential security measures–either Argentina itself, subject to
a review under a good faith standard, or the Tribunal,” and looks to both
the background materials and broader context of the treaty negotia354. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
355. Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 337; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 212;
CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 373; Sempra Award, supra note 29, ¶ 388.
356. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 371.
357. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 212; Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 337.
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tions.358 Despite their agreement on the non self-judging nature of the
NPM clause, only the Sempra tribunal gives serious consideration to the
weighty evidence of the common intent of the United States and Argentina that the clause should be self-judging.359 Yet, the Sempra tribunal,
notably composed of two arbitrators who also served in the CMS case
dismisses the relevance of that evidence.360
The areas of disagreement between the four tribunals are significant
and reflective of two very different understandings of the function of the
NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. A first key difference among
the decisions is their approach to the relationship between the NPM
clause in the treaty and the customary law defense of necessity.361 The
CMS Tribunal, the Enron Tribunal, and the Sempra Tribunal effectively
read the requirements of the customary international law defense of necessity into the NPM clause of the treaty, testing Argentina’s invocation
of the NPM clause against the basic requirements of the necessity defense in customary international law.362 The Enron Tribunal observes:
“because there is no specific guidance” as to the interpretation of the
NPM clause “under the treaty…[it is] necessary to rely on the requirements of the state of necessity under customary law.”363 Likewise, the
CMS Tribunal begins its analysis of Article XI with explicit reference to
“Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility” which addresses the
necessity defense in customary law and asks whether “the plea of neces-

358. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 212. For example, the tribunal considers
when the U.S. policy with respect to self–judging NPM clauses became explicit and finds that did
not occur until 1992, after the U.S.-Argentina BIT was signed. Id. ¶ 213. Despite the agreement
of the two tribunals that the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not self–judging, there is
reason to question both tribunals’ decisions. As noted above, prior to the conclusion of the U.S.Argentina BIT, the United States had asserted a self-judging interpretation of the NPM clause in
its BITs. See supra notes 313–32 and accompanying text.
359. See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 337; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶
212; CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 371.
360. See Sempra Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 382–88.
361. For a discussion of the treatment of the state of necessity in the two cases, see August
Reinisch, Necessity in International Arbitration—An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent
ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina, 3 TRANSNATI’L DISP.
MGMT. (2006); Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to
Handle Economic Crises, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 265, 277–84 (2007).
362. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 357 (asking if, “in the context of Article 25 of the Articles
on State Responsibility [the necessity defense], the act in question does not seriously impair an
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists”); see also Sempra
Award, supra note 29, ¶ 376 (“The Treaty provision is inseparable from the customary law standard.”).
363. Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 333.
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sity would…be precluded.”364 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal considers
Article XI of the BIT and the state of necessity in customary international law independently and does not impose the requirements of customary international law on Argentina’s invocation of the treaty-based
NPM clause. The LG&E Tribunal notes:
The concept of excusing a State for the responsibility for violation of its international obligations during what is called a “state
of necessity” or “state of emergency” also exists in international
law. While the Tribunal considers that the protections afforded
by Article XI have been triggered in this case, and are sufficient
to excuse Argentina’s liability, the Tribunal recognizes that satisfaction of the state of necessity standard as it exists in international law (reflected in Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on
State Responsibility) supports the Tribunal’s conclusion.365
Although the fact that the customary defense of necessity has been satisfied may support the LG&E Tribunal’s findings, the successful invocation of the NPM clause is based on a separate test and distinct evidence,
independent from the customary defense of necessity itself. For the
LG&E Tribunal, the NPM clause is a separate risk allocation device and
an explicit part of the bargain in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, providing the
states-parties greater protections than would have been available in customary law. For the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals, in contrast, the
NPM clause appears to be merely a textual restatement of the preexisting customary defense of necessity.
As both a legal and policy matter, the approach taken by the LG&E
Tribunal is far more appropriate. Legally, reading the customary defense of necessity into the NPM clause both violates the Vienna Convention rule of lex specialis and the canonical rule that each treaty provision must be given effect.366 As a matter of policy, the incorporation
of the necessity defense into the NPM clause fails to recognize the actual understandings of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, whereby in exchange for
granting investors greater protections than would have been available in
customary law, the states also sought to preserve for themselves greater
freedom of action through the NPM clause than would have been available in customary international law. The flawed approach of the CMS
364. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶¶ 353, 358. The CMS tribunal did analyze Article XI of the
treaty independently of the customary defense of necessity, but read the customary law standards
for invoking necessity back into its analysis of the NPM clause. Id. ¶¶ 353–58
365. LG&E Award, supra note 30, ¶ 245.
366. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
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Tribunal in conflating customary and treaty law is suggested by the decision of the Annulment Committee in the CMS case. While the Annulment Committee found that it lacked the power under the limited review
provisions of the ICSID Convention to overturn the decision, it found
that the “errors made by the Tribunal could have had a decisive impact
on the operative part of the Award. As admitted by CMS, the Tribunal
gave an erroneous interpretation of Article XI.”367
A second area of significant disagreement between tribunals is the
level of deference they accord Argentina’s invocation of the NPM
clause. While all the tribunals agree the clause is not self-judging, the
CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals apply a far more rigorous standard
to the nexus requirement under the NPM clause, importing the customary law requirements of necessity and requiring Argentina to show that
the actions taken were the only ones available to the government. Although the Sempra Tribunal recognizes that “it is not the task of the tribunal to substitute its view for the government’s choices,” its interpretation of the “only available means” requirement essentially removes all
policy responses from the government simply by finding that there were
more than one possible response to the crisis.368 In contrast, the LG&E
Tribunal takes an approach somewhat closer to the margin of appreciation doctrine we advocate above. The Tribunal suggests, for example,
that were it “to conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina’s
determination would be subject to a good faith review anyway, which
does not significantly differ from the substantive analysis presented
here.”369 In essence, then, the LG&E Tribunal reduces the level of scrutiny of Argentina’s invocation of Article XI down to something close to
a good faith review and appears to afford Argentina a margin of appreciation in which to make its own determinations of the appropriate responses to the crisis. For example, the LG&E Tribunal found:
Certainly, the conditions in Argentina in December 2001 called
for immediate, decisive action to restore civil order and stop the
economic decline.…Article XI refers to situations in which a
State has no choice but to act. A State may have several re-

367. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 31, ¶ 135.
368. Sempra Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 350–51. This approach fails to give the government
any policy flexibility and does not recognize that some policy options may be more or less effective in responding to the crisis.
369. LG&E Award, supra note 29, ¶ 214.
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sponses at its disposal to maintain public order or protect its essential security interests.370
This approach recognizes the subjective nature of certain permissible
objectives and that states, rather than tribunals, are in the best position
to craft appropriate responses to emergency situations.
A third area of substantive disagreement between the tribunals is the
question of compensation. While the CMS Tribunal did not find either
the requirements of necessity in customary international law or the standards of the NPM clause met, it suggested that neither provision would,
even if properly invoked, excuse the state invoking the clause of liability and the duty to pay compensation.371 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal
opined that “Article XI establishes the state of necessity as a ground for
exclusion from wrongfulness of an act of the State, and therefore, the
State is exempted from liability.”372 As a consequence, the LG&E Tribunal found that Argentina was not liable for damages to investors during the period of emergency.373 Given that the very purpose of the NPM
clause was to guarantee states greater freedom of action in the face of
extraordinary circumstances in exchange for enhanced protections for
investors, the approach taken by the LG&E Tribunal appears to far better reflect the bargain inherent in NPM clauses. If such clauses were not
intended to prevent liability, they would not in fact serve the purpose of
guaranteeing greater freedom of action to states in cases of emergency.

B.

Explaining the Differences: The Function of NPM Clauses

While the holdings of the four tribunals cannot be reconciled, the
contradictory awards can be explained by the tribunals’ different understandings of the function performed by NPM clauses and the nature of
the bargain inherent in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Each of the tribunals
appreciates that the U.S.-Argentina BIT represents a bargain between
the two contracting states. In the CMS case, the Tribunal notes that “[i]t
370. Id. ¶¶ 238–39.
371. The CMS Tribunal observed, for example, that “the plea of state of necessity may preclude the wrongfulness of an act, but it does not exclude the duty to compensate the owner of the
right which had been sacrificed.” Hence, “in the absence of agreement between the parties the
duty of the tribunal in these cases is to determine the compensation due.” CMS Award, supra
note 16, ¶¶ 388, 394.
372. LG&E Award, supra note 30, ¶ 261.
373. Id. ¶ 266 (“Based on the analysis of the state of necessity, the Tribunal concludes that,
first, said state started on December 1, 2001 and ended on April 26, 2003; second, during that
period Argentina is exempt of responsibility, and accordingly, the Claimants should bear the consequences of the measures taken by the host State.”).
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must also be kept in mind that the scope of a given bilateral treaty, such
as this, should normally be understood and interpreted as attending to
the concerns of both parties.” If the treaty were interpreted otherwise,
“it could well result in unbalanced understanding of Article XI.”374
Similarly, the LG&E Tribunal notes that “[t]he provisions included in
the international treaty are to be interpreted in conformity with the interpretation given and agreed upon by both parties at the time of its signature.”375 The Enron Tribunal notes that “what is relevant is the intention the parties had in signing the treaty.”376 In approaching the NPM
clause, then, each tribunal engages in a formal analysis of the text of the
provision, but claims to do so with reference to the intent of the parties
and, at least implicitly, to the bargains underlying the treaties.
Yet, the Tribunals’ awards reflect very different understandings of
the particular function of the NPM clause intended by the United States
and Argentina. For the CMS Tribunal, the bargain inherent in the BIT is
one of investor protection and, hence, the NPM clause has a minimal
function that does not significantly limit investor protection. As the Tribunal observed, “[t]he Treaty in this case is clearly designed to protect
investments at a time of economic difficulties or other circumstances
leading to the adoption of adverse measures by the Government.”377
Further, the CMS Tribunal observed that “[i]f the Treaty was made to
protect investors it must be assumed that this is an important interest of
the States parties.”378 The NPM clause is thus seen as merely a restatement of the limited preexisting necessity defense. Similarly, the Enron
Tribunal finds that the treaty is intended to “apply in situations of economic difficulty and hardship that require the protection of the internationally guaranteed rights of the beneficiaries.”379 Hence, for the Enron
Tribunal, a “restrictive interpretation” of the NPM clause “is mandatory.”380
In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal recognizes that the treaty provides for
a balancing of interests between investor protection and state freedom of
action. That Tribunal notes that it “must decide whether the conditions
that existed in Argentina during the relevant period were such that the
State was entitled to invoke the protections included in Article XI of the
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 360.
LG&E Award, supra note 30, ¶ 213.
Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 337.
CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 354; Sempra Award, supra note 29, ¶ 373.
CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 357.
Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 331.
Id.

400

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 48:2

Treaty.”381 In essence, for the LG&E Tribunal, the NPM clause is an
explicit textual instrument to shift the costs of state action in exceptional
circumstances from states to investors.
These different understandings of the nature of the function of the
NPM clause and the background bargain behind the U.S.-Argentina BIT
guide the divergent interpretative approaches of the Tribunals. The
CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals, focusing on a bargain of investor
protection and a limited role for the NPM clause, read the customary
law requirements of necessity into the clause and restrict its applicability. The LG&E Tribunal recognizes a bargain that balances investor protections and state freedom of action. It therefore treats the NPM clause
as an essential element of the treaty that explicitly shifts costs to investors separate from the customary defense of necessity. These different
understandings of the bargain in the treaty also drive the Tribunals’ approaches to compensation. For the CMS, Enron and Sempra Tribunals,
compensation remains due, even if the NPM clause is appropriately invoked, precisely because the Tribunal sees the BIT as designed to protect investors. In contrast, for the LG&E Tribunal, the successful invocation of the NPM clause alleviates responsibility during the period of
emergency because the clause is specifically intended to balance investor protections with state freedom of action.
While the contradictory outcomes of the arbitrations can be explained
with reference to the four Tribunals’ understandings of the function of
NPM clauses, the interpretations of the NPM clause in the U.S.Argentina BIT highlight the difficult choices with respect to ascertaining state intent and the problems of interpretive shortcuts in that process. While all four tribunals claim to look to state intent in determining
the meaning of the NPM clause, none of them engage in the serious
work necessary to really determine that intent or the appropriate meaning of the NPM clause terms. This lack of interpretive rigor and the divergent awards challenge the very legitimacy of ad hoc investor-state
arbitration. Similarly, the CMS Annulment Committee’s rejection of the
legal reasoning in the CMS award underscores the interpretative difficulties and problematic jurisprudence of, at least, that tribunal. Moreover, the awards indicate the pressing need for a coherent and consistent
approach to NPM clauses, such as that advanced above, that is based on
a treaty’s text, but recognizes both the intent of states that include such
clauses and the risk allocation function they intended NPM provisions
to perform.
381. LG&E Award, supra note 30, ¶ 205.
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IX. THE SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF NPM CLAUSES
The interpretation of NPM clauses must be an individualized process
that considers the text of the clause, its context, the object and purpose
of such treaties, the travaux, and the circumstances surrounding their
conclusion. Yet, the interpretation and application of these clauses and,
particularly, the degree of deference given to their invocations by national governments, have far reaching implications for the international
legal and economic systems. These implications reach well beyond the
Argentina cases and have potentially significant consequences for the
risk allocation between states and investors, the willingness of states to
enter into international agreements, the trajectory of investment flows,
the pricing of cross-border investments, and the policy responses of
states to extraordinary events such as economic crises. In this final section, we explore these broader policy implications that arise out of the
interpretation and application of NPM clauses and suggest that both the
inclusion of NPMs in BITs and their interpretation is of considerable
importance to the future of international cooperation and the stability of
the international economic system.

A.

NPM Clauses, Risk Allocation, and Investment Pricing

Perhaps the most significant implication of the interpretation and application of NPM clauses relates to the risk allocation between states
and investors. As customary international law offers only limited investor protections, cross-border investments made under such a customary
law regime are at some risk of uncompensated impairment by host
states.382 BITs provide investors with broader guarantees for the security
of their investments by ensuring compensation and providing a forum in
which investors can pursue claims against states.383 In essence, then,
BITs shift the costs of potentially adverse state action from investors
(who would bear the costs under a customary law regime) to the host
state of inbound investments. The inclusion of an NPM clause in such a
382. Though customary international law does require compensation in the case of expropriation, investors would generally bear the costs of lesser forms of interference. For a discussion of
investor protection in customary international law, see SORNARAJAH, supra note 10; Guzman,
supra note 10, at 614.
383. BITs are often described as part of a “grand bargain” in which host states provide far
reaching guarantees as to the security of investments in hopes of increasing in–bound investment
flows. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 26, at 75; see also Yackee, supra note 26, at 10 (describing BITs as a “grand bargain”).
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BIT, in turn, reverses that risk allocation, shifting the risks and costs of
state actions that meet the nexus requirement and are taken in pursuit of
a permissible objective, back to investors. In short, NPM clauses reallocate risks to investors, creating a less favorable legal regime for investors, but giving states considerable freedom of action to respond to exceptional threats.
The interpretation of NPM clauses by arbitral tribunals also has considerable bearing on the degree to which such clauses shift risks from
states to investors. The more narrowly NPM clauses are construed and
the more arbitral tribunals engage in substantive reviews of state invocations of NPM clauses, the more those risks and costs remain with host
states, pursuant to the substantive protections of a BIT. In contrast, the
more broadly the terms of an NPM clause are construed and the more
arbitral tribunals defer to state invocations of NPM clauses, the more
those clauses will shift the risks and costs of host-state actions back to
investors. The interpretation of NPM clauses thereby governs the ultimate allocation of risks between host-states and investors with respect
to state actions taken in response to exceptional circumstances. With
present day threats posed by terrorism, financial collapse, public health
emergencies, and environmental disasters, just to name a few, this risk
allocation is likely to be of ever-greater significance.384
In an international market environment which rationally prices investment returns, the inclusion of an NPM clause in a BIT ought to result in investors demanding higher returns for investments made under
such a BIT than they would absent the NPM clause. Investors will seek
a risk premium in the form of higher returns to account for the potential
of uncompensated state actions. As a result, the host states of investments under a BIT with an NPM clause will have to pay more for capital inflows than they would absent that clause. Moreover, if investment
opportunities in such states cannot command the risk premiums investors should demand, capital flows should decline, as investors shift to
either more lucrative or safer host states for their investments. In essence, then, when states decide to include NPM clauses in their BITs,
they engage in a compromise through which they increase their own
costs of capital, but preserve for themselves greater freedom of action to
respond to extraordinary circumstances.
384. For a more detailed discussion of the security threats states face today, see G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in
the 21st Century (Final Paper of the Princeton Project on National Security, Sept. 27, 2006),
available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf.
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The interpretation of NPM clauses by arbitral tribunals should also
impact the pricing of cross-border investments. Given that the more
broadly such clauses are interpreted, the more risks shift from states to
investors, broader interpretations of NPM clauses ought to increase the
costs of capital for states as investors perceive greater potential for uncompensated state-interference with their investments. In contrast, narrow interpretations of NPM clauses that minimize the risk-shifting function of such clauses ought to have a more mild impact on the costs of
capital as the range of state actions that will fall under the NPM clause
is diminished. Hence, even broad interpretations of NPM clauses do not
give states a free pass to interfere with foreign investments; those states
essentially pay for the right to invoke the NPM clause through the higher costs of capital they will face in the financial markets.

B.

Clauses and the Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration

The interpretation of NPM clauses often touches on the core domestic functions of the state—the preservation of security, order, or morals.
In the wake of the Argentine cases, the legitimacy of ad hoc tribunals to
regulate within these core sovereign domains of domestic governments
has been called into question. Particularly in light of the CMS Annulment Decision, which reaffirms Argentina’s obligations to pay hundreds
of millions of dollars in compensation, despite the finding of “errors”
that “could have had a decisive impact on the operative part of the
award, the legitimacy of subjecting such core state policy decisions to
ad hoc arbitration,” is questionable.385 Argentina, for example, is now
looking for a “diplomatic exit from ICSID suits.”386 Moreover, whereas
international economic law has largely been based on objective rules
that derive from treaties with identifiable ordinary meanings, NPM
clauses present arbitral tribunals with far more subjective terms, the
possibility of divergent meanings, and questions of constitutional significance. Our argument for importing the margin of appreciation doctrine from the European human rights context to international economic
law offers a potent means of resolving this legitimacy deficit. The margin of appreciation would provide arbitrators with a legal mechanism to
embrace the ambiguity of some NPM terms and to reconcile potentially
divergent understandings of other terms by varying the deference shown
to a state’s own invocation of an NPM clause. Significantly, the use of
385. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 31, ¶¶ 135–36.
386. Shane Romig, Argentina Seeks Diplomatic Exit from ICSID Suits, DOW JONES
NEWSWIRES, Oct. 15, 2007.
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the margin of appreciation as an interpretive tool might well preserve
the legitimacy of the ad hoc arbitral system387 by granting states space
to develop and implement the policies they deem necessary and focusing the tribunal on its supervisory role. Just as the European Court of
Human Rights was able to enhance its legitimacy and credibility
through the use of the margin of appreciation,388 ad hoc tribunals may
be able to rescue their credibility by borrowing from the ECtHR.
The choice of the standard with which to review a state’s invocation
of an NPM clause will often be determinative of the risk allocation between states and investors for actions taken in extraordinary circumstances. Where states chose to specify explicitly or implicitly a selfjudging NPM clause, they effectively preserve for themselves the right
to determine, subject to the confines of good faith, whether the clause
applies to a given action and whether the state or investors will bear the
cost of that action. As BITs are bilateral agreements between two states,
the states are free to choose any risk allocation they agree upon, including one that places a greater burden on investors, as long as both states
understood that risk allocation when they drafted the treaty. Even if
such a self-judging NPM clause limits protections for investors, it is a
perfectly legitimate choice states may make in structuring their bilateral
relations. Where states have made such a choice, investors ought to recognize their more limited protections and act accordingly. Similarly, arbitral tribunals ought to give effect to the intent of state parties to preserve for themselves the determination of risk allocation by applying a
good-faith review.
In contrast, where NPM clauses are silent as to the appropriate standard of review and there is no evidence of a shared understanding that
the clause was self-judging, the application of the margin of appreciation would serve an important balancing function, simultaneously preserving state freedom of action in exceptional circumstances and ensuring a level of investor protection commensurate with the terms states
chose to include in their NPM clauses. With respect to technical, objective NPM terms, the narrow margin of appreciation will constrain a
state’s invocation of the NPM clause. In such cases, the NPM clause
will allocate costs to investors when a state’s actions meet those technical standards and allocate those costs to the state when its actions do not
387. The legitimacy of this system has been recently called into question as ad hoc arbitral
tribunals have sought to hold states liable for policy decisions that fall within the core sovereign
competencies of the state and have done so inconsistently. See generally Franck, supra note 32.
388. Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 145, at 317-318.

2008]

INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES

405

conform to the objective terms of the NPM clause. With respect to subjective or broad NPM terms or where the two states’ understandings of
those terms are difficult to reconcile, a wider margin of appreciation
gives somewhat more deference to a state’s invocation of the clause,
while retaining a supervisory review that ensures protections for investors.
For states considering whether or not to provide investment protection through BITs or other treaty instruments, both the drafting and interpretation of NPM clauses will impact their willingness to enter into
such agreements and the depth of interstate cooperation. Despite the
perceived benefits of BITs in terms of increased inbound investment,389
many states are unwilling to allow ad hoc tribunals to review core state
policies or to compensate investors for the potentially significant costs
that may result from a state’s response to an emergency. Including NPM
clauses in BITs provides states with a legal mechanism to regulate and
control these risks, thereby reducing the sovereignty costs of cooperation. While treaties with NPM clauses may provide fewer guarantees for
investors in exceptional circumstances, states may be more willing to
enter into agreements that control risks through NPM clauses. However,
if arbitral tribunals interpret NPM clauses so narrowly as to deprive
states of a legal mechanism to reallocate risks in exceptional circumstances, some states may continue to avoid entering into BIT agreements and others may refuse to renew existing treaties when they expire. For states that do seek to enter into BITs with NPM clauses, a
coherent approach to NPM interpretation by arbitral tribunals, perhaps
through the framework we offer above, will help ensure that states are
able to draft clauses that memorialize their preferred risk-allocation.
An interpretive approach based around the margin of appreciation has
the important benefit of helping structure the expectations of all actors
in the international investment system. First, it gives the states that draft
BITs the ability to choose between objective, technical NPM terms,
which will generate a relatively narrow margin of appreciation and
broader, subjective terms, which will be result in a wider margin of appreciation. It puts investors on notice that an NPM clause will be interpreted with reference to the margin of appreciation implied by its terms
and thereby allow investors to structure their investments based on the
likely risks they face under the given terms of an NPM clause. For arbi389. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 26. Even these perceived benefits have been called
into question with new evidence suggesting that BITs may not actually alter cross-border investment flows. See Tobin & Ackerman, supra note 26.
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trators, the margin of appreciation approach offers a tractable way to
balance between the competing interests of investor protection and state
freedom of action in an NPM clause. Likewise, it gives arbitrators a way
of reconciling the different meanings of a given term in an NPM clause,
affording a broader margin where states lack a shared understanding.

C.

Non-Precluded Measures Clauses and Investor Expectations

Despite the clear legitimacy benefits of the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine to interpret NPM clauses, investors may perceive the
application of a margin of appreciation or the determination that NPM
clauses are self-judging as detrimental to their interests. Admittedly, the
process of treaty interpretation advanced herein is likely to be more favorable to states, at least on the surface, than it is to investors. As BITs
are treaties between states parties, primary analysis must focus on the
actual bargain struck by the states parties themselves. BITs may, however, confer rights on individuals and those rights ought to be respected
in the process of treaty interpretation and application. The analysis with
respect to the scope of deference of BIT interpretation in no way undermines the rights such treaties confer on individuals. Rather, it provides a mechanism for accurately ascertaining the nature and breadth of
rights states have chosen to grant to individuals through such treaties.
Investors may also have legitimate expectations as to how their investments will be treated under a BIT, even absent an express conferral
of rights in a treaty. In determining an appropriate scope of deference
for the interpretation of an NPM clause term, such legitimate expectations ought to be recognized. However, in most cases investors will not
have legitimate expectations that their own views of terms such as public order or essential security will in fact be the applicable standard for
the interpretation of an NPM clause. In some cases, investors may be
able to claim a legitimate expectation that a non-expressly self-judging
NPM clause will not subsequently be treated as self-judging. This could
well be the case, for example, if the evidence that the states parties understood a non-expressly self-judging NPM clause as self-judging was
kept secret or classified until it was raised in a subsequent arbitral proceeding. With respect to the U.S. BIT program, however, the U.S. interpretation of NPM clauses as self-judging has been so consistent, open,
and notorious since 1984, that any investor expectations that such clauses were not self-judging cannot be legitimate and should not be given
significant weight by arbitral tribunals.
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While investors may find in the short run that the greater deference to
state invocations of NPM clauses that flows from the use of the margin
of appreciation reduces their investment security, this approach, in fact,
best represents the actual guarantees states provide to investors through
BIT instruments. Moreover, investors are best placed to respond to the
actual legal protections offered by particular BIT instruments and structure their longer-term investments accordingly. For example, investors
may react to the fact that a particular BIT has a self-judging NPM
clause or that a specific state interprets its NPM clauses as self-judging
and limit their risk under that BIT by demanding higher returns from investments in such a state or by investing elsewhere. Hence, in the longer
term, states will be forced to internalize the actual costs of self-judging
NPM clauses or vague NPM terms that result in a wide margin of appreciation through the reduced investment flows or higher prices of foreign direct investment that are likely in such a legal framework.

D.

NPM Clauses, Modern Threats, and Global Stability

In the present world, states often face pressing and unexpected
threats, whether terrorist attacks, financial crises or natural disasters. As
states craft policy responses to these threats they will have to consider
their BIT obligations and any cost and risk shifting that may result from
NPM clauses. If states bear the full costs of harms to investors caused
by a response to a crisis, their available policy options may be constrained. Where, as is the case with Argentina, the total cost of BIT
claims based on harms to investors could top $80 billion, some states
may simply not be able to afford their preferred policy in response to a
crisis. Instead they may be forced to follow a sub-optimal policy that
may or may not achieve an equally desirable outcome. Where states include NPM clauses and tribunals give effect to those clauses, the costs
of host-state action will shift to investors, perhaps allowing the state to
pursue its preferred policy response. While, at least in the short term,
this flexibility may burden investors, in the context of present-day global threats it is fully understandable and, perhaps even wise, for states to
preserve for themselves the right to craft preferred policy responses to
pressing threats.
The use of a margin of appreciation by arbitral tribunals will ensure
states the leeway implied by NPM clause terms to undertake preferred
policy options in response to international crises. The margin of appreciation would allow states to pursue their preferred policy solutions, but
would require them to justify their choices to an international tribunal
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performing a supervisory function. This would, in turn, require states
both to produce reasoned explanations for why it was necessary to compromise investor interests and might result in states internalizing the legal rules governing international investments as part of their own deliberative process.390
Similarly, the interpretation and application of NPM clauses may
prove important to recovery from international financial crises and the
development of a sovereign bankruptcy mechanism. Discussion of financial crises and various proposals from both academe and the International Monetary Fund for a sovereign bankruptcy system have largely
focused on sovereign debt and the collective action problems associated
with defuse bondholders.391 The Argentine case, however, highlights the
fact that financial collapses may give rise to financial claims by investors under a state’s BITs. Even if a state is able to negotiate an advantageous “hair cut” with debt-holders, it can still face directly enforceable
liabilities under its BIT obligations.392 NPM clauses may thus prove to
be an essential, if heretofore overlooked, element of a state’s postconflict economic recovery. States may chose to draft NPM clauses that
explicitly include responses to economic crises among permissible objectives and arbitral tribunals may interpret terms such as “essential security” to include catastrophic economic collapse. In such cases, states
may be relieved of the obligations they would otherwise face under a
BIT, thereby facilitating post-crisis recovery. Moreover, any formal sovereign bankruptcy mechanism that may emerge will have to address
investment liability under BITs as well as ordinary debt liabilities. Ensuring that risks and costs of a response to an economic collapse shift
390. For a discussion of how such internalization of norms operates in the area of human
rights law, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and Human
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L. J. 621 (2004).
391. The primary proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism was authored by
Anne O. Krueger of the International Monetary Fund. See ANNE O. KRUEGER, A NEW
APPROACH
TO
SOVEREIGN
DEBT
RESTRUCTURING
(2002),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/index.htm. Her proposal, however, only addresses debt restructuring and not investment arbitration. For academic commentary and alternative approaches, see Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177 (2005); Lee C. Bucheit &
Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2002); and Daniel K.
Tarullo, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Role of the IMF in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6
CHI. J. INT’L L. 287 (2005).
392. Sovereign debt litigation and BIT investment arbitration have become recently intertwined in a case in which Italian bondholders have initiated ICSID arbitral proceedings against
Argentina. For a discussion of this, see Jilted Argentine Bondholders Appeal to World Bank in
Final Throw of the Dice, CREDIT MAGAZINE, Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://atfa.org/cgi–
data/news/files/32.shtml.
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from states that include NPM clauses in their BITs to investors will be
an important part of any such sovereign bankruptcy mechanism.

X.

CONCLUSION

The way states choose to allocate risks in exceptional circumstances
has important and far-reaching consequences. In many cases, the risk
allocation performed by NPM clauses can be highly beneficial to states,
investors, and, perhaps, the international economic system more generally. Investors can often account for increased risks they face under
NPM clauses through investment strategies and the pricing of their investments. Given the risk allocation performed by NPM clauses, however, all parties to the international investment system must structure
their behavior around relatively clear legal rules. In order for them to do
so, arbitral tribunals need to develop a consistent and coherent approach
to such clauses. Ultimately, however, each NPM clause will have to be
interpreted on its own terms and in light of the risk allocation intended
by the parties to that treaty. Arbitral tribunals must undertake such interpretation with extraordinary care and diligence.
We have sought to explore some of those terms and their meanings
here. As the system continues to develop, states will need to draft treaties that put all parties on notice of the risk allocation being performed
by the particular NPM clause in question. Arbitral tribunals will have to
develop consistent interpretive approaches. Investors will have to structure their investments accordingly. As we have argued, the margin of
appreciation may provide the best legal mechanism for arbitral review
that preserves for states the freedom of action to respond to crises that
they intended when drafting NPM clauses, yet maintains the supervisory
authority of an arbitral tribunal to hold states liable when their policies
exceed the margin of appreciation derived from the terms of the treaty
itself.
As arbitral tribunals are confronted with NPM clauses in investorstate disputes, they will have to develop both a framework for interpreting such clauses and methodologies for reconciling the inherent subjectivity and potentially divergent understandings of their terms. The contradictory decisions in the four recently decided cases against Argentina
and the CMS Annulment Decision noted above highlight the urgent need
for a harmonized approach that is legally and theoretically justifiable.
The framework we offered in Part V provides such a coherent approach
for the interpretation of NPM clauses that is grounded in the Vienna
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Convention, yet also recognizes the intent of states parties in entering
into BITs. More broadly, the challenges presented by the interpretation
of NPM clauses must serve as a reminder of the urgent need for diligent
and serious interpretation of treaty terms. Reliance on interpretive shortcuts or inappropriate invocation of legal doctrines from other areas of
international law is dangerous and may further erode the legitimacy of
an already fragile investor-state arbitral system. Whatever the treaty
clause in question, even ad hoc tribunals must undertake the diligent
process of treaty interpretation called for by the Vienna Convention and
deserved by investors and states alike.

